Expected productivity-based risk analysis in conceptual design : with application to the Terrestrial Planet Finder Interferometer mission by Wertz, Julie (Julie Ann), 1978-
Expected Productivity-Based Risk Analysis in Conceptual Design:
With Application to the Terrestrial Planet Finder Interferometer Mission
by
Julie A. Wertz
S.B. Aeronautics & Astronautics
Maqr.hus1etts Tnqtitlte nf Technnlnov_ 2000
MASSACHUSEri
vr I tuLN
,.__ _
NSTITEi
GY
. ·I
LIRAR 
LIBRR1
S.M. Aeronautics & Astronautics . "
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTORATE OF PHILOSOPHY IN AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
FEBRUARY 2006
© Massachusetts Institute of Technologyv 2005. All rights reserved
MASSACHUSET1
OF TECHN
JUL 10
LIBRAi
Signature of the Author: - -
Departmdt of Aeronautics and A6nautics
,/ December 30, 2005,
Certified by: Av
Professor David W. Miller
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
T {Isis Supervisor
Certified by:
Poessor Jdhn"J. Deyst
Departmqan of Aeronautics 9nd Astronputics
Certified by:
: ,Dr. Raymond J. Sedwick
Department /.ronautcsad Avstronautics
Certified by: _
Dr. Hamid Habib-Agahi
Jef:Plopulsion Laboratory
Accepted by:
Jaime Peraire
Profesr of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Chair, Committee on Graduate Students
~ .VcHJvE
OLOGY
RIES
II I
l
...
Si
)U(
I~·I·UUUIVLIHVV·LU I·~YII -_ - C'.' , - - -VV
- .I I . . 1 
p

Expected Productivity-Based Risk Analysis in Conceptual Design: With
Application to the Terrestrial Planet Finder Interferometer Mission
by
Julie A Wertz
Submitted to the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
on November 1 st 2005, in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctorate of Philosophy
Abstract
During the design process, risk is mentioned often, but, due to the lack of a quantitative
parameter that engineers can understand and trade, infrequently impacts major design
decisions. The definition of risk includes two elements - probability and impact. As a
result of heritage techniques used in the nuclear industry, risk assessment in the aerospace
industry is usually purely reliability based, and is calculated as the probability of a failure
occurring before the end of the design lifetime. While this definition of risk makes sense
if all failures result in the same impact, for many non safety-critical systems, the impact
of failures may vary, including variance by when a failure occurs. While current risk
assessment techniques answer the question "What is the probability of failure?", the true
question that needs to be answered for many missions is "How much return can be
expected?" Depending on the question answered, the relative ranking of risk items may
be different - leading to different risk mitigation investment decisions. Consequently, to
complete an accurate risk assessment, it is important to combine system performance and
reliability, and model the probabilistic nature of the expected value of the total system
productivity. This expected value is defined as the expected productivity.
While the expected productivity is easy to calculate for simple systems, it is more
complex if a system has a path-dependant productivity function, as is the case with many
aerospace systems. In these systems, the productivity in each state depends on the
previous states of the system. An approach, called Expected Productivity Risk Analysis
(EPRA), has been developed to model the systems described above in an efficient manner
by finding the expected path, and then find the expected productivity given that path.
EPRA has been tested against conventional Monte Carlo simulations with excellent
results that consistently fall within the 95% confidence interval of the Monte Carlo
results, while completing the simulation up to 275 times faster. The EPRA approach has
been applied to two case-studies, to demonstrate the importance of using expected
productivity in a trade study for a real mission, the Terrestrial Planet Finder
Interferometer.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
1.1 Motivation
There is a clear need to conduct architectural trades early in the lifetime of a
mission to identify those designs that best meet the needs of stakeholders. Typically,
these architectural trades evaluate mission performance as a function of a set of design
parameters that are assumed to be invariant over the lifetime of a mission. In reality, for
many aerospace systems, degrading failures and emergent properties alter system
parameters during the course of a mission, thus impacting overall system performance
and efficiency. As systems become more complex, engineering judgment is no longer
sufficient to understand how the failures of different components in the system, at
different points in time, will affect the total system performance. Thus, to complete an
accurate risk assessment, it is important to bring together the fields of system
performance modeling and reliability modeling in order to model these effects and
determine the overall expected system performance, which can then be used in
architectural trade studies.
As a result of heritage to techniques used in the nuclear industry [Apostolakis &
Michal, 2000], risk assessment in the aerospace industry is almost always purely
reliability based. Risk is calculated as the probability of a failure occurring before the
end of the lifetime. This type of assessment makes an enormous amount of sense for a
safety-critical system, such as any system in the nuclear industry or any manned space
flight system. In safety-critical systems the impact of a critical failure at any point in the
mission lifetime is the same - loss of human life and mission failure. For non safety-
critical systems, such as unmanned missions, the impact of a critical failure depends on
when the failure occurs. For most unmanned missions, a critical failure that occurs at the
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very end of the mission results in the successful return of the majority of data and
therefore nearly complete mission success. A critical failure that occurs at the very
beginning of the mission results in little to no scientific data being returned and therefore
nearly complete mission failure. This difference between the impacts of failures
depending on when the failure occurs is ignored using current risk assessment techniques,
such as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) [Paulos, 2005]. The definition of risk is the
combination of the probability of a negative event occurring and the impact of that event.
Therefore, these current risk assessment techniques are actually pure reliability analyses,
and not risk analyses, since varying impacts are not considered for non safety-critical
systems. While many current risk assessment techniques are answering the question
"What is the probability of failure by the end of life?," the true question that needs to be
answered for unmanned missions is "How much return, scientific or otherwise, can be
expected by the end of the mission design lifetime?" It has been shown that depending
on which question is answered, the relative ranking of multiple risk items may be
different - leading to different risk mitigation investment decisions. Consequently, the
capability to model the probabilistic nature of the expected value of the total system
productivity, accounting for the possibility of failures throughout time, is needed.
Throughout this report the expected value of the system productivity is called the
expected productivity.
In addition to being one of the only risk assessment techniques that truly accounts
for all aspects of both probability and impact, expected productivity analysis has many
other advantages over current risk assessment techniques. During the design process, risk
is often mentioned, but infrequently actually impacts major design decisions.
Throughout this discussion a design decision is a decision regarding any level of the
design process, from detailed component level decisions to high-level architectural level
decisions. One of the main reasons why risk infrequently impacts major design decisions
is that risk is considered a qualitative parameter. One design may be judged as "high"
risk while another is judged to be "medium" risk, but since a design team member or
engineer does not have a clear understanding of what that means, those risk levels rarely
impact the choice of one design over another. To be effectively used as a parameter to
search a trade-space and make design decisions, it is important to bring risk into the
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design process as a quantitative parameter that engineers can understand and trade. One
parameter that is almost always used when making design decisions is the productivity of
a design. The productivity metric will vary from mission to mission, such as the number
of star systems imaged for observatories, or the number of rocks tested for in-situ Mars
missions, but it is always a parameter that directly represents to the engineers how well
the design is matching the requirements and scientific goals of the mission. If instead of
using simple productivity it were possible to examine the expected value of the
productivity, defined as the expected productivity, taking into account failures and risk
items, the concept of risk could be brought into the design process in a very quantitative
way. The engineers could then judge one design from another based on the expected
number of rocks each will test or the expected number of stellar systems each will
observe. This would turn risk into a parameter that is not only quantitative, but also one
that engineers and design team members can inherently understand and trade.
In addition to risk being considered a qualitative parameter, risk assessment in the
early phases of a mission is often considered unnecessary. In the aerospace industry, it is
too often assumed that not using risk analysis to facilitate design decisions in the early
phases of design is acceptable because a failure of any kind will automatically lead to a
complete system failure and the failure of the whole mission. While some effort is given
to minimizing these failures or risks through additional testing or added redundancy to
critical systems, these efforts are all carried out at the end of the design process. The
nearly finalized design is examined for weakness and critical single-point failures and
these concerns are addressed late in the design process. Any failure that does not lead to
the loss of the mission is considered too unlikely of a scenario to be considered in the
early design phase of the mission. Failures that result in reduced productivity but not a
complete loss of the mission, known as degraded state failures, do occur on spaceflight
systems however, and are more common among these systems than most engineers
perceive. A relatively small effort to evaluate degraded states and partial failures during
the early phases of the design process could lead to missions that are designed to degrade
gracefully. Design decisions can and should be affected by the inherent risk or
susceptibility to failures that one design, architecture, or resource allocation strategy has
over another, including the ability or inability to degrade gracefully.
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Several past missions have benefited from a failure resulting in a degraded state
as opposed to a complete system failure. As discussed above, these types of failures are
often seen as too unlikely of a scenario to plan for during the early design phases;
however, the following examples show that they do occur and are worth considering.
One of the most famous and widely recognized degraded state failures occurred
on the Galileo spacecraft en-route to Jupiter. Galileo, launched on October 18, 1989, was
an orbiter mission to Jupiter. After the first Earth fly-by on the way to Jupiter, the
mission team attempted to open the high-gain antenna that was meant to relay scientific
information and engineering telemetry from deep space back to the scientists on Earth.
Unexpected friction in several of the ribs caused the antenna to deploy only partially,
causing a complete failure of the high-gain antenna. [JPL, Galileo, 2005] Many
engineers would have assumed that the complete loss of the high-gain antenna would
have resulted in a complete mission failure, since the high-gain antenna is the principle
route for receiving science data. In light of the failure, however, mission engineers
worked to develop new flight and ground software and NASA's Deep Space Network
(DSN) was enhanced to allow science data to be returned at a lower rate through the low-
gain antenna. All primary mission data was returned and the mission has been
considered a great success. It should be noted that while it was possible to save the
mission after this failure, it did take the mission engineers three years to fully restore the
communications capability. If a contingency plan for a high-gain antenna failure had
been developed, this down time could have been dramatically reduced. Nonetheless, the
team was able to return the mission to almost complete functionality, even after a major
failure.
A second, more recent, example of what appeared to be a catastrophic failure, that
eventually led to the completion of almost all minimum-mission requirements, occurred
on September 8, 2004, when the Genesis solar sample return capsule crashed into the
Utah desert. Genesis collected solar wind samples for three years and was returning
those samples to Earth. The parachutes on the sample canister did not deploy and the
canister impacted the Earth at 311 kilometers per hour. The container was breached and
the capsule buried into the ground. Contingency planning had laid forth exact procedures
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and plans for how to deal with the samples in this situation. The capsule was recovered
quickly and moved to a clean room, reducing the risk of further contamination.
According to NASA officials, nearly 100% of the mission samples were recovered and
the science team believes it will be able to complete nearly all of the primary science
objectives [JPL, Genesis, 2005].
Neither the Galileo nor Genesis missions were designed to function under the
failure conditions that occurred. In fact, it is unclear if any design improvements could
have, or should have, been built into the mission designs to account for these scenarios.
Both of these cases, however, show that scenarios in which a major failure occurs can
still be very valuable as long as science and mission data are still salvageable. In both
cases what initially appeared to be a mission failure, a loss of millions of dollars, and a
public relations disaster for NASA, turned into a significant amount of scientific value
and a public perception of a mission success with an anomaly. While it is too early to
judge how Genesis will be perceived by NASA management and the public in the future,
years after the failure on the Galileo mission this near disaster is often completely
overlooked when discussing this historic mission and all that it accomplished, and
Galileo is often given as an example of one of the great NASA missions.
In addition to the historical examples of missions that have resulted in degraded
states, it is clear that as future systems become more complex, the possibility for
degraded states increases. Examples of this include distributed and modular systems.
The nature of these types of systems will lead to many more degraded, yet highly
functional, states. While every mission team would hate to see any kind of anomaly occur
on their mission, these examples show the power of partial functionality and degraded
states, and provide excellent motivation for ensuring that, within reason and within the
scope of other trades, graceful degradation should play a role in design decisions.
While the previous discussion has shown many strong benefits to using expected
productivity as a risk metric, for specific types of systems the calculations involved can
be complicated. In previous expected productivity modeling work [Wertz, 2002], the
productivity of the system depended only on the current functional state of the system.
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The productivity was neither time nor path dependent. The functional state of the system
itself can often be assumed to be dependant only on the previous state of the system,
making it possible to calculate the probability of being in each functional state through
time using straightforward Markov models and analysis [Wertz, 2002]. With the
additional restriction that the productivity be neither time nor path-dependant, the
expected productivity can be calculated as the constant productivity in each state
multiplied by the probability of being in that state throughout time and summed over all
times and states. While assuming the productivity is path-independent greatly simplifies
calculations, it is an invalid assumption for many real life systems. As an example, for
this to hold true for observatories, all stars would need to take the same amount of time to
observe, and therefore need to be the same in terms of all stellar parameters, including
brightness and distance from the Earth. In reality, the stars that TPF-I will observe will
vary and will have a wide range of values for stellar parameters such as distance from
Earth and brightness. Therefore, the time it takes to survey or observe a particular star
system will depend not only on the state of the instrument, but also on the particular
characteristics of the star system. This same path-dependant productivity situation is true
for any system that is acting on a list of objects or actions that vary in some way and will
therefore vary in the time required to complete each.
Nearly all space missions have path-dependant productivities. The time required
to take a sample of a rock will depend on the material properties of the rock, and the time
required to send a transmission will depend on the size and complexity of the data.
Therefore, it is not valid to multiply a constant productivity value for each state by the
probability that the system is in that state for each time-step. Instead, the productivity in
each state depends on which action in the list the system is executing at that time, which,
in turn, depends on the amount of time the previous actions took, and therefore depends
on the previous states of the system. The system itself is still a Markov system, since the
current state of the system depends only on the previous state. The productivity,
however, is now time and path-dependent, making the calculation of the expected
productivity much more complicated.
Introduction and Motivation 25
While Monte Carlo simulations can capture the effect of path-dependant
productivities, these simulations take a long time to run and are very inefficient,
especially when utilizing complicated performance functions. This inefficiency is
particularly harmful when broad architecture trade-spaces are being explored and the
number of designs to be analyzed is very large. Thus, a more time and effort saving
approach would improve both the accuracy and efficiency of these modeling efforts.
1.2 Background and Literature Search
1.2.1 State of the Art
While the previous section discussed the benefits and complications of using
expected productivity analysis as a risk tool, this section will discuss the state-of-the-art
methods of risk analysis in the aerospace industry, as well as other current research areas
in the field of risk analysis. The state-of-the-art risk processes for the aerospace industry
can be broken into two main categories - qualitative continuous risk management and
quantitative risk analysis. Continuous Risk Management (CRM) involves collecting,
monitoring, and controlling the risks that face a program or project in a qualitative way
[JPL, 2003]. According to the NASA Procedures and Guidelines, NPG 7120.5B, NASA
programs and projects should use the following guideline:
"The Program or Project Manager applies continuous risk management
principles as a decision making tool which enables programmatic and
technical success. Decisions are supported by a disciplined process,
including the identification, assessment, mitigation, and disposition of
risks throughout the life cycle. The entire team assesses risk early in
formulation, and throughout the life cycle." [JPL, 2003]
Risk management involves six steps - identify, analyze, plan, track, control, and
document and communicate. The process involved in all six steps is to be documented in
the Risk Management Plan. Risks are identified and captured on a risk information sheet
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and kept in a risk database. Multiple methods are provided by the JPL Project Risk
Management Workshop to identify potential risks including checklists, lessons learned
databases, fault tree analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, or probabilistic risk
assessment. Once identified, risks can be analyzed. Analysis involves assigning either
qualitative or quantitative values to the probability and impact of each risk item. For
CRM, NASA focuses on a five-level qualitative analysis - very high, high, moderate,
low, and very low. The combination of probability and impact leads to fever charts to
identify those risks that are most important. Once analysis is complete, the process of
planning begins. Planning activities include assigning responsibility, determining the
approach, and defining the scope and actions required for each risk item. This may
include assigning reserves or margins to resources, adding redundancy, or continued
study among other options. Tracking the risk items then involves collecting the planned
activities, evaluating the activities and their results, and reporting on the status. Finally,
controlling the risks involves the overall execution of the risk mitigation plan and
evaluating the results gathered in the tracking stage [JPL, 2003].
In addition to qualitative risk assessment, there are some state-of-the-art
quantitative methods of risk analysis used in the aerospace industry. For NASA, the
state-of-the-art quantitative risk analysis process is Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).
According to Todd Paulos, a PRA expert with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), PRA
is:
· "A structured, disciplined approach to analyzing system risk.
. An investigation into the responses of a system to perturbations or
deviations from its normal operation or environment.
... A system simulation of how a system acts when something goes
wrong." [Paulos, 2005]
A PRA is basically a quantifiable fault tree and event tree analysis. The systems engineer
identifies major events that could affect the state of the system. These events are then
placed in an event tree. Following each path through the event tree produces one
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sequence of events and results in one of a set of pre-determined end-states. The most
common end-states are "ok" and "failed." While other end states can be included, each
sequence needs to be laid out and assigned an end state, so a large number of end-state
possibilities will lead to a very complicated and tedious analysis. The next step is to
create fault trees for each event. These fault trees combine basic events using "and/or"
gates among other logic to find the probability of each event in the event tree occurring.
The probability of each end-state occurring can then be calculated by working through
the logic in the fault and event trees and using the probabilities of the basic events (i.e.
the probability of a failure of a given component). Those sequences of basic events that
have the largest impact on the total probability of failure can then be identified. This
method of quantitative risk analysis is used in the nuclear industry, and has been used at
NASA since the Apollo program. Inconsistencies between the predicted probability of
success values and the actual percentage of successful missions during the Apollo era
made the PRA approach unpopular with NASA engineers and managers, however, and
the approach was not used again in the NASA main-stream for several years. The
Challenger accident brought PRA back into the forefront however, and at least 13 major
PRA studies were conducted at NASA between 1987 and 1995 [Paulos, 2005].
Currently, the NASA policy states that a full scope PRA is required for all missions with
a planetary protection requirement, such as sample returns, all missions with nuclear
payloads, all human space flight missions, all missions of high strategic importance,
including any mission in the Mars program, and all missions with high schedule
criticality. In addition, a limited scope PRA is required for any mission costing over
$1 00M and is recommended for all missions [Stamatelatos, 2002].
1.2.2 Current Research Efforts
Ongoing research efforts are continuously searching for ways to improve risk
analysis, both in the aerospace and other industries. These research efforts can be
categorized into six general categories: identifying risks, estimating and quantifying risk
values, uncertainty management, risk analysis case studies, improvements to the PRA
process, and the field of performability.
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One of the more difficult aspects of risk analysis has always been identifying the
full list of risks that affect a given program. Multiple efforts are ongoing to address this
difficulty. Tumer, Stone, and Arunajadai are working on approaches and databases to
map failure mode identification to the functional breakdown of a particular system. Since
it is difficult to identify and estimate failure modes early in the process, when the design
is not complete, Tumer et al. feel that by decomposing problems into their functional
basis, a more accurate estimate of the failure modes can be obtained even without a
complete design [Tumer & Stone, 2001] [Arunajadai et al, 2002]. Additional work is
being carried out to identify risks in the conceptual design phase in a concurrent design
environment. Meshkat and Scherbenski are currently designing, implementing, and
testing risk software and processes to be used in concurrent design environments, such as
JPL's Team X. State-of-the-art tools and processes are combined in order to achieve a
complete and accurate risk model of a conceptual system. This process has been tested
on a case study of a Mars Sample Return mission [Meshkat & Scherbenski, 2005].
Once failure modes are identified, the next step in any quantitative risk analysis
process is to estimate the values associated with each risk. Roberts has developed
procedures to accomplish just that. Roberts' process involves identifying all risk items,
using qualitative measures to first rank the risk items, and then quantitatively analyze the
most important risks. The most common method of estimating probability and impact
values for risk items is to use historical analogies and databases. Roberts has applied this
process to technical, programmatic, schedule, and cost risks [Roberts, 2001]. Wilhite et
al. have carried out additional research to quantify the risks associated with technology
development. This is a particularly difficult area to estimate in terms of risks given the
uncertainty in the nature of technology development. Wilhite et al. have developed both
a database tool to collect risks for use in historical analogies, and a tool for assessing the
impact of a failure in a technology development area on a program [Wilhite et al, 2003].
One important aspect of risk analysis is uncertainty management and propagation.
Uncertainty propagation is a very common method of determining a program's cost or
schedule risk. Additionally, uncertainty propagation in terms of technical design
parameters can lead to a robust design. It is important to distinguish between a robust
Introduction and Motivation 29
design and a design with reduced risk. Uncertainty analysis in terms of technical
variables leads to a design that is able to perform even in uncertain conditions. In other
words, a robust design is robust to uncertainty in the nominal conditions of the mission.
A low risk design is robust to failures, and deals with the impact and likelihood of off-
nominal conditions occurring. An uncertainty in what the nominal conditions are leads to
one of many ways in which off-nominal conditions could occur. Therefore, uncertainty
propagation of technical variables leads to a single, important risk factor that is then used
in the risk analysis. DeLaurentis and Mavris have provided a new method for modeling
the technical uncertainty in a design. This method is both explained and demonstrated,
using a supersonic transport case study in DeLaurentis, et al. [DeLaurentis & Mavris,
2000] Additional work both in propagating uncertainty and in visualizing the results of
uncertainty propagations has been carried out by Walton and Hastings [Walton &
Hastings, 2001]. Finally, Hassan and Crossley have used uncertainty propagation to
allow the reliability values of components to be random variables in a reliability study of
a communications satellite system [Hassan & Crossley, 2003].
In the early design phases, risk is often considered a qualitative variable.
However, some work has been done to do early, large-scale, quantitative risk studies of
conceptual designs for use in design trade-offs and decisions. An example of this is the
reliability-based analysis done by Ebbeler, Aaron, Fox, and Walker for the Space
Interferometry Mission (SIM). An Excel-based Monte Carlo tool was used to analyze
several different designs for the SIM mission from a reliability standpoint. The study
used a complex model of the SIM mission and focused in on the components that were
different between designs, as well as those components that made the largest difference
from a reliability standpoint. A large amount of effort went into capturing and modeling
dependencies in the design and in the failures. While some effort was placed on
examining the expected science return from various designs, using a constant
productivity rate, the focus of the study was on reliability, or probability of failure. It
should be noted that in the conclusions of the study the authors state, "It would be
desirable to extend this analysis to compare expected science returns for the competing
designs over the nominal 5.5 year mission." [Ebbeler et al, 2003]
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The state-of-the-art at NASA for risk assessment in the later design phases is to
complete a Probabilistic Risk Assessment, or PRA. The PRA approach has several
downsides, however, and multiple efforts are ongoing to attempt to improve the PRA
methodology. PRA was developed to determine the probability of failure by the end of a
given time, with no consideration for the dynamic aspects of the system. This is the main
drawback to using PRA in the aerospace industry and improvements to the PRA process
to include this dynamic aspect are ongoing. While the dynamic aspect of systems is
particularly important to the aerospace industry, researchers in the other industries have
determined a need to include dynamic aspects in the PRAs analyzing nuclear systems as
well. PRA is an approach to calculating a final probability of failure, and relies on
component probabilities of failure and event probabilities to be accurate. Removing the
dynamic elements of any engineering system makes determining the probabilities of
these base events more difficult.
As an example, in a nuclear system, a failure occurs only if a chain of events
occurs. Several of these events may involve human interaction or even human error.
How a human will respond, and therefore the human's probability of error, will depend
on past events. If a human operator has made a particular error in the past, he or she is
less likely to make that error again. If an action is repeated many times and the operator
gets accustomed to completing the action in a given way and then the previous chain of
events changes, such that the operator's action should change, the operator is more likely
to make an error and revert to his or her usual action. These types of dynamic responses
are not captured in a traditional PRA since no aspect of time is considered and therefore
there are no conditional probabilities based on the previous set of actions or events.
Several approaches have been developed to deal with these dynamic issues [Siu,
1994] [Devooght & Smidts, 1996] [Cojazzi, 1996]. One of the main approaches for
dealing with the dynamic aspect of systems is a phased mission system analysis and
phase-modular fault tree, developed by Meshkat, Xing, Donohue, and Ou. In the
traditional PRA approach, static fault trees, in which timing aspects are not considered,
are used to determine the final probability of failure. In phase-modular fault trees, a fault
tree is broken into independent modules. Each module is then solved using either
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traditional static fault tree approaches or dynamic Markov chain approaches. Markov
chains allow the analyst to consider dynamic aspects to the system. In addition to
requiring both static and dynamic fault trees, a phased mission system has multiple
phases in which the physical characteristics or requirements for the system might change.
As an example, a Mars lander may have launch, cruise, entry descent and landing, and
ground phases. In each of these phases the requirements of the system, as well as the
systems physical attributes may be different. While some failure rates may change from
one phase to another, others may be dependant and linked to a previous phase. This
dependency is accounted for in phased mission system analysis [Meshkat et al, 2003].
One way of improving phase-modular fault trees may be to include Semi-Markov chains
in addition to Markov chains. Semi-Markov chains allow for additional time to be added
for the transition from state to state [Chhikara et al, 2003].
Each of the approaches listed above, while making significant improvements to
the traditional PRA approach, still deal exclusively with the probability of failure by the
end of a given time. While this captures one extremely important aspect of risk, it often
ignores, or does not completely capture, the other aspect - impact. In the aerospace
industry, the impact of a failure can vary both by when the failure occurs, as well as by
what state the system is left in after the failure. Degraded states, in which performance is
lower than nominal but not zero, are possible in the aerospace industry. In addition, if a
failure occurs late in life then the productive return of the mission could still be very high
if the mission is a non-safety-critical system, such as an unmanned space flight mission.
The computer science and software engineering industries have similar systems
that can have degraded states and in which the timing of failures is important. To
account for these systems, Meyer has developed a new area of study, known as
performability, which combines reliability and performance analyses [Meyer, 1980].
Performability combines Markov, or Semi-Markov, chain analyses with a performance
level in each state, to determine the overall system performance. The metric in most
performability analyses is the probability that the system will meet a given performance
requirement. This is a slightly different metric than the previously proposed expected
value of the performance, or expected performance. Additionally, all performability
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analyses found to date have used a constant performance value for each state of the
system [Ciardo et al, 1990] [Smith et al, 1988] [Meyer, 1980]. Therefore, these analysis
methods would not be applicable to systems with path-dependant productivities.
While the majority of performability analyses have been done on software or
processor systems, Ciciani and Grassi have completed a performability analysis of a
fault-tolerant commercial satellite system. This performability analysis again used the
probability that the system will meet a given performance as the metric, as well as
constant productivities in each state. The analysis was done on a small portion of the
satellite system, specifically the number of transponders that should be included in the
full system. All subsystems other than the communications subsystem were given a
common, single failure rate. Therefore, while this study was a large step in the direction
of using the expected value of the performance as a risk metric for aerospace systems, it
was limited in the type of system it could analyze (no path-dependant systems), and in the
level and number of design decisions that could be affected (number of transponders).
This study did, however, set the precedent that a metric that combines both the
performance and the reliability into a single metric is needed to achieve a full risk
analysis of an aerospace system [Ciciani & Vincenzo, 1987].
Jilla and Wertz performed the first studies on aerospace systems in which the
expected value of the performance metric was used as a figure of merit. These studies
introduced the concept of combining reliability and performance into a single metric for
use in design trade studies. While they laid the initial groundwork for the research
developed in this document, the focus of these studies was on system modeling and trade
tool development, and not on risk analysis. Additionally, none of the previous studies
that involved expected productivity included the ability to analyze systems with path-
dependant productivity functions [Wertz, 2002] [Jilla, 2002].
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1.3 Research Objectives and Approach
1.3.1 Objectives
The first primary objective of this research is to develop a new risk metric for use
with non safety-critical systems in the aerospace industry, along with a methodology for
analyzing this metric. This new risk metric needs to cover two additional objectives -
capturing all aspects of risk for non safety-critical systems, including varying impacts,
and facilitating the use of risk as a design decision parameter in the conceptual design
stages. It is important to develop the methodologies and techniques needed to accurately
and efficiently model all components of risk for non safety-critical systems. This
includes the ability to model the varying impacts of failures occurring at different points
in time in the lifetime of the mission. Additionally, it is important to capture failure
modes that lead to degraded states instead of complete mission failure. Capturing all
components of risk accurately is only useful if the associated risk metric actually
influences design decisions. Since design decisions made in the early stages of design
have the largest impact on the overall performance, cost, and risk of the final product, it
is additionally important that the risk metric developed be easily applied to missions in all
stages of design, including conceptual design.
In order to meet all the objectives listed above, a risk metric of expected
productivity has been proposed. The expected productivity of a system is the product of
the probability of being in each functional state and the productivity in that state, summed
over all states and all time. Calculating the expected productivity of a system is relatively
simple if the system productivity depends only on the functional state of the system. If
the system productivity is additionally path-dependant, the complexity of the calculation
of the expected productivity for the system is greatly increased. Therefore, a second
objective of this research is to develop a modeling methodology to efficiently and
accurately estimate the expected productivity over a given lifetime of systems with path-
dependant productivities.
The third primary goal of this research is to show, through case studies using a
real mission, that risk can be analyzed and can affect design decisions in the early design
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stages. The application mission for this research, TPF-I, is in a very early design stage.
In addition, mitigating perceived mission risk is considered to be a top priority for the
TPF-I design team. Therefore, a secondary objective of this research is to work with the
TPF-I design team to bring failures and risks into the design process.
The primary and secondary objectives of this research are shown below.
o Develop a new risk metric for use with non safety-critical systems
in the aerospace industry. Ensure that the given risk metric:
* Captures all aspects of risk for non safety-critical systems,
including varying impacts.
* Facilitates the use of risk as a design decision parameter in
the conceptual design stages.
o Develop a modeling methodology to efficiently and accurately
estimate the expected productivity over a given lifetime of systems
with path-dependant productivities.
o Show through case studies, using a real mission, how risk can be
used early in the design process.
Work with the TPF-I design team to bring failures and risks
into the design process.
1.3.2 Hypothesis
This research is based on the hypothesis that a change in the method of how risk
is represented will lead to risk becoming a factor in early design phase decisions. It is
assumed that if risk is presented as expected productivity, which designers can
understand and assign value to, it will become a factor in design decisions. It is also
assumed that some knowledge about the failure modes and probabilities of failure for a
design is known in the early design phases. This knowledge can be based on pure
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engineering judgment, but a basic knowledge is required. Finally, it is assumed that
missions in the early design phases have a system model capable of calculating the
system level productivity, and that the model can be modified to include degraded states.
This system model should be appropriate for the phase of the design process, and can
therefore have various levels of fidelity.
1.3.3 Approach
An approach has been developed to model the expected productivity of systems
with path-dependant productivities in a more efficient and effort saving manner than a
Monte Carlo simulation. The basic principle behind the approach is to find the expected
path and then find the expected productivity given the expected path. The seven main
steps to this approach can be seen in Figure 1-1. Note that while Figure 1-1 shows the
basic principles behind the steps to the modeling approach, there are many details and
adjustments that need to be made before implementing the approach. The approach,
called Expected Productivity Risk Assessment (EPRA), is covered in more detail in later
chapters of this report.
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Figure 1-1: Basic steps to the Expected Productivity Risk Analysis (EPRA) approach.
1.3.4 Case Studies
The concepts of expected productivity and degraded state analysis have been
applied to the Terrestrial Planet Finder Interferometer (TPF-I) mission. The mission is
planned for launch in 2020 and is a very complex, formation flown interferometer
mission with an objective of finding and characterizing Earth like planets around other
stars. Additional details about the TPF-I mission can be found in Chapter 3. The main
metric used by TPF-I to date to evaluate one architecture option against another is the
number of star systems that the architecture can observe. However, with the exception of
the studies associated with this research effort, these star counts did not take into account
any failures or off-nominal scenarios. Because of the complexity of formation flown
interferometers, missions of this type are perceived to be risky by both management and
the general public. One of the major challenges presented to the design teams has been to
reduce this perceived risk. If instead of nominal star counts, the design team could
calculate the expected star count, taking into account known failure modes and risks, this
1. Use probability of failures prior to operations to determine the initial
conditions and the expected value of the initial system performance
variables
2. Use Markov modeling to find P, the probability of being in each state at
each time-step
3. For each object*, based on the probability of being in each state at the
beginning of that object and the time required in each state, find the
expected number of time steps to complete the object
1. Normalize probabilities based on only those states in which
completing the object is possible
4. Calculate a vector of the probabilities of being in a functioning state at the
time each object is expected to be completed
5. Based on the expected time to complete each object and the probability of
being in a working state at that time, find the vector of probabilities that
the system completed exactly each number of objects before failing.
6. Determine expected productivity and standard deviation
7. Find the probability of completing each number of objects or less, or the
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
* An "object" is defined as a single unit of the performance metric. Examples include an
image for an observatory, or a measurement for an instrument.
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metric could be used to represent both the performance and associated risk of an
architecture option. If this expected star count is acceptable to reach mission success, the
perceived risk of the mission could be dramatically reduced. Therefore, an effort has
been on-going to calculate and use the expected star count for the TPF-I mission.
The path-dependant expected productivity analysis approach discussed above has
been used to calculate the expected star count for candidate TPF-I architectures. This
expected star count, as well as the process of calculating it, have already impacted the
design of the TPF-I mission in several ways.
Since the basic design for the TPF-I mission involves several spacecraft in a
formation, previous design-team discussions have explored degraded states that could
occur if there was a failure of a single spacecraft. Prior to this study, most of these
discussions were dismissed with the assumption that if any of the spacecraft were to fail
then the mission would certainly be lost. An initial round of analysis has been completed
to challenge that assumption. Each of the multiple spacecraft architectures under
consideration for TPF-I was examined without each of the possible component spacecraft
to determine if interferometry would still be possible. Interferometry, and therefore the
observation of a star system, is only possible if the light paths to the combining optics
from three or more collecting apertures are equal in length and the phases of these light
beams can be summed to zero. It quickly became evident that none of the architectures
could function in a degraded state if the phase of the light coming from each of the
apertures was fixed and could not be varied if a failure had occurred. However, several
of the architectures could still function with the loss of a single spacecraft if these phases
were variable.
At the same time that this analysis was being performed, work had already begun
on the design of the instrument, including the beam transport and combining system.
Given the information about the ability to degrade to partially functional states if the
phases of the beams were variable, the design team members began to examine the
difficulty of achieving variable phasing. The beam combiner design that had been under
development was more difficult to modify to allow for variable phases than a secondary
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design which had been examined but not developed in detail. Therefore, the design team
members recommended that the baseline beam combining system design be switched, at
this early stage of the mission, to allow for the ability to degrade to partially functional
states in the event of a single spacecraft failure. If this design decision had not been
made at this early point in the design, the difficulty of adding variable phases later would
have either pushed the design process over budget or would have been too difficult to
accommodate, and degraded states after the loss of a single spacecraft would not be
possible in flight. While it is still unclear if the architecture that will eventually be flown
for TPF-I will be one that can accommodate a single spacecraft failure, it is clear that the
knowledge of what would be required to achieve this graceful degradation has made a
positive impact on the design process.
In addition to facilitating design decisions that enable graceful degradation, the
same graceful degradation analysis discussed above has also affected architecture design
decisions by introducing the level of graceful degradation as a metric used to discriminate
between architectures. In December 2004, the TPF-I design and architecture teams
participated in a series of meetings intended to score various architectures against one
another in order to down-select to a baseline architecture to be considered in more detail
during future studies. The architectures were scored for 27 different weighted
parameters. The weighted scores were then summed together for each of the
architectures in order to compare the overall designs. The weights for all 27 parameters
summed to 100, leading to an average weight of 3.7. The ability to degrade gracefully
was one of the parameters considered and had an above average weighting of 4.3. The
score each of the architectures received in graceful degradation had a significant impact
on the overall score, and therefore had a significant impact on the architectural decision
arrived at during these meetings. Again, by introducing the concept of graceful
degradation and risk at an early stage in the design process, the TPF-I team has been able
to make decisions that make risk reduction techniques and lower risk designs a high
priority without having a large negative impact on resources at the end of the design
cycle.
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The final way that risk and reliability are brought into the TPF-I design process at
this early stage is through specific design-based risk modeling and analysis. A detailed
risk list for the current TPF-I design has been compiled through interviews with experts
on the design and architecture teams. Most of these experts initially stated that no real
consideration has been given to risks or failures yet. However, through the interview
process it was possible to gather information about what each particular expert is
concerned about in the design. These concerns translate directly into risks. The current
risk list consists of information gathered from interviews from eleven different subsystem
experts: the attitude control system (ACS), structures, the autonomous formation flight
sensor system (AFF), formation flight algorithms and control, technology development,
architecture development, instrument, and four systems experts. These interviews have
led to 102 individual failure modes or risk items. For each of these failure modes or risk
items, information is gathered on the nature of the risk, the probability of the negative
event occurring, and the impact if that event does occur. The impact can range from no
impact, if there is a completely redundant system on board, to complete system and
mission failure. The impact of a particular risk item or failure can also be a degraded
state, where there is some functionality in the system, but some parameters are no longer
nominal. These partial failure impacts can include, among others, an increased
probability of failure or increased failure rate of a different failure mode or risk item,
increased observation time, or reduced observational efficiency. Of the 102 current risk
list items, 26 result in a complete system failure, 36 result in a degraded state, and 40
result in either a complete failure or a degraded state depending on the severity of the
failure or level of redundancy in the system. While the probability of failure or the
failure rate of a particular risk item is often hard to judge at this early stage in the design
process, the relative probability of each failure occurring is much more intuitive. Events
were binned into those that are very likely to occur, likely to occur, somewhat likely to
occur, not likely to occur, and very unlikely to occur. These probability bins were then
assigned specific probability values that were later examined in a sensitivity analysis.
Once the probability and impact of each risk item were known, a risk model was
developed. Given a particular set of risks and their associated values, the expected
productivity of the system was calculated. With all probabilities of failure and impacts
40 Introduction and Motivation
set at the nominal level, the risk model returns an overall expected star-count of nearly
123 stars for the detection phase of the mission. The probability or impact values of
different risk items were then altered to model mitigation of those particular risk items.
When the model was run again with these adjusted probability or impact values, the
expected productivity of the system increased. The difference in the expected
productivity of the system with the adjusted values and the original system represents the
value gained by the mitigations. In this way, those risk items that have the largest impact
on the overall system expected productivity can be identified, and given priority in terms
of risk mitigation strategies early in the design process. This provides another method of
using risk and reliability analyses in the early design stages to influence both the design
and the overall mission and resource allocation strategy.
By using the expected value of the total system productivity to represent risk, it is
possible to enable design decisions at an early stage of the design process that incorporate
risk modeling considerations. When these design decisions are made earlier in the design
process, the cost of these decisions is significantly reduced. The work that has been
conducted in this study introduces large strides in the effort to bring risk and reliability
into the design process at an earlier phase by introducing these approaches and applying
them to an actual mission example using the TPF-I mission.
1.4 Overview of Thesis
The remainder of this document presents the approach developed for calculating
the expected productivity of systems with path-dependant productivities and provides
case studies as examples of how and why to use this new risk analysis methodology.
Chapter 2 covers why expected productivity analysis is a necessary risk assessment
technique. Chapter 3 presents the new methodology, called Expected Productivity Risk
Analysis (EPRA), for calculating the expected productivity of systems with path-
dependant productivities. This chapter includes both the mathematical and conceptual
details behind the approach, as well as calibration of EPRA results against Monte Carlo
simulation results. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the application mission for this
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research, TPF-I. This chapter also includes a brief introduction to the concept of
interferometry and a brief description of the main productivity model being used by the
TPF-I design team. Chapters 5 and 6 present the two case studies highlighting how risk,
when represented by expected productivity, can be incorporated into the design process at
an early stage of the design. The first case study, presented in Chapter 5, compares
multiple architectures under consideration for TPF-I from a graceful degradation
standpoint. The second case study, presented in Chapter 6, examines the risks inherent in
the current TPF-I architecture and analyzes those risks. The final chapter, Chapter 7,
summarizes the conclusions of this research, the contributions that have been made, and
the suggestions for future work in this arena.
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Chapter 2
EXPECTED PRODUCTIVITY AS A RISK
ASSESSMENT TOOL
2.1 Expected Productivity
The definition of risk is the combination of the probability of a negative event
occurring and the impact of that negative event. Therefore, risk assessment needs to
incorporate both the probability of a failure occurring and the impact of that failure.
When dealing with safety-critical systems the only important failures are critical failures,
and these all result in the same impact - loss of human life. With non safety-critical
systems, however, the impacts of failures are more varied. The timing of when a failure
occurs affects the impact on the overall mission performance. Additionally, failures that
result in lowered performance, but not complete mission failure should be modeled to
determine the impact. The expected value of the overall productivity of a system, or the
sum of the products of the possible productivities in various states multiplied by the
probability of those states occurring, takes into account all aspects of true risk assessment
since both probabilities and impacts are considered. This type of assessment is defined as
expected productivity analysis.
As discussed in Chapter 1, expected productivity analysis has many benefits in
terms of use as a risk metric. The largest benefit however, is the natural fit of how well
the expected productivity represents the true meaning of risk. By definition, the expected
value of a variable is the probability of a value occurring multiplied by the specific value.
This is basically identical to the definition of risk - the probability of a particular event
occurring times the impact of that event. When dealing with non-safety-critical systems
the impact of a given event is best measured by the productivity of the state that remains
43
44 Expected Productivity as a Risk Assessment Tool
after the event. Therefore, a natural choice for a risk metric is the expected value of the
productivity of the system, or the expected productivity.
2.2 Differences Between Traditional Risk Assessment Techniques
and Expected Productivity Risk Assessment Techniques
As discussed in Chapter 1, traditional risk assessment techniques are different
from expected productivity risk assessment in terms of the question that is being
answered. In traditional risk assessment techniques, the question is what is the
probability of a critical failure by the end of the mission lifetime? In expected
productivity risk assessment techniques, the question is how much return can be expected
from the system? Each risk assessment technique will not only determine the answer to
the associated question, but will also rank how much each risk item being modeled has
affected that answer. The more a risk item affects the overall answer, the more important
that risk item is to the project or program. This is measured using one or more
importance measures. The higher the importance measure of a particular risk item, the
more impact it has on the overall risk of the system, and therefore more resources should
be committed to mitigating or controlling it. Independent of which question is answered,
or which risk metric is used, the ranking of the risk items should be comparable between
the various importance metrics, in terms of the impact to the overall risk of the project or
program. If different risk metrics lead to the same ranking of the risk items then the
results using the different metrics would lead to similar courses of action by management
and decision makers. If rankings are significantly different using different risk metrics,
then the resulting courses of action that a program or project will take would most likely
vary.
For a very simple example problem, three main importance measures that use
overall probability of failure as a risk metric will be compared to a new importance
measure that uses expected productivity as a risk metric in order to highlight the
differences between the two. The three importance measures that use probability of
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failure as a risk metric are the Birnbaum and Fussell-Veseley importance measures and
the percentage of the total probability of failure from a given set of events.
Birnbaum was the first to introduce the concept of an importance measure to
reliability analysis. This importance measure calculates the sensitivity of the total
probability of failure to the probability of a particular event or risk item. The equation
for the Birnbaum importance measure is given below [Wang et al, 2004] [Hoyland &
Rausand, 1994].
IBsrnbaum (A) = Failure (total) (2-1)
aPA
Here IBirnbaum is the Birnbaum importance measure, A is the risk item or event of interest,
PFailure(ttal) is the total probability of failure, and PA is the probability of event A
occurring. While Equation 2-1 is the general form of the Birnbaum importance measure,
a different form is often used to ease calculations. The general form, as shown in
Equation 2-1, is the sensitivity of the total probability of failure to a change in the
probability of the event of interest. The form of the equation is greatly simplified if the
change in the probability of the event is set equal to 1. In this case the denominator of
Equation 2-1 is simply 1 and the numerator is the difference in the system probability of
failure with the probability of the event of interest set to 1 and 0. This form of the
Birnbaum equation is given in Equation 2-2 and is used in the examples that follow in
this section [Smith et al, 2002] [Relex, 2005].
Birnbaum (A) = (Pa,,re (total PA = 1) (Paiure (totalPA = 0) (2-2)
The final two importance measures discussed here that use probability of failure
as a risk metric both use the idea of minimal cut-sets. A cut-set is a particular path
through a system, or set of events, which will lead to system failure. A minimal cut-set is
a cut-set in which if a single event were removed, the system would no longer fail
[Paulos, 2005]. In fault-tree analyses, minimal cut-sets are often used to describe the
important failure paths of the system. As an example take a system that consists three
components: A; B; and C. The system will fail if either component A or one of
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components B and C fail. This system is shown in the fault-tree in Figure 2-1. In this
case, the minimal cut-sets are (A] and (BC). Note that the set (ABC], while a cut-set, is
not a minimal cut-set because if you remove either B or C from it the system would still
fail since A is still in the set.
1.OE-2
A
1.OE-2 1.OE-2
B C
Figure 2-1: Example fault tree - the minimal cut-sets are {A} and {B,C}
The first importance measure that uses the concept of minimal cut-sets is the
Fussell-Vesely importance measure. The Fussell-Vesely importance measure calculates
the probability of the union of all minimal cut-sets that contain the event of interest
divided by the probability of the union of all minimal cut-sets [Relex, 2005]. This is
shown below.
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ssevelyA) = P(U {AllCutSetsContainingA})1Fussell-esely P(U{AllCutSets})
It may be difficult for software programs to automatically determine all the cut-sets
containing the specific event of interest. Since this is required for the numerator of
Equation 2-3, it is often useful to put the Fussell-Veseley importance measure in a
different form. The probability of the union of all minimal cut-sets containing A can be
thought of as the probability of the union of all minimal cut-sets minus the probability of
the union of all minimal cut-sets not containing the event A. The latter can be easily
found by setting the probability of event A to zero and recalculating the probability of the
union of all minimum cut-sets. This form of the Fussell-Veseley importance measure is
given below and is used in the examples in the following discussion [Smith et al, 2002]
[Wolfram, 2005].
iuv ,(A)= P(U {AllCutSetsP(A)= P )- P(U{AlICutSetsIP(A)=0) (
Irussell-pesel A) = xl00% (2-4)
P(U {AllCutSetsIP(A)= PA )
In Equation 2-4, P(A) is the probability of event A occurring and PA is the original
probability of event A occurring.
The final importance measure that uses the probability of failure as a risk metric is
the percentage of the total probability of failure from a given cut-set. This metric
measures the importance of minimal cut-sets instead of basic events. Both the Birnbaum
and Fussell-Veseley importance measures calculate the importance of basic events. If a
system consists of only single-point failures the minimal cut-sets and the basic events are
identical. The cut-set importance meaure is given below [Smith et al, 2002] [Paulos,
2005].
cPu seai(A)= P(A) e)x 100% (2-5)
Note that A in Equation 2-5 is a cut-set, and not a basic event like in Equation 2-4.
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In order to make a comparison to the existing importance measures discussed
above, a new importance measure needs to be defined using the expected value as a risk
metric. The expected productivity importance measure is modeled after the concepts
from both the Fussell-Veseley and Bimbaum importance measures. The impact of an
event or risk item is determined by finding the expected productivity of the nominal
system, in addition to the expected productivity given a zero probability of the given risk
item occurring. Since the negative event would have lowered the expected productivity,
the expected productivity should increase when the probability of the event occurring is
set to zero. The impact of the event or risk item is then simply the expected productivity
with the probability set to zero minus the expected productivity with the probability set to
the original value. This is then normalized by the expected productivity with all
probabilities set at the original values and turned into a percentage. The equation for the
expected productivity importance measure is shown below.
(A) = ((E[p](P(A) = 0))- (E[plP(A) =PA) X100% (2-6)IEp(A)=( (E[p](A) P) x100% (2-6)
In Equation 2-6, IEP is the expected productivity importance measure, E[p] is the
expected productivity, A is the risk item or event of interest, P(A) is the probability of
event A occurring used in a given calculation, and PA is the original input for the
probability of event A occurring.
In order to show the differences between using expected productivity versus
probability of failure as the risk metric, a simple example problem has been created. For
this problem, the system of interest has only two failure modes, both of which are single
point failures. The first failure mode is from a deployment. The deployment only occurs
once and needs to be completed in order for the system to enter operations. The second
failure mode is from a moving component. The component is required once operations
begin and can fail at any point throughout operations. If either the deployment or the
moving component fails the system is in a failed state. With this system there are two
basic events (deployment failure and component failure) and only two minimal cut-sets
(deployment failure and component failure). The importance of each of the two events or
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cut-sets was calculated usmg each of the importance measures described above for
varying values for the probability of each event occurring. Additionally, the two events
were ranked using each importance measure to determine which failure mode is the more
critical mode and should have priority in terms of mitigation actions. The results are
shown in Figures 2-2 through 2-4.
Comparison of Expected Productivity Importance Measure to
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Figure 2-2: Example problem results comparing the Birnbaum importance measure to the expected
productivity importance measure
In Figures 2-2 through 2-4, PD(/) is the probability of deployment failure and
PC(/) is the probability of component failure by the end of the lifetime of the mission.
An exponential failure rate was assumed for the component failure. The specific values
used for the probability of failure are given as the case definition on the x-axis. Note that
in all cases the component has a higher probability of failure by the end of life than the
deployment probability of failure. The y-axes in all three figures are the importance
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measures for the deployment failure minus the importance measures for the component
failure. Therefore, a positive value implies that the deployment failure is the more
important failure mode. Similarly, a negative value implies that the component failure is
the more important failure mode. The first thing to note about all three figures is that in
ten of the eleven cases tested the expected productivity importance measure ranked the
two failure modes in opposite order from the existing importance measure. In several
cases the component failure was measured to be significantly more important than the
deployment failure using the existing importance measures, but the expected productivity
importance measure finds that the deployment is actually the more important failure
mode. These discrepancies mean that using current risk analysis techniques, an engineer
or designer would assign more importance and therefore more resources to mitigating the
component failure mode. However, if the key metric is actually the expected return of
the mission and not the probability of failure by the end of the lifetime, more importance
and therefore more resources should be focused on the deployment failure. The reasons
for this are clear. The component has a higher probability of failure by the end of the
mission lifetime. Therefore, existing measures that use probability of failure as the risk
metric rank the component failure mode higher than the deployment failure mode. The
component may fail at any point throughout the mission lifetime, however, including
only a short time before the scheduled end of the mission. If the component fails after
any significant amount of time has passed then the mission will still have returned some
useful data. The deployment failure occurs at only one point in time, before operations.
If the deployment fails, no data will be returned from the mission. This is not dependant
on the timing of the failure since the event must occur before operations even begin.
Therefore the deployment actually has a larger impact on the system than the component
failure. Since risk, in addition to expected productivity, measures the combination of
probability and impact, this higher impact outweighs the lower probability in ten of the
eleven cases shown. This effect is not captured with the current risk metrics and
importance measures. Note that in all three figures the only case in which both
importance measures lead to the same ranking of failure modes, the probability of failure
for the component is twice the probability of a deployment failure.
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Figure 2-3: Example problem results comparing the Fussell-Veseley importance measure to the
expected productivity importance measure
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Figure 2-4: Example problem results comparing the cut-set importance measure to the expected
productivity importance measure
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A subset of the cases shown in Figure 2-2 are shown in Figure 2-5. In these
figures the probability of deployment failure is set at a constant value of 5%. The
probability of failure for the component varies along the x-axis from 6% to 10%. This set
of cases clearly shows the differences between the importance measures. If the
probability of component failure is only slightly higher than that of deployment failure,
the current importance measures will indicate that the component failure mode is the
most important failure mode but only by a small margin. In contrast, using the expected
productivity importance measure, the deployment is ranked as the more important failure
mode by a significant margin. As the component probability of failure increases the
differences in the importance of the two failure modes increases for the probability of
failure importance measure but decreases for the expected productivity importance
measure. Note that these same trends, while only shown for the Birnbaum importance
measure, occur in Figures 2-3 and 2-4 as well for the Fussell-Veseley and cut-set
importance measures.
The previous examples highlight the differences between using probability of
failure and using expected productivity as the risk metric in trade studies and risk
analyses. Since probability of failure only captures the probability aspect of risk, if the
impacts of the failures are significantly different, either due to degraded states or due to
the timing of the failures as in the previously discussed examples, importance measures
that rank risk items in terms of their impact on the probability of failure can give
misleading results. Current risk analysis techniques may lead to resources being
allocated inappropriately, such as if more resources were devoted to mitigating the
component failure mode over the deployment failure mode in the previous example.
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Figure 2-5: Subset ofcomparisons between the Birnbaum and expected productivity importance
measures
2.3 Complexities of Using Expected Productivity as a Risk
Assessment Tool
2.3.1 Mission Uniqueness
Tools exist to do risk assessment for missions of all varieties. Combining the
systems performance aspect with the probabilistic aspect of risk analysis leads to the need
for much more customized tools for each individual mission. In the same sense that each
mission needs a system performance model that is custom built for that mission, it will
also need a risk assessment model that is custom built for that mission (utilizing the
already custom built performance model). Engineers running these analyses will need to
understand both the system performance and the probabilistic aspect of risk. This
challenges conventional thinking and would require engineers to be trained in this new
methodology. With more attention paid to educating existing systems engineers in
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probabilistic assessment, however, this challenge could be easily met by an engineer in a
conventional systems engineering role.
2.3.2 Path-dependant Productivities
As discussed in Section 1.1, calculating expected productivity is relatively simple
if the system productivity is dependant only on the functional state of the system. In
these cases the expected productivity is simply the productivity in each state multiplied
by the probability of being in that state. Many real-life aerospace systems however have
productivities that are time or path dependant. An example of this is an observatory
system. The time required to examine a particular star depends not only on the functional
state of the instrument, but also on the characteristics of the star. Stars that are fainter or
further away may take longer to characterize than those that are brighter or closer. The
productivity in each state now depends on which object in a given list the system is
processing at that time, which in turn depends on the amount of time the previous objects
took to process, and therefore depends on the previous states of the system. The system
itself is still a Markov system, since the current state of the system depends only on the
previous state. The productivity, however, is now path-dependent, making the
calculation of the expected productivity much more complicated. An approach to
calculating the expected productivity of path-dependant productivity systems has been
developed and is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3
THE EPRA PATH-DEPENDANT PRODUCTIVITY
MODELING APPROACH
3.1 Motivation for a New Modeling Methodology
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, there are many benefits and advantages to using
the expected value of the total system productivity, or the expected productivity, as the
metric used to measure the risk of non-safety critical aerospace systems. This chapter
presents a new method of calculating the expected productivity for a system in which the
nominal productivity is path-dependent.
Calculating expected productivity is relatively simple if the system productivity is
dependant only on the functional state of the system. In these cases, the expected
productivity is simply the productivity in each state multiplied by the probability of being
in that state. Unfortunately, many real-life aerospace systems have productivities that are
time or path-dependant. An example of this characteristic is an observatory system. The
time required to examine a particular star depends not only on the functional state of the
instrument, but also on the characteristics of the star. Stars that are fainter or farther
away may take longer to characterize than those that are brighter or closer. For any
system of this nature, the productivity in each state depends on which object in a given
list of objects the system is processing at that time, which in turn depends on the amount
of time spent completing the previous objects on the list, and therefore depends on the
previous states of the system. In the observatory example, the list of objects may be a list
of observations of specific stars. Other examples include a list of measurements from
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specific rocks or sites for an in-situ instrument or a list of traverses of varying distances
and difficulties for a rover. The list of objects the system is processing can also represent
varying actions, such as different types of measurements on a particular rock. The
productivity of the system is measured by the number of objects that are completed in the
given lifetime, such as the number of observations or the number of measurements. Note
that even for systems with path-dependant productivities, the system itself is still a
Markov system, since the current state of the system depends only on the previous state;
however, the system productivity is now path-dependent, making the calculation of the
expected productivity much more complicated.
Prior to this work, the only method available to calculate the expected
productivity of a system with a path-dependant productivity function was to use a Monte
Carlo simulation. Monte Carlo simulations are a way of calculating the statistical
outcomes of uncertain events using "brute-force." A simulation of the mission is
repeated a large number of times, each time with uncertain variables or outcomes given a
single value determined by their probability distributions. In the case of expected
productivity analysis, each simulation follows a single path through the mission, resulting
in one of the many possible outcomes for the total system productivity. Once many
simulations have been completed, these different outcomes can be averaged to find the
overall expected value of the system productivity, or the expected productivity.
While the Monte Carlo approach is a well understood and trusted approach, it has
several draw-backs. Since Monte Carlo simulations require the full productivity to be
calculated a large number of times, these simulations can take a very long time to
complete. This is especially true if calculating the productivity of the system is
complicated and time-consuming for even a single case. If calculating the system
productivity for a single case takes several minutes, repeating this process hundreds of
times for the Monte Carlo simulation will take hours or even days. If the expected
productivity is to be used as a metric to represent risk in a trade-study, this calculation
will need to be repeated many times for many different designs. Therefore, if a
simulation which takes days to run is required to calculate the expected productivity for a
single design, it is unlikely that this metric will actually be used in a trade-study.
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Additionally, because a Monte Carlo simulation uses random sampling of uncertain
variables, the outcomes are by definition uncertain. While the uncertainty in the results
can be reduced by increasing the number of runs per simulation, this uncertainty can
never be truly removed. The uncertainty in the results makes sensitivity studies or
comparisons between two similar designs very difficult, since it is unknown if small
differences in results are due to a change in the design or input parameters, or simply due
to variations in the uncertain samplings between the simulations.
A more efficient and more repeatable approach to calculating the expected
productivity of systems with path-dependant productivities has been developed. This
new approach is called Expected Productivity Risk Analysis (EPRA), and is described in
the following sections.
3.2 The EPRA Modeling Approach
The basic concept behind the EPRA approach to modeling the overall expected
productivity of a path-dependent system is simple - find the expected path through the
system, and then find the expected results given that path. The basic steps to the
approach, and the order in which they occur, are shown in Figure 3-1.
Figure 3-1: Basic approach to the EPRA methodology for modeling the expected productivity of path
dependent systems
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The first step to the EPRA approach is to determine the initial conditions for the
problem. The initial conditions are set by examining any possible failures that would
occur prior to the beginning of operations.
Next, the probability of being in each state, at each time, is calculated using
Markov modeling. The time to complete each object in each state is calculated using a
productivity model. Note that throughout this discussion, an object is defined as a single
unit of the performance metric.
Once the probability and productivity information is known, it is possible to
calculate the expected amount of time required to complete each object. Prior to this
calculation, a few adjustment calculations are required. These adjustments account for
specific, often unusual circumstances, and are calculated automatically.
The expected time required to complete each object can then be used to calculate
the probability that the system is still functional after completing each number of objects.
This calculation will again require some adjustments to account for specific
circumstances.
Next, the probability of completing exactly each number of objects can be
calculated. Given these probabilities, it is relatively simple to calculate the expected
number of objects completed, the standard deviation off of this expected value, and the
cumulative distribution function (CDF).
Figure 3-1 and the previous discussion give a broad overview of the EPRA
approach. Each of the nine basic steps shown in Figure 3-1 will be discussed in detail in
the following sections.
3.2.1 Step 1: Determining Initial Conditions from Possible Failures Prior to
Operations
The first step in the EPRA approach is to determine the initial conditions for the
simulation. The initial conditions are set by the possibility of failures prior to the
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beginning of operations. This step is shown and summarized in Figure 3-2, and discussed
in detail below.
2. Probability
of being in
each state at
each time
3. Time to
complete
each object
in each state
8. Probability
of completing
exactly each
number ot
objects
9. Expected
number of
objects,
standard
deviation, CDF
Possible failures prior to
operations
• Begin in failed or
degraded state
• Expected value ot
system parameters
Figure 3-2: Determining Initial Conditions from Possible Failures Prior to Operations
Many of the risk items identified for missions are single events that occur before
operations. Examples of these include a launch failure or a deployment failure. These
risks result in a change to the initial conditions used to find the probability of being in
each state. The probability that the system is in a completely failed state before
operations begin is the probability that at least one critical failure event occurred prior to
operations. Care needs to be taken not to double count the probability of multiple critical
failure events occurring, as shown by the overlap of events A and B in Figure 3-3.
~) ~)
POust A) = P(A)x(1.P(B» POust B) = (1.P(A»xP(B)
~) CD
P(both A and B) = P(A)xP(B) P(neither A nor B) = (1.P(A»x(1.P(B»
Figure 3-3: Four possible outcomes and their probabilities from two independent, probabilistic
events.
60 The EPRA Path-Dependant Productivity Modeling Approach
If both A and B are critical failure events that occur prior to operations, then the
probability that the mission is in a functional state at the beginning of operations, and
therefore that neither A nor B has occurred, is given by Equation 3-1.
P(neither A nor B) = 1- [P(A) + P(B) - P(A and B)]
P(neither A nor B) = 1- [P(A) + P(B)- P(A) x P(B)] (3-1)
P(neither A nor B) = 1-P(A)-P(B) + P(A) x P(B)
A Matlab function has been created to determine the probability that at least one
of any n independent events will occur given the probability of each individual event.
This function can now be used to find the probability that the system is in a failed state
before operations have begun, or Po Failed. This same function can be used to find the
probability that the system begins operations in any degraded state captured in the state
information matrix (the state information matrix will be discussed in Section 3.2.2). An
example of beginning operations in a degraded state could occur if a particular
component is not mission critical, and could fail either due to an anomaly prior to
operations or due to a malfunction during operations. In this case, a degraded state of the
system will be defined as the state in which the component has failed, and this degraded
state will have a non-zero initial probability based on the probability of the anomaly prior
to operations occurring.
The initial conditions are represented as a row vector that is eventually used as the
first row of the P matrix, which is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2. The entries in the
row vector are the probabilities of being in each corresponding state at the beginning of
operations. All of these initial probabilities, except the probability of beginning
operations in the nominal state are calculated as discussed above. The probability of
beginning operations in the nominal state is calculated as one minus the sum of the
probabilities of beginning operations in any of the degraded states or the completely
failed state. This logic is shown in Equation 3-2:
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((# of states
(1) = -P (n+ Po Failed (3-2)
n=2
where P(n) is the probability of beginning operations in state n, and PoFailed is the
probability of complete system failure prior to operations.
In addition to risk elements that decrease the probability of beginning operations
in the nominal state, other risk elements increase the probability that the system will
begin operations with degraded performance. Examples of these types of risk elements
include a subsystem or technology not being developed to the required performance level
or a partial deployment failure with which the system could still function, but at a
reduced throughput rate or for a reduced time. These failure modes occur at or before the
beginning of operations. Therefore, the initial system performance metrics, such as
failure rates, lifetime, or efficiency, need to be adjusted before being used in conjunction
with a dynamic failure model to find the overall expected total productivity. Using an
observatory system example, a nominal system may have an observational efficiency of 1
(defined as equal time observing and non-observing). However, if control algorithms are
not developed to the required level, the observational efficiency may be reduced to 0.5
(twice the time taking observations is spent on overhead). These algorithms will not
mature to the required level with some probability, Pc. As an example, let us take the
probability of these algorithms not being developed to be 0.1. As shown in Equation 3-3,
the initial starting condition of this system is an expected observational efficiency value
of 0.95.
E[Initial Observational Efficiency] = 0.5 x Pc + 1 x (1 - Pc) = 0.05 + 0.9
E[Initial Observational Efficiency] = 0.95
Once in operations, a single actuator may then fail. If this occurs, we assume for
this example that the observational efficiency is once again cut in half. The productivity
in the state in which a single actuator has failed should be based on an initial
observational efficiency of 0.95, as shown in Equation 3-4.
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Obervational Efficiency in Degraded State = - x E[Initial Observational Efficiency]
1 (3-4)
Obervational Efficiency in Degraded State = - x 0.95 = 0.475
2
The example shown in Equations 3 and 4 is very simple. However, this shows
only a single failure mode's effect on a system performance metric. In reality, many
different failure modes will affect the expected value of the initial performance metrics.
Therefore, it is important to develop a method to find the combined expected value of
each of these metrics, given several independent events that could affect them. For
example, assume there are two events that would decrease the initial observational
efficiency. These events are totally independent; however, both have similar outcomes.
Assume that both of these events would reduce the observational efficiency by a factor of
two. There is now a chance, if both events occur, that the initial observational efficiency
could be reduced by a factor of four compared to the original value. A method is needed
to determine the expected value of a metric given several different probabilistic events
that affect the value of that metric.
In general, the expected value is found by multiplying the probability of an event
by the outcome of that event. In the case of two independent probabilistic events, there
are four separate and unique outcomes. These outcomes were shown previously in
Figure 3-3 and are defined as one or the other event occurring, both occurring, and
neither occurring. Since the events are independent, the probability of each outcome can
be calculated using the probability of either event individually occurring. For event A
only to occur, event A needs to occur and event B cannot occur, and vice versa for event
B only. If the probability of event A occurring is Pa, the probability of event A not
occurring is -Pa. Therefore, the probability of each outcome occurring is simply a
combination of the probability of each event and/or one minus the probability of each
event. All possible outcomes can be found easily by determining a full-factorial matrix
for the number of events with two possible values each - 0 if the event did not occur and
1 if the event did occur. Then a probability vector can be found by starting with a
probability of 1 for each case and multiplying by Pa if there is a 1 in the A column and
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(I-Pa) if there is a 0 in the A column, and so on for other events. This is shown in
Equation 3-5 for an example problem:
P=[Pax(1-Pb) Pbx(1-Pa) PbxPa 1-(Pa+Pb-PbxPa)] (3-5)
Next, a value vector can be determined by starting with the initial condition and
multiplying by the effect of event A if there is a 1 in the A column, and so on as with the
probability vector. This is shown in Equation 3-6, assuming that either event would
independently reduce the performance metric by a factor of 2:
o.5s
0.25S
where S is the initial system performance metric (such as observational efficiency).
Finally, the dot product of the value vector and the probability vector can be used to get
the total final expected value, as shown in Equation 3-7 for the example problem:
P. V = 0.5S x Pa x (1 - Pb) + 0.5S x Pb x (I - Pa) + 0.25S x Pb x Pa + S x (1 - (Pa + Pb - Pb x Pa))
P. V = S x (0.5Pa - O.5PbPa + 0.5Pb - O.SPbPa + 0.25PbPa + 1 - Pa - Pb + PbPa) (3-7)
P. V = S x (1 - 0.5Pb - 0.5Pa +0.25PbPa) = S x (1 - O.SPb) x (1 - 0.5Pa)
Currently, we have assumed that the effects of individual events are multiplied
together if two or more events occur; however, several other methods could be used, such
as summing the effects together, or multiplying the effects for a few events and then
assuming that after a given number of partial failures the whole system is considered
completely failed. These other methods could be easily implemented using the approach
described above, by simply adjusting the V vector.
3.2.2 Step 2: Determining the Probability of Being in Each State at Each
Time
Once the initial conditions are set, the next step in determining the expected
productivity of a path-dependent system is to find the probability of being in each
degraded state throughout time. This is accomplished by using Markov modeling and the
state-transition matrix. As discussed previously, a Markov modeling approach can be
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used, even if the productivity is path-dependant, if the functional state of the system itself
still depends only on the previous functional state. This step is shown and summarized in
Figure 3-4, and discussed in detail below.
Figure 3-4: Probability of Being in Each State at Each Time
The state-transition matrix, also called the A matrix, defines both the states of a
system and the rate at which the system will transition from one state to the next. The
state of the system changes as failures occur in the system. The A matrix is found by
analyzing the Markov model of a system. If P(t) is defined as the vector of probabilities
of being in each state of the system at a particular time, the A matrix is defined as:
d(t) = A(t)
dt (3-8)
The state-transition matrix is essential in calculating the probability of being in each state
of the system, and therefore is also needed to calculate several important parameters of
the entire system, such as productivity and reliability.
Markov Modeling - A
P=AP
P(t,:) = e = e A((I) -+ )
P(t,:) = eaeA('-I)
eA' _= I+ AAt = M
eA(',- ) = P(t - 1,:)
P(1,:) = Po
P(t,:) = P(t -1,:) x M
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An A matrix can be created by looking at each state individually. Each row and
column of the matrix corresponds to a different state. Figure 3-5 shows a very simple
example of a state diagram, or Markov model, and the corresponding A matrix.
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Figure 3-5: Markov model and corresponding A matrix for a sample system of three dual functioning
spacecraft, one combining spacecraft, and one collecting spacecraft.
In Figure 3-5 d, m, and I are the failure rates of three different components -
component "D", component "M", and component "L". The diagonal entries of the A
matrix correspond to the ways in which the system could leave that state. In the example
shown in Figure 3-5, three independent components could fail in state two. As a result,
the diagonal entry for the second row would be minus one times the sum of the failure
rates of each of the three components, as shown in Equation 3-9:
A(2,2) = -(2d +m + i) (3-9)
If a component fails in a given state and the system is still operating but in a different
state, then the column entry of the new state's row would contain the rate at which this
process occurs. Consider the example shown in Figure 3-5, where when a component
fails the system transitions from the second to the third, fourth, or fifth state. In the A
matrix representation, the third, fourth, or fifth row and second column entry would be
the failure rate of the failed component. The system transitions from the second to the
fifth state if a "L" component fails. Therefore, the fifth row and second column entry of
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the A matrix is the failure rate of the collecting spacecraft, or 1, as shown in Equation 3-
10:
A(5,2) = 1 (3-10)
A(4,2)= m
Since there are two identical "D" components in the system in state two, and if either one
of them fails the system is considered in the third state, the corresponding third row and
second column entry of the A matrix would be two times the failure rate of the
component, as shown in Equation 3-11:
A(3,2) = 2d (3-11)
Any entry of the matrix that is not on the diagonal and does not connect one state to
another is simply zero.
To generate the A matrix in an efficient manner for many different systems, a
recursive, automatic A matrix generation Matlab function has been developed [Wertz,
2002]. Once the pattern to the A matrix has been identified and understood, the main
challenges in automating the process of creating the A matrix are defining the states,
checking if a new state has been previously defined or not, knowing when a failure
causes the system to move to a new state, and identifying when the entire system has
failed.
Both the state-transition matrix itself and a matrix containing the state information
are simultaneously inputs and outputs to the recursive function used to automatically
generate the A matrix. Each row of the state information matrix corresponds to a
particular state and completely identifies that state. Examples of columns in the state
information matrix include the number of functioning components of a particular type
(e.g. 2 transmitters) or a binary variable to identify if a particular aspect of the system is
functioning or not (e.g. 1 if the antenna is functional, 0 if the antenna has failed). Each
one-by-n row vector from the state information matrix is unique for that given state, such
that by checking if the one-by-n vector identifying a particular state is already a row of
the state information matrix, it is possible to see if that given state has previously been
defined. If this vector is not already a row of the state information matrix, the state should
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be added as a new state. An additional variable is passed as another input to the function
to identify the row number of the previous state, from which the current state was
derived. This allows the entries for all states to be entered in both the correct rows and
columns of the A matrix. A flow diagram showing this process is shown in Figure 3-6.
Yes No
Next state is the Next state is a new
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state number state numDer ana aua
to the state
identification matrix
Figure 3-6: Flow chart showing the state information matrix definition process.
The automatic A matrix generation code is a recursive function, meaning that it
calls itself within the function. The function has built in rules that decide whether a given
state definition is acceptable and could be a new state, or if the system has failed.
Consider the example of a formation flight interferometer system with three different
types of spacecraft - collecting spacecraft, combing spacecraft, and dual functioning
spacecraft which can collect or combine light but not do both at the same time. Assume
that the system requires two spacecraft capable of collecting light and one capable of
combining light to be functional. The operational rules for such a system are:
1. The number of spacecraft acting as collecting spacecraft must be greater than
or equal to two. This includes both the collecting spacecraft and the dual
functioning spacecraft.
Determine the state
identification vector for
the next state
Is the identification
vector a previous row
of the state
identification matrix?
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2. The number of spacecraft acting as combining spacecraft must be greater than
or equal to one. This includes both the combining spacecraft and the dual
functioning spacecraft.
3. Since the dual functioning spacecraft cannot collect and combine light at the
same time, and since both two collecting spacecraft and one combining spacecraft
must be working for the system to be operational, the total number of spacecraft
must be greater than or equal to three.
Since the A and state information matrices are both inputs and outputs in each call
to the automatic A matrix generation function, they are continuously updated. If altering
the status of any one column in the state information matrix leads to a state that satisfies
the operational rules, the function is called again with the new state identifier. If altering
the status of any one column in the state information matrix causes the system to fail the
operational rules tests, the current state must lead directly to system failure if that
component fails and the function is not called again.
One call to the recursive automatic A matrix generation function will
automatically produce the full A matrix and the full state information matrix. The state
information matrix can then be used to calculate the productivity in each state while the A
matrix is used to calculate the probability of being in each state throughout time. More
information on the details of the recursive automatic A matrix generation function are
available in [Wertz, 2002].
The probability of being in any given state at any given time is calculated using
numerical integrations of Markov models [Babcock, 1986]. The method involves
transforming the A matrix from a continuous time matrix to a discrete time matrix, M, as
shown in Equation 3-12, where At is the duration of the time step and I is the identity
matrix.
M = I + AAt (3-12)
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Define P as a matrix of the probabilities of being in each state at each time. The vector of
the probabilities of being in each state at a given time, P(t,.), can be found by integrating
the definition of the A matrix, given in Equation 3-8. This is shown is Equation 3-13:
= AP
(3-13)
P(t,:) =e '
We can break t into the time at the end of the previous time step plus the length of the
time step.
P(t,:) = eA' = eA(('- I)+ V) (3-14)
Simplifying, we get:
P(t,:) = e AAeA (t -l) (3-15)
Remembering the Taylor series expansion, the first term in Equation 3-15 is an
approximation for the M matrix.
eA' _I+AAt=M (3-16)
From Equation 3-12, the second term in Equation 3-15 is the previous row of the P
matrix.
eA(' ) = P(t -1,:) (3-17)
We already know that the first row of the P matrix is the initial conditions that were
calculated in Section 3.2.1.
P(1,:) = Po (3-18)
Substituting Equation 3-16 and Equation 3-17 into Equation 3-15, we can find the rest of
the rows of the P matrix by multiplying the probability of being in each state from one
time step before by the M matrix, as shown in Equation 3-19:
P(t,:) = P(t - l,:)xM (3-19)
Note that the rows of P correspond to time steps, and the columns correspond to states.
Therefore, to know the probability of being in state two (as defined by the second row of
the state information matrix), during time step five, one would look at P(5,2).
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3.2.3 Step 3: Time to Complete Each Object in Each State
The time to complete each object in each state is calculated using a productivity
model. This step in the overall flow is shown in Figure 3-7. As a reminder, throughout
this discussion, an object is defined as a single unit of the performance metric. Examples
of an object include a measurement or an image. The time to complete a particular object
is calculated using a productivity model. This time will depend on both the
characteristics of that object and the functional state of the system. In degraded states,
the productivity of the system is generally lower, resulting in a longer time to complete a
given object. Additionally, in some degraded states it will not be physically possible to
complete certain objects. Whether or not an object can be completed in a particular
degraded state will also be determined by the productivity model.
1. Initial
Conditions
Figure 3-7: Time to complete each object in each state
The first step in the "time to complete each object" calculation is to decide the
order in which objects will be completed. Adjustments to this order will be made in
future steps to account for various situations, but an initial ordering must be set for the
simulation. In some cases, the order of objects may be set based on a given preference of
Productivity model
* An "object" is defined as a single unit of the
performance metric. Examples include an image for an
observatory, or a measurement for an instrument.
* The time to complete a given object will depend on both
the object characteristics and the functional state of the
system
Generally takes longer to complete an object in a
degraded state than it would in the nominal state
l
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the stake-holders. If a pre-determined order is not set based on preferences, then the
objects are sorted in terms of increasing time required in the nominal state. This is
logical because the most likely scenario is that a failure will not occur, leaving the system
in the nominal state, and therefore the objects will be completed in the optimal order of
shortest to longest completion times.
The time required to complete an object can be transformed into the number of
time steps required to complete the object. This is shown in Equation 3-20:
T=- (3-20)
At
where is a vector of the times required to finish the object in each state, At is the length
of a time step, and T is a vector of the number of time steps required to finish the object
in each state. If it is not possible to complete the object in a given state, the time required
in that state is reported as zero.
In situations where it is possible to complete an object in a degraded state, but not
in the nominal state, a minor adjustment must be made to the t vector, or the vector of
the required times to complete the object in each state. While this situation is extremely
rare, it does occur, usually when the degraded state can complete different, but not more,
objects than the nominal state. It is assumed that if an object can be completed in a
degraded state, the system would be able to change to this state from the nominal state to
complete the object. Therefore, in this situation, the time required to complete the object
in the degraded state is used as the required time in both the nominal and degraded states.
3.2.4 Step 4: Expected Time to Complete Each Object
The next step is to find the expected number of time steps to complete each
object. This step is shown in Figure 3-8 and discussed in more detail below.
I I II I I
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Figure 3-8: Expected time to complete each object
First, we need to find the index of the number of time steps corresponding to the
simulation time when a particular object is begun. This is shown in Equation 3-21:
time
index = time (3-21)
At
where time is the current simulation time and At is the length of a time step.
The probability of being in each state at the beginning of the object can be found
by looking up the row index in the probability matrix, P. The number of time steps
required to complete the object in each state is calculated using the productivity model, as
discussed in Section 3.2.3. The expected number of time steps required to complete the
object is then calculated by multiplying the number of time steps required in each state by
the probability of being in that state at the beginning of the object. This is shown in
Equation 3-22:
E[T]= T = T (3-22)
where, T is the expected number of time steps, T is the vector of time steps required to
complete the object in each state, and P is the vector of the probability of being in each
state at time index, or P(index, :).
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3.2.5 Step 5: Adjustments to the Expected Time to Complete Each Object
Calculation
A few adjustments to the calculations that determine the expected time to
complete each object are required to account for specific situations and details. These
adjustments are summarized in Figure 3-9, and discussed in detail below.
Normalize probabilities based on states
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Figure 3-9: Adjustments to the expected time to complete each object calculation
When finding the expected number of time steps to complete an object, it is
important to first normalize the probabilities that the system is in each state based on only
those states in which completing the object is possible. Therefore, the calculated value
for the expected time to complete an object is actually the expected time to complete the
object given that the object can be completed. First, the states in which it is possible to
complete the object are identified, as shown in Equation 3-23:
W = find(T 0O) (3-23)
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where the find function returns the index of the vector entries that match the given
criteria, and W is a vector of all states in which the system can complete the given
object, called the "working vector." Next, the normalized probabilities can be calculated,
as shown in Equation 3-24:
P~norm = P indexW )
sum P(index, i)) (3-24)
where Pnorm is the vector of normalized probabilities, P is the probability matrix, and
index is the current time step in the simulation. Finally, the expected number of time
steps to complete the object is calculated using the normalized probabilities, as shown in
Equation 3-25:
E[T] = = ().om (3-25)
Perhaps the best method to describe this adjustment is to look at a simple
example. Suppose we have a system with three states - nominal, partially failed, and
completely failed. In addition, suppose that at the current time in the simulation, we have
an equal chance of being in any of the three states, as shown in Equation 3-26:
P(index,:)=[i 1 (3-26)
In the nominal state, it takes two time steps to complete the current object. In the
partially failed state, this same object requires four time steps, and in the completely
failed state, the object cannot be completed. These time step requirements are shown in
Equation 3-27:
i=[2 4 0] (3-27)
To find the expected number of time steps required to complete our object, we must first
find the states in which completing an object is possible:
J=[1 2] (3-28)
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Next, we must renormalize the probabilities of being in the two working states, shown in
Equation 3-29.
norm 1 1
3 3
1
(3-29)
3 3
Aor, (2) 
1 2
3 3
Finally, we find the total expected number of time steps required, given that the object
can be completed, shown in Equation 3-30:
E[T]== [2 4] [ 2. ]
T ~~12 ~143 ~(3-30)T=i-x2+-x4=3
2 2
In certain cases, an adjustment must also be made to the P matrix to account for
situations in which mission lifetime will run out in degraded states before the number of
objects the system is capable of completing in those states runs out. Take, for example, a
case where completing an object in the degraded state takes twice as long as completing
that same object in the nominal case. If in the nominal case this system can complete x
objects, then if the system started life in the degraded state it could only complete
approximately x/2 objects (this number may vary based on the spread of times to compete
each object, but for this example it can be approximated as x/2). The first reaction may
be to correct for this problem by setting the time required to complete each object after
object x/2, or whatever the limit to the degraded state system is, to zero. This would be
equivalent to stating that all objects after this object could not be completed in the
degraded state, even if the system has the capability to complete them, because time has
run out. While this statement is accurate if the system began life in the degraded state, it
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is not accurate if the system transferred to the degraded state through a failure at some
point during the lifetime of the mission. Accounting for the exact scenario of the system
transitioning to the degraded state at every possible time step would be too complex and
would make the computation effort and time required too much to be useful in a trade
tool. Additionally, transferring to the degraded state at some point throughout life is
already covered by using the expected time to complete objects to calculate the overall
productivity. Therefore, an adjustment is made to account only for the situation in which
the system transferred to the degraded state prior to operations.
To account for the situation discussed above, the probability matrix, P, is adjusted
for all objects after the final object that the system could complete if it was in the
degraded state for the entire lifetime. In actuality, the probability of completing these
objects is not zero, but is a reduced value. In other words, there is still some probability
that the system transitioned to the degraded state sometime during operations, as opposed
to prior to operations, therefore allowing for the possibility that the object in question
could still be completed within the allotted time. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the
value in the probability matrix for these objects from the probability of being in the
degraded state, to the probability of being in the degraded state at this time and not being
in the degraded state at the beginning of life.
The first step to this adjustment is to determine which objects to adjust, i.e. the
objects that are beyond the limit of what can be completed if the entire lifetime is spent in
the degraded state. The time required to complete each object in each degraded state is
already calculated to find the expected time required for each object. The number of
objects that can be completed in a particular state throughout the entire lifetime can be
calculated by summing up the previously calculated required times to complete each
object. This number of objects will be called Ndegraded , with each entry of the vector
corresponding to a particular state.
Next, an adjusted P matrix can be calculated, called P adj. The values in this
matrix correspond to those in the P matrix; however, the adjusted values are the
probabilities that the system is in each state given that the system did not begin operations
in that state. Each column of this matrix is calculated in exactly the same fashion as the
P matrix, but with the initial conditions set to zero for the given state and the probability
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of being in each other state normalized to account for zero probability in the given state.
The process of calculating Padj is shown in Equation 3-31:
-ad -l (n)
-o ( (n)
P_adj, (1,:) = Po_aj (3-31)
P_adj (t,:) = P_adj (t - 1,:)M
P_adj(:, n) = P_adj, (:,n)
where n varies from two through the total number of states. Note that the columns of
P adj corresponding to the first state, in addition to any state in which Po(n) is zero, will
be equal to the original P matrix and do not need to be recalculated. The P_adj matrix
will be used later in the process to find the probability that the system is not only in the
degraded state, but also has not been in that degraded state for the entire lifetime.
For all objects after Ndegradd (n), the probability of being in the degraded state n, is
adjusted to account for the probability that the entire lifetime of the mission has been
spent in that state. The probability in the P matrix is the probability that the system is in
a particular degraded state at a particular time. This probability needs to be adjusted to
become the probability that the system is in a particular degraded state at this time, and it
also did not begin operations in this state. We now have two known, calculated, values -
P adj, the probability that the system is in this state at this time given that it did not start
in this state, and (1- Po (n)), the probability that the system did not start in this state. We
are looking for the probability that both of these events occurred. From probabilistic
theory, we know that:
P(AB) = P(A)P(B I A) (3-32)
If we now substitute the event that the system did not begin in this state for event A by
setting P(A) equal to (-PO (n)), and substituting the event that the system is in the
degraded state at this time for event B, setting P(BIA) equal to P_adj, we have everything
we need to calculate the probability that the system both started in the nominal state and
is now in the degraded state, P(AB). Therefore, the values of the entries in the P matrix
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are substituted for (1- Po (n)) times the appropriate entry of the Padj matrix for all time
steps beyond the expected time to begin the next object after Ndegraded(n). This process is
shown in Equation 3-33:
P(1,2)
P(2,2)
(1- o(2))x Padj(a,2)
(1-(2))x P_adj(a + 1,2)
(1- P (2))x P adjb,2)
(1- O (2))x P _adj(b +,2)
P(1,n)
P(2,n)
P(a, n)
P(a+ l,n)
(1- o (n))x P adj(b,n)
(- (n))x P_ dj(b + 1,n)
where a is the expected time step where object (Ndegraded (2)+ 1) is begun, and b is the
expected time step where object (Ndegraded(n)+ 1) is begun.
3.2.6 Step 6: Probability that the System is Functional after Completing
Each Number of Objects
Once the expected number of time steps to complete an object has been
calculated, this information can then be used to find the probability that the system is
function after completing each number of objects. This is shown in Figure 3-10 and
discussed in detail below.
P(1,1)
P(2,1)
P(a,l)
P(a+l,1)
P(b,l)
P(b + 1,1)
PNeW =
(3-33)
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Figure 3-10: Probability that the system is functional after completing each number of objects
For each time step, the probability of being in each of the functioning and
partially functioning states can be summed, resulting in the probability that the system is
not in a completely failed state at that time. The vector of the identification numbers of
the states in which the system is functional, or working, will be called the working vector,
or W . Clearly, if an object cannot be completed in a degraded state then that state is not
considered a "working" state for that object. However, if the next object can be
completed in this degraded state, then for that object the state is listed in the working
vector. Therefore, W needs to be calculated on a per-object basis, and includes only
those states that are not only defined as a functioning state, but are also capable of
completing the given object. As mentioned previously, if it is not possible to complete an
object in a given state, the productivity model will return a value of zero. Therefore, it is
possible to identify the states that should be included in the working vector by identifying
those states for which the productivity model has returned a non-zero value. This is
shown in Equation 3-34:
W = find(t 0o)
R(n) = Probability that
system is
working after n
objects
W = find ( = 0)
ti (n)= Expected time at
object n is completed
sum=~( ·~ ·l
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where t is the vector of times to complete the given object returned by the productivity
model, and the find function returns the index of the vector entries that match the given
criteria.
Using the expected time to complete each given object, the index of the time step
at which it is expected that the system will be done completing that object can be
calculated. Define iR(n) as the probability that the system is in a working state at the end
of the nth object, as shown in Equation 3-35:
k(n) =sumP twtj J (3-35)
where te(n) is the time at which object n is expected to be completed, At is the length of a
time step, and P is the probability matrix (rows are time steps, columns are states).
3.2.7 Step 7: Adjustments to the Probability that the System is Functional
after Completing Each Number of Objects Calculation
A few adjustments to the calculations that determine the probability that the
system is functional after completing each number of objects are required to account for
specific situations. These adjustments are summarized in Figure 3-11, and discussed in
detail below.
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Adjust R to ensure calculating probability of
completing n objects, not the first n objects
in the initial ordering
9. Expected
number of
objects,
standard
deviation, CDF
Figure 3-11: Adjustments to the calculation of the probability that the system is in a functional state
at the end of each number of objects
The R vector is defined as the vector of probabilities that the system is in a
working state at the end of each object. The first adjustment to the R vector accounts for
situations when the system never leaves the first state. In this situation, it is possible to
calculate the exact time needed to complete each object. The only cases where it is clear
that the system never left the first state are cases where the last n objects in the initial
ordering could only be completed in the first state. In these cases, either the system
completed the objects still in the first state, or it did not complete the objects at all.
Instead of using the expected time to complete each object, it is possible to use the time
needed to complete all objects up to that point in the first state alone. To account for this
possibility, the amount of time needed to complete each object in the first state needs to
be recorded in addition to the expected time to complete each object. This first state time
is then used to determine R(i) for any object in which that object, and any objects later in
the list of objects, can only be completed in the first state.
Adjust R for case when object can only be
completed in first state
Kn track f time tn rnmnltf all
Adjust R for if the objects that can be completed in the
degraded states are late in the initial ordering
5, = Vector of objects that can be completed in all possible states.
td,(n)= T(dd,(i))
i-l
if sum(P(tds(n),:))> j(n)
f(n) = sum(P(td,(n),:))
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The first adjustment to the R vector is illustrated in Figure 3-12 through a simple
example. The time steps required to complete each object in each state are given at the
top of the figure. Also provided are the probabilities of being in each state at each time,
along with the expected number of time steps required to complete each object. With
these probabilities and expected time steps, the original R vector can be calculated, and
is shown in Figure 3-12a. The first adjustment, which was discussed above, is shown in
Figure 3-12b, with the affected entry of the R vector highlighted in blue.
A second adjustment to the R vector is needed to account for situations in which
the initial ordering of objects did not place all objects that can be completed in a degraded
state first. (n), as calculated previously, is the probability of being in a functioning or
partially functioning state at the end of the expected time to complete object n, but is
meant to represent the probability that the system will still be functional after completing
n objects. There is nothing about R(n) that implies that the system needs to complete
objects in the order that was used to estimate the time to complete each object. In other
words, if the second object cannot be completed in a degraded state, but the third object
can, then the probability of completing at least two objects will be the probability of
being in the nominal state at the end of two objects or in the degraded state at the end of
the third object. Therefore, when completing the calculations for R(n) it is important to
remember that if iR(n) is less than (n + 1), then objects n+l and n may be switched in
order depending on the state of the system at that time. To account for this, R is sorted
in increasing order. In this sense, R still holds the same meaning, but the order of the
objects is simply switched to account for those objects that may be more likely to be
completed, since they can be completed in the degraded states. The R vector should be
viewed as a vector of values, R(n), that represent the probability of the system being in a
functioning state after completing any n objects, and not the particular first n objects in
the initial ordering. This second adjustment is also illustrated in Figure 3-12c, again with
the affected entry of the R vector highlighted in blue.
The EPRA Path-Dependant Productivity Modeling Approach 83
NomIn.1 Sm.
adKt State
EJl:pect.-d Time St.p~f~lIlimAt.)
11 12 IJ '4 Ie Ie 17
Tm.5! J.. Nom.,al Twnes
. ,t 1 ,
Ob 2
O' J
Ob •
O' e
Time-steps 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
ProbabilityinNominal State 0.9 0.88 0.85 0.83 0.8 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.7 0.88 0.65 0.63 0.6 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.5
ProbabilityinDegraded State 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.37
Expected Number of Time
Steps
Objecl1 1
Objecl2 2
Objecl3 3
Objecl4 5
Objecl5 5
R(i)• Original
Object 1 0.945
Object 2 0.825
Object 3 0.750
Object 4 0.895
ObjectS 0.5
a. Original R( i)
P( State 1 only)
1 Object 0.9
2 Objects 0.825
3 Objects 0.75
4 Objects 0.650
5 Objects 0.525
Nominal state
only adjustment--~ R(i)-wI Adjustment 11 Object 0.9452 Objects 0.8253 Objects 0.754 Objects 0.895
5 Objects 0.525
b. Adjustment 1: Nominal state only
R(i)-wI Adjustment 1
1 Object 0.945
2 Objects 0.825
3 Objects 0.75
4 Objects 0.895
5 Objects 0.525
Degraded state
possible for only
some objects (sort)---~
R(i)- Sorted, wI
Adjustment 1
1 Object 0.945
2 Objects 0.895
3 Objects 0.825
4 Objects 0.750
5 Objects 0.525
c. Adjustment 2: Sorting
Number of objects thatcan be
completed inallstates 2
Total E(timesieps) to complete
allobjects from above 6
P(Nom or Deg State@end of
Timeslep 6) 0.920
Degraded state late in
initialordering
adjustment--~
R(i)- Final
1 Object 0.945
2 Objects 0.920
3 Objects 0.825
4 Objects 0.750
5 Objects 0.525
d. Adjustment 3: Degraded state late in initialordering
Figure 3-12 : Example of adjustments to the R vector.
The third and final adjustment to the R vector again accounts for situations in
which the initialordering of objects, based on the time to complete the objects in the
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nominal state, is not optimal as degradations occur. This adjustment specifically
accounts for situations in which only a few objects can be completed in a degraded state,
and those objects are not near the beginning of the initial ordering. The probability of
completing these objects is lowered by the fact that the ordering of objects places them
near the end of life in the simulation, leaving the probability of being in a completely
failed state higher than if they were attempted earlier in the order. In these cases, an
adjustment needs to be made to account for situations in which the system either starts or
transitions early to a degraded state. If the system is in a degraded state early in the life
of the mission, then the probability of completing all the objects that the degraded states
are capable of completing is higher than may have been previously calculated, since those
particular objects will now be completed earlier. To account for this scenario, the total
expected time required to complete all possible objects that can be completed in all
degraded states is calculated. If the probability of being in a functioning state by the end
of the time calculated is higher than the R vector entry for that number of objects, then
this probability is used in the R vector in place of the previously calculated value.
Essentially, this adjustment accounts for the fact that the probability values used for the
objects that can be completed in all degraded states need to be adjusted for any re-
ordering that occurred during the previous adjustment sorting the R vector.
This third adjustment is the final adjustment illustrated in Figure 3-12d, again
with the affected entry of the R vector highlighted in blue. The final R vector can be
seen in Figure 3-12d, and can be compared to the original R vector, shown in Figure
3-12a, to see the effect of all of the adjustments discussed above.
3.2.8 Step 8: Probability of Completing Exactly Each Number of Objects
The next step in the EPRA approach is to calculate the probability of completing
exactly each number of objects. This step is summarized in Figure 3-13 and discussed in
more detail below.
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Figure 3-13: Probability of completing exactly each number of objects
For each object there are two possible outcomes: the object was completed or it
was not completed. The probability that the object was completed is equal to the
probability that the system is in a functioning or partially functioning state at the
completion of the object, which is equal to .R(n). Since the number of time steps required
to complete the object is an expected value, which already takes into account the longer
time needed to complete the object in partially failed states, it is assumed that if the
system is in a functioning or partially functioning state at the required time, the object is
completed. For the first object on the list there is a probability, equal to the probability
that the system is in a completely failed state by the end of completing that first object, or
(I-R(l)), that no objects will be completed. There is also a probability, equal to the
probability that the system is still in a functioning state at the end of the first object, but
in a completely failed state by the end of the second object, that the system will complete
exactly one object. Likewise, for the second object processed, there is a probability,
equal to the probability that the system is functioning at the end of the second object but
not at the end of the third object, that the instrument will complete exactly two objects. If
If system is not working at the end of the (n+l)th object,
defined as (- R(n+ 1)), one of two events must have
occurred:
* The system failed prior to object n: - (n)
* The system failed while completing object n+1
resulting in exactly n objects. Define this
probability as P.,, (n)
--
--------- 
-
---- 
-
IU---·^lrri----··P-·rrr·l-··P^^-*l*nr
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two events, A and B, are mutually exclusive, then the probability of either A or B
occurring is the sum of the probabilities of either occurring. If event C is exhaustive in
events A and B, and can therefore only occur if either event A or event B occurs, then
P(C) = P(A) + P(B). In this case, if the system is not in a working state at the end of the
(n+l)th object, which occurs with a probability of (1- R(n + 1)), there are only two events
which could have occurred. Either the system failed prior to finishing the nth object,
which occurs with a probability equal to (- R(n)), or the system failed between the n h
and (n+l)th object, resulting in exactly n objects being completed, defined as Pexact (n).
(1- R(n + 1))= (- R(n))+ Pexac (n) (3-36)
Rearranging and simplifying Equation 3-36, it can be shown that the probability that the
system completed exactly n objects, act (n), is given by (R(n)- R(n + 1)). This is shown
in Equation 3-37:
Pe (n)= (1- R(n + 1))- - (n)) (3-37)
exact (n)= (n)- (n + 1)
where iR(n) is the probability of being in a functioning or partially functioning state,at the
mission elapsed time when object n is expected to be completed and Pexact(n) is the
probability of completing exactly n objects.
3.2.9 Step 9: Expected Number of Objects, Standard Deviation, and CDF
The final step to the EPRA approach is to calculate the desired outputs: the
expected number of objects (expected productivity); the standard deviation of this
expected value; and the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF). The output
calculations are summarized in Figure 3-14, and discussed in more detail below.
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Figure 3-14: Calculating the EPRA outputs
Once the probability of completing exactly each number of objects is calculated,
the expected number of objects completed is simply the probability times the number of
objects, as shown in Equation 3-38.
E[objects] = Zn * ((n)- R(n + l))
n=l:length(objects)
(3-38)
Additionally, the expected number of objects squared, and therefore the standard
deviation, can be calculated as shown in Equation 3-39.
E[objects2]= n2 * (R(n)- R(n + 1))
n=l:length(objecls) (3-39)
cr(objects) = (E[objeCt2 ]- (E[objectsD2 )
i(n) as calculated above is defined as the probability of being in a functioning or
partially functioning state at the end of the expected time to complete object n.
Therefore, the probability of completing at least n objects is equivalent to (n). If a
project has a goal of completing at least a given number of objects, the probability of
87
88 The EPRA Path-Dependant Productivity Modeling Approach
accomplishing that goal can now be calculated. Therefore, the architecture and failure
rates required to meet that goal with a given probability can be calculated. The
cumulative distribution function, or CDF, is defined as the probability that a random
variable will be less than or equal to a given value. In this case, the random variable is
the number of objects completed by the end of the lifetime. Therefore, the CDF can
easily be calculated as ( - R(n + 1)) for each value of n. First, from basic definitions, the
probability that x is greater than a given value n can be determined using (n):
By Definition:
P(x > n) = R(n)
(3-40)
P(x > n) = P(x > n) - P(x = n)
P(x > n) = (n)- (R(n)- R(n + 1)) = R(n + 1)
The definition of the CDF is the probability that x is less than a given value n, or one
minus the probability that x is greater than or equal to n. This is shown in Equation 3-41:
P(x < n)= 1- P(x > n)= 1- (n + 1) (3-41)
F(n)= 1- R(n + 1)
where F(n) is the Cumulative Distribution Function.
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3.2.10 Approach Summary
The EPRA approach described above is summarized in Figure 3-15. Figure 3-15
is a distilled step-by-step guide to implementing the EPRA approach for any mission or
project. Each of the steps shown is discussed in detail in the above sections. The seven
main steps to the EPRA approach shown in Figure 3-15 are the same steps as the seven
main boxes shown in Figure 3-1. The boxes labeled "adjustments," as well as other small
details, are shown in the sub-steps in Figure 3-15.
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1. Use probability of failures prior to operations to determine
initial conditions and the expected value of the system
parameters
2. Use Markov modeling to find P, a matrix of the probability of
being in each state at each time-step
3. Find time to complete each object in all states
1. Use productivity model
2. Find proper order of objects
1. If possible to complete object in any degraded
state but not in nominal state, make time to
complete object in nominal state equal to the
shortest possible degraded state time
2. Sort objects in terms of increasing time required
to complete in nominal state
4. Find the expected time to complete each object. For each
object:
1. Find the index of the current simulation time, and the
time to complete each object (t)
time - tindex = - , =-
At At
2. Find the expected number of time steps to complete the
object
1. Use adjusted values of probabilities for
degraded states if object is beyond Ndegaed (i)
1. Determine the number of objects that
could be completed in the given lifetime
in each degraded state: Ndegded
2. Find Padj using the A matrix and
foi.adj 7
n1
oadj l _ p (
_ 1-o (n) (n)
3. Use the entry from P_adj instead of P if
the object is beyond Ndegaded(i)
2. Normalize probabilities based on only those
states in which completing the object is possible
f =fifnd(t •O) - P(index,f)
sum(P(index, f))
At = Length of one time- step
PO = Initial conditions: Vector
of probabilities of being in
each state at beginning of life
A = State - transition matrix
t = Column vector of times
required in each state.
Reported as 0 if not possible
to function in that state.
P = Matrix of the probability that
the system is in each state
(columns) at each time (rows).
Ys = Vector of states in which
system is functioning.
T = Number of time -steps
required in each state.
R(i) = Probability of being in a
working state when
object i is completed
P_,, = Probability of
completing exactly each
number of objects.
E[objects] = Expected number
of objects.
a(objects) = Standard deviation
F = Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF)
tc = Vector of expected times
to complete each object
3. Update clock by the expected number of time-steps
time = time + T x At
4. If time is less than the lifetime, move on to the next
object
i.e. irsf ) # 0.
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5. Calculate the R vector
1. Define R(n) as the probability that the system is working when n objects are
completed
e (n) = Expected time at which object n is completed
r(n) = sum(p(te()
2. Adjust R(n) for situation in which it is only possible to complete the object in
the first state
1. Keep track of time to complete each object in first state. If object, and
all objects after given object, can only be completed in first state, use
probability that the system is still in the first state when reach given
object.
3. Adjust R to ensure calculating probability of completing n objects and not the
first n objects in the order calculated.
2. Sort R in decreasing order
4. Adjust for situation in which objects that can be completed in the degraded
states are late in the initial ordering
ods, = Vector of objects that can be completed in all possible states.
n~Id; (n) = E T°ds OD))i=i
if sum(P(itd(n),:))> i(n)
R(n) = sum(P(tdS (n),:))
6. Find the vector of probabilities that the system completed exactly n objects before
failing.
1. Probability of completing exactly n objects is the same as the probability of
being in a working state at the end of the nth object, but in a failed state at the
end of the (n+l)th object.
1. If system is not working at the end of the (n+l)th object, defined as
(1- R(n + 1)), one of two events must have occurred:
1. The system failed prior to object n: I - iR(n)
2. The system failed while completing object n+l resulting in
exactly n objects. Define this probability as Peaxc(n)
(I - R(n + I))= ( - i(n))+ exac(n)
Pexact(n) =(- (n + ))- ( - (n))
Pexac(n) = Ri(n)- Ri(n + 1)
7. Determine the expected number of objects, the standard deviation, and the CDF
E[objects]= E n P,(x (n)
n=l leng(objecs, P(x > n) = R(n)
E[objects]= Pexx[I 2 ... n
E[objects2]= Z n2 x Pe, (n)
I=l:length(objects )
a(objects) = I(E objects 2- (E[objects 2 )
P(x > n)= P(x 2 n)- ,(n) = R(n)- (R(n)- (n+ 1))
P(x > n)= R(n+ 1)
P(x < n)= F(n) =1- P(x > n) =1- R(n + 1)
Figure 3-15: Step-by-step summary of EPRA approach
92 The EPRA Path-Dependant Productivity Modeling Approach
3.3 Testing the EPRA Approach
3.3.1 Test Set-up
As with most reliability and risk modeling, there is little to no data available to
verify that the approach presented above is producing accurate results. In the aerospace
industry, systems take years to be developed and built, during which time the final, actual
productivity is unknown. Additionally, only a single copy of each system is usually built,
providing only a single data point to judge the expected productivity. Therefore, the only
available method to test the EPRA approach is to use simulation. A Monte Carlo
simulation was used to test the results of the method discussed above.
At first glance, the probability that a particular failure did not occur in each time
step in the Monte Carlo analysis may be calculated as R = e- , where t is the current
time in the simulation and X is the failure rate for each particular failure. However, this
probability is the probability of no failure occurring anytime before the given time, t. In
the Monte Carlo analysis the state the system is currently in is known. Therefore, the
probability of particular failures occurring previous to that time step is zero, because if
the failure had occurred, the system would be in a different state. What is really needed
is the probability of the failure not occurring in that exact time step. Therefore, the
correct equation for the reliability in that time step uses the amount of time in the time
step, or At, instead of the current time. The correct equation for the probability of each
particular failure not occurring in a given time step is R = e- ' .
This equation can be derived more rigorously from first principles. What is
needed is R, defined as the probability that the system did not fail in a given time step.
This is equal to one minus the probability that the system did fail in the given time step,
defined as P*. The fact that we are dealing with a given time step implies that the system
did not fail before the beginning of the time step, but did fail before the end of the time
step. Therefore, P* can be defined rigorously as:
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P* = P(T < t2 T t ) (3-42)
where T is the time a failure occurred, t is the time at the beginning of the time step, and
t2 is the time at the end of the time step. In a general sense,
P(AIB)= P(AB)
P(B)
and (3-43)
R(t) = P(T < t) = 1-e- "'
where P(AB) is the probability of A and B both occurring, P(B) is the probability of B
occurring, P(AIB) is the probability of A given B, T is the time a failure occurred (a
random variable), t is a given time, and X is the failure rate. Using this formula, P* can
be derived. Using Equation 3-42 and the first line of Equation 3-43:
P* = P(T < t2lT > t )
p* P(t, T t 2 ) (3-44)
P(T t )
Next, the numerator can be simplified. Figure 3-16 provides a graphical description of
this step. In this figure, the area shown with red stripes is the probability that Xis less
than x2, called F(x2). The area shown with blue stripes is the probability that X is less
than xl, called F(xl). Additionally, the figure shows that the probability that X is larger
than x, but smaller than x2, shown as the area on the figure with red stripes only, can be
calculated as F(x2 )- F(XI).
= P(T t )-P( (3-45)
P(T > t, )
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fx(x)
Area = P(XI ~ X ~X2} = F(X2} - F(xl}
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Figure 3-16: Clarification of P(t)<=T<=t2)=P(T<=t2)-P(T<=t)
Combining Equation 3-45 with the second line of Equation 3-43:
(3-46)
Finally, simplifying and using the definition of the time step gives us the final formula for
P*, as shown in Equation 3-47:
(e-..tJ1 _ e-..tJ2)
P*=-----e-..tJ1
p* = 1- eA(II-12)
p* = 1- e-A(aJ)
(3-47)
Since p* is defined as the probability that the system will fail during the time
step, R, or the probability that the system will not fail during that time step, is simply 1-
P*, as shown in Equation 3-48.
R = 1- p* = e -..t(~t) (3-48)
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Once the method for calculating R in each time step is determined, each trial of
the Monte Carlo simulation can calculate the number of objects completed. This is
accomplished by stepping through the simulation one time step at a time. Each trial
begins in the completely functioning state. After testing for pre-operational failures, the
probability of a failure not occurring during each time step is determined using the
method described above. The Matlab function "rand" is used to draw a random number
between zero and one. If this random number is larger than the calculated R, then a
failure has occurred. The state of the system is changed to reflect the failure and, if the
system is still functioning, the time required in that state to complete that particular object
is calculated. Using the length of the time step and the completion time, the fraction of
the object that is completed in that time step is calculated. The simulation then moves on
to the next time step and repeats the process until either the system fails or the total
fraction of an object is equal to one. Once an object is completed, the information
required for the next time step is calculated using the characteristics of the next object in
the list. This process is repeated until either the system has failed or the lifetime of the
mission is exhausted. At the end of the simulation, the total number of objects
completed is calculated by summing up the fractions of all objects in the list.
The path-dependent EPRA simulation approach discussed previously was tested
against this Monte Carlo approach to verify the accuracy of the new method. All tests
were initially conducted using 100 trials per Monte Carlo simulation. It should be noted
that these tests are meant to validate the approach and not the specifics of the risk model
used. Both approaches use the same model, and should therefore get the same or very
similar results. However, there is nothing in these tests to validate that the model used is
modeling the example mission correctly.
3.3.2 Results
The new EPRA path-dependant simulation approach was tested against the Monte
Carlo simulation approach for two different models and many different scenarios. The
first model, called the Detailed Level model, includes detailed failure modes for an
example mission. The second model, called the Systems Level model, models the
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degraded state productivities of several different architectures for the same mission, and
includes major system-level failures only. The two simulation approaches were tested
against one another using these models with several different scenarios. Different
scenarios contained varying combinations of lifetime, time step, failure rates, system
configurations and architectures.
Thirteen different scenarios were tested using the Systems Level model along
with twenty-two scenarios using the Detailed Level model. The results from the two
different approaches were then compared for each scenario. A p-test was completed for
each scenario [Rumsey, 2003]. In these tests, it is hypothesized that the EPRA path-
dependant simulation approach discussed above is correct and providing accurate
answers. The p-value from this test gives the percentage chance that, if the true values
were the same as the EPRA approach results, the Monte Carlo would return the given
results. A p-value of five or higher is considered a passing value, leading to a 95%
confidence in the hypothesis. See Figure 3-17 for an explanation of the p-value. In
Figure 3-17, the blue line represents the Monte Carlo results for the number of objects.
The red line represents the EPRA results for the expected number of objects. The shaded
area shows the probability that the Monte Carlo results would have returned a value as far
away or farther than the actual value returned, if the EPRA results are assumed to be
accurate, which is defined as the p-value.
\
Shaded area =
p-value
Figu re 3-17: Explanation of p-value (two-tailed).
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For both the Detailed Level model and the Systems Level model cases, a single
scenario initially failed the p-test used to compare the two simulation approaches. This
was a total of two p-test failures out of 35 trials. It is worth noting that this number of
failures is to be expected. Recall that passing the p-test is defined by a having a 95%
confidence in the hypothesis. Therefore, even in a perfect case, 5% of the results should
fall outside this 95% confidence level and result in a failure in the p-test. Two failures
out of 35 trials is a 5.7% failure rate, which is nearly exactly what would be expected
given the nature of the p-test.
In addition to the one p-test failure, several scenarios from each model produced
results that varied between the EPRA simulation and the Monte Carlo simulation by more
than expected. In each case, when the scenario was run again with more trials in the
Monte Carlo simulation, the results became much closer and passed the p-test. This is
shown in Figure 3-18. These results show not only that the new EPRA approach does an
excellent job of matching the Monte Carlo results, but also highlight one of the
weaknesses of using Monte Carlo simulations. While using as few trials as possible per
Monte Carlo simulation will help to keep down the simulation time, it can lead to errors
and uncertainty in the results, since the Monte Carlo simulation is by definition
dependent upon random chance. The new EPRA simulation approach is both quite
accurate when compared to the Monte Carlo results and completely repeatable with the
same accuracy level every time. The accuracy of the EPRA approach can be seen in
Tables 3-1 and 3-2, and is discussed below.
98 The EPRA Path-Dependant Productivity Modeling Approach
90
~ 80
4l
"iJ 70
o
'0 60
; 50
.Qg 40
Z 30
'0
~ 20
4le- 10
w 0
-t
@-. fffi.-~--. --
t
-,-
--@ •
-~
~-(i)-,
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
10 Number
a) Initial results
III 90
g 80 -t-
"E 70o
'0 60
; 50
.Q
~ 40
Z 30
'0
.! 20u
8. 10
d1 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
10 Number
• EPRA
• MonteCarlo
b) Results after re-running Monte Carlo simulations
Figure 3-18: Results for different scenarios for the Systems Level model tests before and after re-
running Monte Carlo simulations. The scenarios circled in green have been re-done with additional
trials per Monte Carlo.
The numerical results of the simulation testing can be seen in Table 3-1 and Table
3-2. Table 3-1 shows the results for the Detailed Level model, while Table 3-2 shows the
results for the Systems Level model. Note that in the best cases, the results from the
Monte Carlo simulation and the EPRA simulation matched almost exactly. Even in the
worst performing cases, the differences between the results from the two approaches are
very small. This is best seen by noticing the fraction of a standard deviation (SO) that
separates the two approaches, shown in the last three rows of Table 3-1 and Table 3-2.
The standard deviation metric takes the standard deviation from the Monte Carlo
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simulation to be "truth" and determines the ratio of the difference in the expected number
of objects, between the Monte Carlo simulation and the EPRA approach, to this standard
deviation. This metric has an average value of zero, to two significant digits, for both
types of models. This implies that not only are the results nearly identical, the EPRA
approach is not consistently either larger or smaller than the Monte Carlo approach.
Even when looking at the absolute value of the difference between the approaches, the
maximum difference found in either type of model is only 12% of a single standard
deviation. These results clearly show that the EPRA approach is providing very accurate
results.
Table 3-1: Performance results from Detailed Level model tests.
Number of Scenarios Tested 22
Average p-value 73.8
Min p-value 7.2
Max p-value 100.0
Average % off from MC -0.27%
Min 1% off from MCI 0.05%
Max 1% off from MCI 5.8%
Average # of SD off from MC 0.00
Min # of SD off from MCI 0.001
Max # of SD off from MCI 0.12
Table 3-2: Performance results from Systems Level model tests.
Number of Scenarios Tested 13
Average p-value 62.6
Min p-value 31.7
Max p-value 100.0
Average % off from MC -0.16%
Min 1% off from MCI 0.22%
Max 1% off from MCI 5.28%
Average # of SD off from MC 0.00
Min # of SD off from MCI 0.002
Max # of SD off from MCI 0.06
The new EPRA approach is also capable of calculating the CDF of the expected
productivity. This allows a designer to get a feel for where a requirement stands in
relation to the probability of meeting that requirement. Examples of the CDFs calculated
100 The EPRA Path-Dependant Productivity Modeling Approach
by the EPRA approach compared to those calculated by the Monte Carlo simulation are
shown in Figure 3-19. Note that the two CDFs follow the same trends and have break-
points at the same locations for both approaches. Since the CDP shows the probability of
meeting various productivity levels, providing an accurate CDP to design teams could be
a powerful design tool.
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Figure 3-19: CDFs for two different tested scenarios. The solid green line shows the new EPRA
simulation results while the red lines show the Monte Carlo results (dashed lines represent the 95%
confidence interval).
The mInor differences between the EPRA and Monte Carlo results can be
explained both by the randomness associated with the Monte Carlo result as well as by
the approximations used in the EPRA approach. While these approximations will lead to
a very small difference between the EPRA results and the truth-value, these small errors
are justified by the speed of calculation. Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 show the computation
times required for the new EPRA simulation versus the Monte Carlo simulation. On
average the computation time was nearly 5 times faster for the Systems Level model
cases and nearly 70 times faster for the Detailed Level model cases using the new EPRA
simulation over the Monte Carlo simulation. Additionally, the maximum computation
time over all scenarios was reduced from 2.5 hours for the Monte Carlo simulation to
only a little over 10 minutes for the new EPRA approach. Note that while the code was
not optimized to minimize computation times for either approach, effort was taken to
ensure that neither effort wasted or repeated calculations.
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Table 3-3: Computation times for Detailed Level model tests. EPRA stands for the EPRA
simulation and MC stands for Monte Carlo simulation.
Average EPRA Time 2.4 min
Min EPRA Time 0.5 min
Max EPRA time 3.1 min
Average MC Time 85.0 min
Min MC Time 21.4 min
Max MC Time 149.7 min
Average MC Time/EPRA Time 69.3
Min MC Time/EPRA Time 7.7
Max MC Time/EPRA Time 274.1
Table 3-4: Computation times for Systems Level model tests. EPRA stands for the EPRA simulation
and MC stands for Monte Carlo simulation.
Average EPRA Time 5.5 min
Min EPRA Time 1.6 min
Max EPRA time 11.2 min
Average MC Time 18.2 min
Min MC Time 8.1 min
Max MC Time 40.9 min
Average MC Time/EPRA Time 4.6
Min MC Time/EPRA Time 1.9
Max MC Time/EPRA Time 11.9
The computation times for the EPRA approach are longer for the Systems Level
model than they are for the Detailed Level model. This is caused by the fact that
differences in productivity for the Detailed Level model are based primarily on changes
to factors applied to the nominal productivities. Therefore, the time required to complete
each object only needed to be calculated once and could then be adjusted with a minimal
calculation, to obtain the time required to complete the object in the degraded states. The
differences in productivity between states in the Systems Level model are based primarily
on new configurations; consequently, the time required to complete each object needed to
be calculated separately for each degraded state for each object.
In an opposite trend from the EPRA approach, the computation time for the
Monte Carlo simulation using the Detailed Level model takes longer than the Systems
Level model, because it is necessary to calculate the actual time required for each object
during each Monte Carlo run using the Detailed Level model. Unlike in the Systems
Level model, failures can build on one another. It is possible to calculate the base
w . II - -
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productivity times in advance, but initial productivity factors depend on starting
conditions and all productivity builds off those factors, requiring that the final time,
including both the factor and the pre-calculated base time, be calculated for each object.
While this calculation is simple and takes little computational effort per object, the time
and effort required to repeat this calculation for each object in each Monte Carlo trial
builds up. This situation is more complicated, and in a sense a better approximation of
reality, than the Systems Level model.
3.4 Conclusions
The new EPRA approach presented here uses small approximations to directly
calculate the expected productivity, standard deviation of that productivity, and CDF of
systems with path-dependant productivities. These values can then be used as metrics in
any design trade matrix to facilitate decisions between designs. The new EPRA approach
presented returns statistically identical results to those of a conventional Monte Carlo
simulation, but calculates these results in significantly less time. This leads to the ability
to test multiple designs and use these results to incorporate risk and degraded state
productivity into the design.
Chapter 4
TERRESTRIAL PLANET FINDER
INTERFEROMETER (TPF-I) OVERVIEW
The previous chapters discussed the value of using expected productivity as a risk
metric, as well as the need for, and the development of, the new EPRA path-dependant
productivity modeling approach. However, the clearest way to show that expected
productivity analysis can have a true impact on design decisions is to show this impact
through example case-studies using a real mission. The two case-studies presented in this
thesis both use the same application mission: Terrestrial Planet Finder Interferometer
(TPF-I). There are many reasons why TPF-I makes an excellent application mission for
this research, including the fact that it is a very complex and expensive mission, it is
currently in a very early phase of the design, it has very clear potential for degraded
states, and, since it is an observatory, it has a path-dependant productivity function. The
rationale for using TPF-I as the application mission for this research is explained in more
detail at the end of this chapter; however, to give a better understanding of this rationale,
as well as a better understanding of the models used in the case-studies, a mission
overview and a discussion of how an interferometer works, both in general and in terms
of the specific productivity model used, are given first.
4.1 Terrestrial Planet Finder Mission Overview
One of the fundamental questions in space science is whether or not life exists
anywhere else in our universe. The possibility of life on other worlds has sparked the
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imagination of scientists and the general public throughout the centuries. The concept of
discovering that we are not alone is so exciting and thought provoking that it has
spawned numerous books, movies, and television shows. The search for life on other
worlds also has major scientific drivers. According to the 2001 decadal review of
astronomy and astrophysics, published by the National Research Council:
"The discovery of life on another planet is potentially one of the most important
scientific advances of this century, let alone this decade, and it would have
enormous philosophical implications." [JPL, TPF, 2005]
Due to the ramifications of the research involved, determining if life exists on other
worlds is a one of the focus science areas of NASA. The program dealing with the search
for other life is called Origins.
One of the flagship missions in the Origins program is called Terrestrial Planet
Finder (TPF). TPF has two main goals [JPL, TPF, 2005]:
· Detect Earth-like planets in the habitable zone around other stars
* Characterize the atmospheres of the planets found to examine for evidence
of possible past, current, or future life
The first goal of the TPF project is to detect Earth-like planets around other stars. For a
planet to be considered "Earth-like" it needs to be approximately the same size as Earth.
Planets that are either too big or too small are assumed to not be candidates for life.
Additionally, the planets need to be located within the "habitable zone." The habitable
zone is the range of distances from the star where it is assumed that life may be possible.
If a planet is too close to or too far from a star, the temperature of the planet would not be
appropriate to support life. Specifically, the habitable zone is set by the range in which
the temperature of the planet could support liquid water. Science requirements state that
TPF must survey 150 stars to look for planets in the habitable zone. All of these stars
should be located within 15 parsecs of our solar system.
The second main goal of the TPF mission is to characterize any planets that are
found during the detection phase of the mission. Spectroscopy will be used to determine
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the chemical compositions of the atmospheres of any detected planets. The chemical
composition of the atmosphere can give several clues about whether or not life has ever
existed on the planet. Are the building blocks of life, such as water, carbon monoxide, or
carbon dioxide present? Are there indications that life may currently exist on the planet,
such as ozone, molecular oxygen, or non-equilibrium conditions? Information about the
atmospheric content of any detected planets could be the first step towards concretely
identifying life on another world.
The requirement that TPF must not only be able to detect planets within the
habitable zone, but also characterize their atmospheres, presents the major technical
hurdle for the mission. While planets have been detected around other stars in the past,
none have been in the habitable zone. Indirect detection, such as detection based on
gravitational wobbles, usually detects planets that are much closer to the star than the
habitable zone definition allows. In addition, planets do not produce light of their own,
but simply reflect the light of their parent star. This implies that planets themselves are
very faint sources, making direct detection very difficult. In order to characterize the
atmospheres of the planets that are found, the detection must be a direct detection. Direct
detection of planets within the habitable zone is very difficult due to the relative
brightness of the star compared to the planet. In general, the parent star is anywhere
between one million and ten billion times brighter than the planet [JPL, TPF, 2005]. This
problem is explained on the TPF website:
"For example, if there were a planet orbiting Proxima Centauri, the nearest star, it
would be 7,000 times more distant than Pluto. Trying to observe this planet would
be like standing in Boston and looking for a moth near a spotlight in San Diego."
[JPL, TPF, 2005]
A planet can be located by reducing the ratio of the brightness of the parent star to the
planet. This is accomplished by reducing the light source from the star. Reducing the
light source from the star is called blocking out the starlight, and is carried out using one
of two technologies - coronagraphs or nulling interferometers.
TPF will consist of two separate missions. The first mission launched will be a
coronagraph instrument. The basic idea behind a coronagraph is to block out the parent
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starlight by using an occulting disk. The occulting disk is flown in front of the telescope.
The coronagraph version ofTPF, known as TPF-C, is a visible light instrument.
The second TPF mission will be a formation flown nulling interferometer
mission, known as TPF-I. While TPF-C is a visible light instrument, TPF-I is an infrared
instrument. The difference in the wavelengths used is the main reason for including both
missions in the TPF suite. The two different wavelength regimes can provide different
and unique information from a spectroscopic analysis. The combination of the
information provided by both wavelength regimes is exceptionally valuable when
attempting to identify life signatures. Artist renditions of both TPF-I and TPF-C can be
seen in Figure 4-1.
a. TPF-C
b. TPF-I
Figure 4-1: Artist renditions of both TPF missions
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TPF-I uses a nulling interferometer instrument. A nulling interferometer
combines light beams in a way such that some of the light cancels out, while other light is
not cancelled out. The waves of light from the star are combined from different sources,
or apertures, in a destructive way. In this way the light from the star is cancelled out.
However, the light from the off-center planet is not completely cancelled out. To achieve
the nulling interferometer functions most efficiently, TPF-I uses a formation of separate
spacecraft. Either three or four apertures are flown in formation and used to collect the
starlight. The starlight beams from these separate apertures are then transferred between
spacecraft to the combining bench.
The research presented in this thesis uses TPF-I as the application mission for
both case-studies. Therefore, the productivity model used, in addition to the rules for
degraded state functionality, deals with the basic concepts of interferometry. To aid in
better understanding these models, the concepts of interferometry in general, and of
nulling interferometry, are explained further in the following section.
4.2 Basic Concepts of Interferometry
4.2.1 General Interferometry
Resolution is one of the key parameters used to describe the power of a telescope.
A telescope with course resolution can make out smaller objects than one with fine
resolution. This parameter improves (decreases) with increased diameter of the main
aperture, or mirror. As mirrors get larger however, they get more impractical to launch
into space. An interferometer is a type of telescope that uses multiple smaller mirrors
instead of one large one. With this method, if two one-meter diameter mirrors are placed
a kilometer apart they will have the same resolution as a one-kilometer diameter mirror.
This method of improving resolution is very powerful for space-based telescopes, since
launch costs can be dramatically reduced.
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4.2.1.1 Fringes
A telescope creates images by collecting photons from the target being observed.
In celestial observations the targets are usually stars. If it is sufficiently far away, a star
can be considered a point of light with no angular diameter. A typical optical telescope
with a single main aperture collects photons in the manner shown in Figure 4-2. In this
figure, the black line is the photon rates from a single point of light, represented as the
black dot. If a second point of light is next to the initial point of light, as in the green
dot, it will create a similar pattern, slightly shifted, as seen by the green line. In this case
the second, or green, point of light is fainter than the first, or black, point of light. This
can be seen from the relative amplitudes of the peaks. The actual data from the telescope
would not show these individual patterns, but the sum of the individual patterns. The
angular resolution of a single aperture optical telescope is given by Equation 4-1 .
• •
Figure 4-2: Photon rates for a single aperture optical telescope
Angular Resolution
A--
D
(4-1)
In Equation 4-1, A is the wavelength of the light being observed, and D is the diameter of
the main aperture. If the second point of light is too close to the first point of light, then
the peaks will overlap, and the telescope will not be able to see a distinction between the
points. The second point, or star, needs to be separated from the first point, or star, by the
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width of the peaks in order for the stars to be distinguishable. This gives the equation for
angular resolution.
Interferometers are similar to single aperture optical telescopes in many ways.
The images are again created by collecting photons from the targets. With
interferometers, a number of measurements are required to get a full image of a target.
An example of the data an interferometer would measure can be seen in Figure 4-3a.
This pattern of photon rate versus projected angle in the sky is called a fringe, and is used
to determine information about the target. The distance between the two collecting
apertures is known as the baseline, and is represented as B. The pattern in Figure 4-3a is
similar to that from an optical telescope, shown in Figure 4-2, in that the peaks are of
equivalent widths, with the diameter simply replaced by the baseline. The main
difference is that the peaks in the pattern from the interferometer do not decay, but rather
are of constant amplitude. The effect of the baseline can be seen in Figure 4-3b. As the
baseline increases, the frequency of the fringe increases. The amplitude of the peaks is
again dependent on the magnitude of the target.
B
Angle in Sky, e Angle in Sky, e
a: Single baseline b. Showing the effects of varying baselines
Figure 4-3: Photon rates for an interferometer
Interferometers use active delay lines to change the distance the light travels to
the combining optics from one aperture versus the other aperture. When the light from
the two apertures is combined, it creates the pattern shown in Figure 4-3. If the light
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from the two apertures traveled exactly the same distance, or exactly one wavelength
different, then it would combine constructively, giving rise to one of the peaks shown in
Figure 4-3. If the light from the two apertures was exactly half a wavelength off, it
would combine destructively, and give rise to one of the valleys shown in Figure 4-3.
There are two ways to think about the axes of a fringe. A fringe can be thought of
as a projected pattern on the sky. In this method, the light from a target travels the same
distance to both apertures if it is directly in line with the middle point of the two sets of
optics, giving rise to a peak. As the star moves to one side or the other of the middle
point, the light begins to travel slightly different amounts to each aperture, causing
varying constructive and destructive interference levels, and giving rise to a fringe
pattern. In this case, the x-axis of the fringe is the angle in the sky of the target compared
to the mid-point of the apertures, and the y-axis remains the photon rate. Figure 4-3
shows this method of portraying a fringe, while Figure 4-4 shows an example of this
angular offset. The second method of portraying a fringe is to consider a fringe the
pattern a target would make in the focal plane of the instrument. In this method, the x-
axis is the amount of offset in the delay line, or the optical path difference (OPD), and the
y-axis is the photon rate. If this method of portraying a fringe is used, the pattern remains
similar to the one shown in Figure 4-3; however, the axes change and the width of the
peaks is no longer X/B, but rather the distance between the peaks is simply X, as shown in
Figure 4-5. The patterns shown in Figures 4-3 and 4-5 are representative of a single point
in the sky with zero angular width. [Lay, 2001]
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e
Figure 4-4: Definition of angle in sky
B
OPD
Figure 4-5: Photon rates for an interferometer
4.2.1.2 Visibility
Unless a star is infinitely far away, it is actually wider than a single point in the
sky. This width is effectively seen in interferometer measurements as individual points
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of light next to each other that together are as wide as the actual star. This can be seen in
Figure 4-6 .
••••++o
B
Figure 4-6: Collecting light from multiple points in an interferometer
In Figure 4-6, each point is separated by an angular distance e. Note that the different
colors in Figure 4-6 represent different points of light, all with the same wavelength.
Light coming straight into both apertures is compared to light coming in at an angle e,
implying the target is offset in the sky by this same angle. This offset causes the light to
travel Bsin{} farther to one aperture than to the other. This extra distance can be
approximated as Be for small angles. The effect on the fringe pattern is similar to the
effect of adding a second point to the pattern in an optical telescope. This effect can be
seen in Figure 4-7. A target represented by the four points shown in Figure 4-6 would be
40 wide. As the star gets wider and wider, there are more and more points of light next to
each other. As with the optical telescope, these individual patterns for each point do not
appear in the data, but rather the sum of all photons is recorded. The sum of the
individual patterns can be seen in Figure 4-8 for a single point of light up to four points of
light. Note that as more points of light are summed, implying a larger star, the total
photon rate becomes more constant, with less relative difference between the valleys and
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the peaks. It is this difference that is used to measure the angular size of the star in the
sky.
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Figure 4-7: Photon rates from multiple points of light
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Figure 4-8: Total photon rates for up to 4 points
Visibility is a parameter used to measure the relationship between peaks and
valleys of a fringe. Figure 4-9 and Equation 4-2 illustrate the method of calculating fringe
visibility. If a single point of light is measured, as in the black line in Figure 4-8, the
valleys of the pattern have zero amplitude. Therefore, the y variable in Equation 4-2 is
zero, and the visibility is equal to one. However, if two or more points are seen to
together, as in a star with angular width, the valleys no longer have amplitudes of exactly
zero. For example, in Figures 4-6 and 4-7 the point A has zero photon rate if just the
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black line is measured. If multiple lines are summed, as is the case with the green, blue,
and red lines in Figure 4-8, the sum is no longer zero. These summed lines in fact will
never reach a value of zero. Therefore, the value ofy in the equation for visibility will no
longer be zero, and the visibility will no longer be one.
X
Y
Figure 4-9: Visibility calculation definitions
A 0.5(x -y)vis = 5xy-=)
B 0.5(x +y) (4-2)
As more patterns are summed the relative sum of the peak and the valley, B, increases,
while the relative difference, A, decreases. This causes the visibility to decrease. In the
extreme case, if the fringe were a constant value, x would equal y in Equation 4-2, and the
visibility would be zero. Therefore, a single point of light will have a visibility of exactly
one, while a star of infinite width will have a visibility of zero. This relationship can be
seen in Figure 4-10.
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Figure 4-10: Visibility comparison for up to 4 points
As discussed previously and shown in Figure 4-7, the distance between the
patterns of individual points of light goes approximately as the baseline times the angular
distance between the points. Therefore, as the baseline decreases, so does the distance
between patterns in Figure 4-7. If this distance becomes too small, then it becomes
impossible to distinguish between the peaks. This is similar to angular resolution of a
single aperture optical telescope. If these patterns are too close, the visibility will not
drop, since the pattern of the individual points summed up still approaches zero. This
effect can be seen in Figure 4-11. Compare Figure 4-11 to Figures 4-7, 4-8, and 4-10 to
see the difference between a large Be and a small Be.
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Figure 4-11: 4 points separated by 0.2 units (Figures 4-7,4-8, and 4-10 are separated by 1.6 units)
Assuming an ideal instrument, visibility is always equal to one for a single point
of light, and for a star of any width if the baseline is very small. As the baseline
increases, the visibility drops. A sharper the drop in visibility implies a larger angular
width of the star. As the baseline increases past the first minimum in visibility, the
visibility begins to increase again. This effect could be seen by adding more points to the
example shown in Figures 4-7, 4-8, and 4-10. A fifth point would add a second line
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basically on top of the black line in Figure 4-7 and double the component from the first,
or black, point in the sum. This would cause a larger visibility than if each component is
only counted once, as shown. These later peaks in visibility are much smaller than the
first peak however, and will eventually taper out to zero. This can be seen in Figure 4-12.
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Figure 4-12: Relationship between visibility, baseline, and target size
Figure 4-12 is simply an example of the trends of visibility in relation to the
angular width of the target and the baseline of the interferometer. Curves similar to those
in Figure 4-12 exist with the exact relationship between these three parameters.
Therefore, the size, or angular width, of a star, if it is assumed to be circular, can be
measured by simply measuring the visibility of the target at one known baseline. The
measurement can then be fit to one of the pre-existing curves to determine the size of the
target.
Visibility can be measured by measuring the photon rate, N, at any four points
along a wavelength in the fringe. This can be seen in Figure 4-13 and Equation 4-3.
__
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Figure 4-13: Visibility calculation definitions
i = (NA- N) 2 +(N - ND)
(NA +NB +N+ND) (4-3)
Figure 4-13 shows points A, B, C, and D falling directly on, or half way between,
the exact peaks and valleys of the fringe. This does not need to be the case for Equation
4-3 to hold. The point A can be anywhere along the fringe. The points B, C, and D
simply need to be measured relative to the point A, at exactly one-quarter wavelength
intervals. Therefore, once the fringe is found for a given target, the visibility can be
calculated from four measurements along that fringe. [Lay, 2001]
4.2.1.3 Resolution
As mentioned previously, a star or target with angular width can be thought of as
individual points of light next to each other for a distance equal to the angular width of
the target. If enough of these points are next to each other, the entire area within the
pattern shown in Figure 4-7 will be filled in. This can be seen in Figure 4-14a. If the
pattern is entirely filled in, there is no way to make out even a small fringe in the total
photon rate, which approaches a constant value. This can be seen in Figure 4-14b. If the
total photon rate is constant, then the visibility is exactly zero, and the interferometer
cannot resolve anything. This is known as resolving out a star. This occurs if the
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baseline times the angular width of the star (the distance between the first pattern's peak
and the last pattern's peak - see Figure 4-7) is much greater than the wavelength of the
light being observed. Therefore, it is difficult for an interferometer at a given baseline to
resolve a star that has a larger angular width than the wavelength of the light divided by
the baseline. If the angular width of a target is larger than this angle, the interferometer
can only decipher that the target is larger than its capability to see, but cannot decipher
any information on how much larger the target is. The angular width at which a star is
resolved out is given in Equation 4-4. Note that in order to resolve individual targets of
large angular width, a baseline should be small.
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Figure 4-14: Example of a resolved out star - 30 points separated by 0.2 units
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There remains the question of how close together two individual targets can be for
an interferometer to be able to distinguish between them. For example, how close can the
two stars, or point sources, in a binary system be, before the interferometer sees them as a
single point source? A binary system would create a visibility pattern similar to that
shown in Figure 4-15. The first star would create the usual pattern shown in Figure 4-3a.
The second star would create the same pattern, shifted over by an amount equal to the
baseline times the angular separation between the two sources. When this shift is exactly
equal to one-half the wavelength of light, the two patterns will add together and cause
complete destructive interference. In other words, the total photon rate would be
constant, causing a visibility of zero. This accounts for the null at lambda over two times
the angular separation, shown in Figure 4-15. As the separation between the patterns
continues, this process continues and eventually, when the baseline times the separation
of the sources is equal to exactly one wavelength, the two patterns have complete
constructive interference, and the visibility is once again one. In order to determine that
there are two sources and not simply one larger source, the baseline must be able go past
this null and see the second maximum peak in Figure 4-15.
X/20
Baseline
Figure 4-15: Visibility for a binary system
It is also possible to look at the angular resolution of an interferometer in a similar
manner to the discussion of the angular resolution of a single aperture optical telescope.
If the patterns in Figure 4-7 are too close together, as in Figure 4-1 1, then they cannot be
distinguished from one another. One criterion for when peaks can be distinguished is that
51' 
4r
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the peak of the second pattern cannot be within the distance from the peak to the trough
of the first pattern. For a square target, in which all the light has the same distance to
travel, the first trough is at one half the wavelength. This is the easiest concept to
visualize and has therefore been used in all previous discussions. For a circular target,
the first trough is actually at approximately 1.22 times the wavelength, since there are
more photons coming from the exact center of the target than from the sides. This can be
seen in Figure 4-16.
0
Figure 4-16: Difference between a circular target and a simpler to model square target
All of these arguments put the smallest angular separation at which an
interferometer at a given baseline can still make out two individual targets between the
wavelength over the baseline and the wavelength over two times the baseline. This can
be seen in Equation 4-5. The range in this equation is due to the fact that there is no strict
value of where the instrument can specifically separate two targets. The area in which it
can and cannot separate targets blends together smoothly, and where exactly the cut-off is
can be unclear or undistinguishable.
<- < 0R <- (4-5)2B B
It is worth noting that in order to resolve individual large targets (large ORO) a
small baseline is needed (see Equation 4-4), but in order to resolve between two close
small targets (small ORES) a large baseline is needed (see Equation 4-5). With a large
!
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baseline, details of an image can be resolved, but the background and large areas in the
image would be resolved out. With a small baseline the large areas and backgrounds can
be resolved, but no detail would come through. This is one reason that any
interferometer attempting to image a target needs a variable baseline. [Lay, 2001]
4.2.1.4 Imaging
In addition to the size of a target, an interferometer can also be used to gather
information about the shape of a target. Figure 4-17 illustrates this process. If a target is
actually an ellipse, rather than a circle, then the size information given by an
interferometer with collecting mirrors horizontally across from one another would be
different from the size information given by the same interferometer with the same
baseline, but with the collecting mirrors vertically across from one another. This
difference in measurements implies that the target is elliptical in shape. Therefore, an
interferometer can begin gathering data on the shape of a target with just two
measurements.
1. B 4 OD X
Target 2. B OD Y
Figure 4-17: Resolving a target's shape
The two measurements shown in Figure 4-17 are represented by the red dots in
Figure 4-18. The plane in Figure 4-18 is known as the UV-plane. Each measurement
taken at a given baseline and orientation produces one UV-point. If the entire UV-plane
is filled in, within a circle with a radius of the largest baseline used, a fully sampled
image can be created. The transformation from the UV-plane to the image plane is
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accomplished through a Fourier transform. With one point, the size can be determined.
With two points, similar to the two red points in Figure 4-18, the basic shape can begin to
be determined. With the entire plane filled in uniformly, as in the black dots in Figure
4-18, the entire shape of the target can be determined, and an image can be taken. The
change in angle around the circle is used to gather shape information, and the change in
radius through the circle is used to gather both detailed and large area information, as was
discussed above. [Lay, 2001]
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Figure 4-18: Sample UV-plane
4.2.1.5 Broadband Light
The previous discussion has involved a simplification to assist in the visualization
of concepts. The light discussed above is assumed to be monochromatic, or single
wavelength. While this simplification makes interference and other concepts much
simpler to visualize, it is almost never physically realizable or useful. In reality, most
light being studied by an interferometer has components of different wavelengths. When
this occurs, it is impossible to get a visibility of exactly one. This is due to the fact that
even if one component were shifted by exactly one wavelength, that shift would not be
exactly one wavelength for a different component. In other words, the instance in which
the optical path difference is exactly zero is the only instance in which all the light from
both sides lines up exactly. At any other optical path difference other than zero, the light
from at least one wavelength component will not be lined up exactly from the two
apertures. This implies that the pattern the interferometer will receive for broadband light
will have a maximum when the light is completely constructively interfered. The general
pattern, as the OPD is increased and decreased, will remain the same as with
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monochromatic light in the sense that it will still vary between peaks and valleys.
However, the peaks will continuously decrease in magnitude, while the valleys will never
be zero and will continuously increase in magnitude. This pattern can be seen in Figure
4-19. The visibility, as defined in the previous discussion, of broadband light is
measured at the center of the fringe, using the first (zero-point) peak and valley
amplitudes.
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Figu re 4-19: Photon rates for broadband light. The red and blue lines are individual wavelength
components and the black line is the sum.
Figure 4-19 implies that the theoretical limit on visibility for broadband light is
not one, but a value lower than one, since the first valley will never be zero. The specific
theoretical limit is different for different combinations of wavelengths. For example,
white light is comprised of a component of every wavelength. The photon pattern an
interferometer would record for a point of pure white light would then be an impulse at
zero OPD, with an amplitude dependant on the magnitude of the light being observed. At
any point other than zero OPD, the photon rate would average to a constant amplitude
equal to one half the amplitude of the impulse. This pattern can be seen in Figure 4-20,
and is simply an extreme case of the pattern shown in Figure 4-19. If these numbers are
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plugged into Equation 4-2, the theoretical limit on visibility for white light is shown to be
one-third. This calculation is shown in Equation 4-6. [Miller, 2001]
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Figure 4-20: Photon rate for white light
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4.2.2 Nulling Interferometry
(4-6)
In nulling interferometry, a 7t phase shift is added to one of the light beams. This
causes destructive interference at the center of the source, in this case the star. The same
concept of fringes that is used in general interferometry is also used in nulling
interferometry. Figure 4-3 is still appropriate for nulling interferometry; however, now
the null of the fringe is located at the zero point in terms of angle on the sky. This is
shown in Figure 4-21.
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Figure 4-21: Nulling interferometer fringes
If the star is located in the null of the fringe, it is possible to detect a planet
located in one of the peak areas of the fringe. If the baseline is kept at a single
orientation, the signal received will be a steady value of a combination of signal received
from the planet, stellar leakage from the edge of the null, and other noise sources. In this
situation, it would be impossible to determine how much of photons detected, if any, are
from a planet as opposed to from the other sources. If the baseline is rotated however,
the planet will move across the fringes. As the planet moves into and out of the nulls and
peaks of the fringes, the photons received from the planet will modulate, as shown in
Figure 4-22 [Henry, 2003]. Therefore, if a planet is located in the habitable zone of a
star, the total photon count will modulate as the instrument is rotated. The difference
between the peaks and valleys of this photon modulation indicates the photon flux of the
star.
Terrestrial Planet Finder Interferometer (TPF-I) Overview 127
o~
Detected optical
energy
+
l--+-------+-----+-~
Time or Baseline rotation angle
Figure 4-22: Detecting a planet using nulling interferometry
In nulling interferometry, the path-lengths from the two apertures need to be
exactly equal, and the apertures need to be pointed at the exact middle of the star. This
places the null at the proper location to block out the starlight, without blocking signal
from the planet. To keep the path-lengths equal and the star centered in the field of view,
a second detector, known as the fringe-tracking camera, is used. For this detector, the 1t
phase shift is not added to either light path. Therefore, this detector records photon rates
similar to those shown in Figure 4-3a. As discussed previously, the x-axis of
interferometer fringes can be viewed either as OPO, or as the angle in the sky of the light
source. If the x-axis is the angle on the sky of the star, by tracking the photon rate in the
fringe tracking camera the instrument can control the location of the star in the field of
view. Additionally, if the x-axis is thought of as the OPO, tracking the fringe ensures
that the path-lengths of the light to each aperture are identical, or that the OPD is zero.
Therefore, by using the fringe tracking camera, a nulling interferometer can ensure a null
by keeping the path-lengths equal, and can keep that null on the center of a star such that
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any planets can be detected. The basic concept of using two detectors for nulling
interferometry is shown in Figure 4-23. Note that Figure 4-23 is a concept diagram, and
the actual beam combining paths and instrument design will be much more complex.
[Lay, August 2005]
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Figure 4-23: Concept of nulling vs. fringe tracking detectors
4.3 Star-count Model
The productivity model used to analyze the performance of various TPF-I
architectures is called the star-count model. This model was originally written by Serge
Dubovitsky of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in 2003 [Dubovitsky, 2004]. The original
model was written in MathCad, but was transferred to Matlab for use in this research.
The star-count model consists of four major steps, shown in Figure 4-24. First,
the original list of candidate stars is read in, and stars are checked for eligibility. A star is
not eligible for observations if it is part of a binary system with the stars too close
together. Additionally, the TPF-I instrument has a specific sky-coverage, in terms of
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ecliptic latitude. Therefore, a star that is outside of the latitude band covered by the
instrument is not eligible for observation. Once the eligible stars are determined,
observable stars are identified. If the instrument has the resolution capability to examine
the habitable zone around an eligible star, that star is considered observable.
r- ----- -- - ---------- ---- ---- ----- - -- --- -- - - --- -- - - _- - - - --- ----
2. Find integration time
1. Find observable stars * Based on SNR
iSky coverage? * Noise sources
l* Within resolution? * S· Local zodi
Within resolution S LagStellar Leakage
.......................-......................7 
4. Sum up number of
stars complete within 
lifetime
Figure 4-24: Four major steps of the star-count model. Only the steps within the red-dashed box are
used if the model is used for expected productivity analysis.
The second major step in the star count model is finding the integration time for
each star. This is by far the most complicated step in the process. Determining the
required integration time is based on determining the signal and noise sources coming
into the instrument. The power in photons incident from the planet, per second per
square meter, is based on the assumed temperature of the planet, the radius of the planet,
the distance to the star, and the minimum and maximum wavelengths under
consideration. The total number of photons per second from the planet can then be
calculated from the power per second per square meter, the total collecting area of the
instrument, and a throughput factor for the instrument that accounts for the modulation
efficiency, the beam combiner efficiency, the optics throughput, and the detector
response.
The total noise into the system is calculated using two major factors - the local
zodi and the stellar leakage. The number of photons per second per square meter from
3. Sort stars in order of
integration time
·Shortest to longest
_ _
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the local zodi is calculated using a parametric model that includes the ecliptic latitude, the
effective temperature of the dust, and the diameter of the apertures. The total number of
photons per second received at the detector is then calculated using the number of
photons per second per square meter, the total collecting area of all apertures, the same
efficiency factor used for the planet signal calculation, and an additional throughput
factor that is applied to incoherent signals. The second major noise source is stellar
leakage. The stellar leakage is calculated from the luminosity of the star, the temperature
of the star, the distance to the star, a factor based on the configuration of the architecture,
and the length of the baseline. The total number of photons per second received at the
detector from the stellar leakage is calculated using the same throughput values as the
local zodi photon calculation.
Once the photon count per second for each signal and noise source is known, the
signal to noise ratio acquired in a single second of operation can be calculated. The time
required to achieve the necessary signal to noise ratio can then be calculated. This is
shown in the following equations:
SNRsec = planet
SLocalZodi + SLeakage (4
SNRreq 2
req -SNR 1 sec)
In the above equations, is an efficiency factor based on the number of ports in the
detector, Splanet, SLocalZodi, and SLeakage are the total number of photons per second from the
planet, the local zodi, and stellar leakage respectively, Treq is the total integration time
required, SNRse,, is the signal to noise ratio acquired in a single second of integration,
and SNRreq is the required signal to noise ratio. The integration time required for either
the detection or spectroscopy phase of the mission can be determined by adjusting the
required signal to noise ratio.
As the length of the baseline increases, the stellar leakage also increases. This
leads to an increase in the integration time. Therefore, it is more efficient, in terms of
integration time, to have shorter baselines. If a baseline gets too short however, the
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instrument will no longer have the resolution required to complete the observation.
Therefore, for formation flown interferometers with variable baselines, the minimum
baseline length required to achieve the necessary resolution for each star is calculated. If
this length is less than or equal to the minimum allowable length of the baseline, set due
to concern over collisions, the baseline length is set at the minimum allowable length.
The maximum baseline length is set by stray-light concerns. If the baseline length
required for the proper resolution is between the minimum and maximum allowable
baseline lengths, the baseline length is set to the length required for the resolution. If the
baseline length needed to achieve the proper resolution is larger than the maximum
allowable length set by stray-light concerns, the star is not observable.
The final restriction on integration time deals with the time the star is visible to
the instrument. The amount of time the star is visible depends on the ecliptic latitude of
the star and the sky coverage of the instrument. The integration time plus any associated
overhead time, based on the observational efficiency, must be less than or equal to the
time the instrument can view the star. This constraint often has a large impact on the
number of stars that can be observed by a particular architectural design.
One of the major TPF-I architectures has multiple possible observation modes,
which means that the above process of determining integration times needs to be
completed multiple times. The Linear Dual Chopped Bracewell (DCB) architecture has
two separate modes - high resolution and low resolution. These modes are shown in
Figure 4-25. For each star, the integration time required in each mode is calculated. The
minimum of the two integration times is then used as the required integration time for
that star.
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Figure 4-25: High versus low resolution modes for the Linear DeB
If the star-count model discussed here is used as the productivity model in an
expected productivity analysis, the productivity metric is defined as the integration time
per star. In these cases, only the first two steps shown in Figure 4-24 are used. If the
star-count model is used without consideration of failures, the total number of
observations that a particular instrument can complete in a given lifetime can be
calculated. For the detection phase of the mission, the stars are sorted in order from
shortest to longest integration times. The running sum of the integration times can then
be used to calculate the number of observations that can be completed in the given
lifetime.
For the spectroscopy phase of the mISSIOn, the calculation of the number of
observations that can be completed is slightly more complicated. First, it is important to
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ensure that spectroscopy observations are only done on stars for which observations were
completed in the detection phase of the mission. It is also important to account for the
fact that spectroscopy observations will only be possible for stars in which a planet was
actually detected. In other words, spectroscopy is not possible if the detection phase
observation was completed for a particular star, but no planet was found. However, there
is no way of knowing ahead of time what the distribution of planets will be. If all the
near-by stars have planets, the number of spectroscopy observations will be higher than if
only the farther away stars have planets. To account for this, the total amount of time
allowed for spectroscopy observations is first calculated as the lifetime of the
spectroscopy phase of the mission divided by q&1rth, defined as the expected percentage
of stars that have terrestrial sized planets within the habitable zone. The number of
spectroscopy observations that can be completed within this extended time is then
calculated using a running sum of the integration times. The expected number of
spectroscopy observations is then calculated as this extended number of observations
multiplied by rlarth. The resulting expected number of spectroscopy observations then
accounts for the spread of integration times possible, depending on which stars actually
have detected planets in their habitable zone. [Dubovitsky, 2004]
4.4 TPF-I as a Case-study for Expected Productivity Analysis
TPF-I is a very complex and expensive mission in the very early design phases.
While the timeline is still somewhat uncertain, launch is currently scheduled for 2019.
With the launch date still over a decade away, major pre-formulation system architecture
and spacecraft design decisions are still being made. These major decisions include the
number of spacecraft, the type of beam combining, and the geometry of the array. It is at
this early phase of a mission that introducing risk analysis into the trade process can have
a major impact. TPF-I, therefore, makes a particularly good case-study for this research,
since the results of any analysis can be used in design decision trade-studies, and can
therefore affect the actual design of the mission.
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It is well-accepted that analysis work done in the conceptual phases of a mission
can have a very large impact on the overall outcome of the mission. Since cost, risk, and
performance are commonly used as the three most important measures of effectiveness in
trade-studies, it would stand to reason that cost, risk, and performance analyses should be
used as factors when completing trade-studies in the conceptual design phases of a
mission. While cost and performance are usually quantitatively analyzed and compared
during these early phases, risk is most often analyzed in a qualitative way, if it is
analyzed at all. This is due to the common misconception that a quantitative risk analysis
can not be completed on a design that is in the conceptual stages, since every detail of the
design must be known before the risk can be calculated. This research works to disprove
that misconception by showing that a relative risk analysis can be done on any design that
has a productivity model built, no matter how detailed the productivity model is. It was
therefore important to use a mission that is in the conceptual design phase, such as TPF-I,
as the case-study for this research, both to have as large an impact as possible on the
design, and to prove that risk analyses can be completed, and be effective, when done
early in the design phases of a mission.
While the reasons discussed above explain why the mission used as a case-study
for this research should be in the early conceptual design phases, there are also several
reasons why TPF-I makes one of the best conceptual design missions to use in this
research. TPF-I is a formation flown interferometer, with five separate spacecraft. The
multiple, individual spacecraft aspect of the mission lends itself to a set of obvious
degraded states. Whether or not a particular architecture can function without a single
spacecraft in the array, in addition to what is required to improve the chances of still
having afunctioning system if a single spacecraft were to fail, are very interesting risk-
based analysis questions.
The interferometry aspect of TPF-I means that the mission is a perfect example of
a mission with a path-dependant productivity function. The time to observe a given star
depends not only on the functioning state of the instrument, but also on the stellar
characteristics of that particular star. Additionally, the star-count model discussed in the
previous section was used to calculate the integration time required for each star, for both
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the nominal and degraded states of the instrument. This model is quite complicated and
can take several minutes to calculate the integration time required for a single star.
Therefore, running a Monte Carlo simulation using this productivity function could take
an exceptionally large amount of time, possibly to the point of being prohibitive.
The final reason why TPF-I makes an excellent case-study for this research is that
the expected productivity-based risk analysis results fill a gap in the current TPF-I set of
analyses. For this mission, the number of stars observed is used as the major metric in
architecture decisions. Prior to this work, all estimates of the star-counts did not take into
account the possibility of any failures. Additionally, one of the major areas which the
design team is working towards is reducing the perception, by both management and the
public, that TPF-I will be a very risky mission. Completing a quantitative risk analysis
that accounts for a conservative list of failure modes could help to reduce this perceived
mission risk.
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Chapter 5
CASE STUDY 1 - TPF-I ARCHITECTURAL TRADE
STUDY FOR GRACEFUL DEGRADATION
5.1 Motivation
NASA needs to decide on a single architecture for the TPF-I mission to use as a
baseline design. This baseline design will be used to study the expected performance and
design issues of TPF-I. Additionally, the performance, cost, and risk of variations off this
design can be compared to the equivalent parameters from the baseline design to
determine the value of these variations. This mission is also known to require a very
large amount of technology development and design work, forcing a need to begin
working on a design as soon as possible in order to meet the proposed 2019 launch.
Therefore, in December, 2004, NASA performed a down-select to a single architectural
design for the TPF-I mission. In order to make a rational decision between different
architectural options, these options needed to be quantitatively scored and compared
against one another. This process of comparing the architectures was called the
architecture trade study. The architectures under consideration in this study were the
Linear Dual-chopped Bracewell (DCB), the X-array, the Diamond DCB, the Z-array, the
Triangle, and the Linear 3 [Lay et al., 2005].
Each of the architectures under consideration requires at least three separate
spacecraft that need to be controlled to the centimeter level and need to function for at
least five years. Additionally, this mission is assumed to be in the billion-dollar range in
terms of cost. Given the extreme cost and the political ramifications of a failed mission,
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along with the complexity of all of the designs and the probability of losing at least one
spacecraft in five years, one of the characteristics that was listed as a discriminator
between the architectures was how gracefully it is able to degrade. Graceful degradation
implies that a single major failure will not result in a complete loss of the mission. The
most obvious example of a single major failure is the loss of a single spacecraft.
Therefore, the problem of examining how each of the architectures behaves after the loss
of a single spacecraft was an important characteristic to examine in order to complete the
architectural trade study for the down-select.
In order to determine the level of graceful degradation for a given architecture the
degraded states for that architecture need to first be identified. The degraded states for
any architecture are the states of the system in which there is still some level of
functionality, but the system is no longer in the nominal state due to a failure. It should
be noted that degraded states do not need to be as productive as the nominal states. In
other words, a degraded state may have very little productivity and may not meet the
requirements of the full, or even minimum, mission. The first goal of this study was to
determine if any productivity at all would be possible in these degraded states, and if so
to capture the basic characteristics of these states. Performance analyses were then
completed for each degraded and nominal state. This information was then used to
calculate the overall expected productivity of each of the architectures. If a degraded
state from one of the architectures was significantly more productive than a degraded
state from a different architecture than this difference was captured in the expected
productivity. The expected productivity was then used as a quantitative value to compare
the graceful degradation of each of the architectures for the architectural trade study.
This chapter will first discuss the process of how each of the architectures was analyzed.
The next section will discuss the basics of each architectural design, followed by a
summary of how each of the architectures degrades. The results of the study will then be
presented. Finally, some conclusions and summaries will be drawn.
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5.2 Productivity in Degraded States
The first step in identifying the degraded states of any given architecture, in the
event of the loss of a single spacecraft, was to identify the rules for determining when a
system can still function. These rules were derived from the basic principles of
interferometry. See Section 4.2 for a discussion on these basic principles. While it may
be possible after some failures to do ancillary science that does not require
interferometry, this was not considered a functioning state for the purposes of this study.
For a given state to be considered a partially functional state, the following two criteria
were required to be met:
1. Balanced path-lengths from at least three spacecraft capable of collecting
light to a combining bench.
2. Zeroed-out input beam phases to the combiner.
It should be noted that while the rule used for this study was that three spacecraft must be
capable of collecting light, it is possible to do very basic interferometry with only two
collecting spacecraft. With two beams it is not possible to achieve chopping between
sources, however. The process of chopping changes from one set of beams to another in
order to greatly reduce the level of systematic noise in the data. Given the TPF-I
requirements for very low noise levels, it was decided that chopping will be required for
the type of science that TPF-I is doing. Therefore, in this study at least three functioning
starlight beams were required to be combined to be considered a functional state. While
states capable of combining only two starlight beams were considered zero-productivity
states, these states were recorded in the study, in case chopping is not considered a
necessity in the future.
The path-lengths from each source to the combiner need to be equalized in order
to achieve interferometry. The beam paths can go directly to the combiner or, if the
system is designed to support it, the beams can go through other spacecraft before
reaching the combiner or through a delay line to equal out the path lengths. The phases
of the separate beams also need to be zeroed out in order for interferometry to work. This
is explained further in Figure 5-1. The arrows in Figure 5-1 represent the beams of
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different sources or collectors. The length of the arrow represents the amplitude of the
beam while the direction represents the phase. Figure 5-la shows the beams for a four-
collector interferometer. Note that the end of the last, or fourth, arrow is in the same
location as the beginning of the first arrow. This is called zeroing out the beams. Figure
5-lb shows this same architectural set-up but with a single spacecraft missing. Note that
the beams no longer meet up, or zero out. Using only the first and third beams in this
configuration would zero out the beams as shown in Figure 5-lc. If the phases, or
directions of the arrows, were variable, all three beams could be zeroed out, as seen in
Figure 5-1d. This implies that a four-collector system with fixed phases would be
reduced to a two-collector system with the failure of a single spacecraft. But it could use
all three collectors if the system was designed to allow for variable phases, and if the path
lengths from the three sources to the combiner are still equal.
T- 1
a. Initial Phase Diagram
b. If one spacecraft fails, the phases no longer sum to zero
c. Can still zero out the phases using only 2 spacecraft
d. To use 3 spacecraft, you need to be able to vary the phases
Figure 5-1: Phase diagrams to show the concept of zeroing out phases.
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For each of the architectures under consideration the unmodified design, in terms
of beam paths and phases, was examined to see if the degraded system, without any one
given spacecraft, could meet the two criteria specified above. If the criteria were met, the
type of the degraded system was noted. The number of collecting elements and the
geometry of the spacecraft define the type of system. An example of a type of system is
a two-collector system in which the collectors are placed in a line relative to one another,
called a Linear 2 in this study. After the degraded states of the unmodified design were
examined, different options were identified which change the design in order to attempt
to increase the likelihood of graceful degradation.
The unmodified design for each of the architectures was assumed to have fixed
phases. Adding the ability to vary phases after launch was the first change examined.
Adding the ability to vary the angles of the input and output beams to and from each
spacecraft, such that the geometry of the spacecraft relative to one another could vary
from the nominal design, was the second change considered. Finally, for each of the
architectures a single additional major change was identified that would make a large
impact on the degradation of the architecture. This change varied from architecture to
architecture and included making spacecraft identical to one another, adding extra beam
routing paths, or adding a delay line. In some cases, if either variable phases or variable
angles in and out of the spacecraft had zero impact on the degraded state analysis, two
other changes that are specific to that architecture were examined. This analysis resulted
in anywhere from four (22) to eight (23) designs per architecture.
Each design is defined as a combination of hardwired (non-variable) or variable
phases, fixed or variable beam angles, and making or not making another one or two
major changes to the design. The functionality of each design given a failure of each
individual spacecraft was examined. The final result of this analysis for each of the
architectures is a table similar to the example shown in Table 5-1, along with figures
similar to the example shown in Figure 5-2.
w
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8.
Nominal
b.
Degraded state: Linear 2
Figure 5-2: Degraded state diagram example
Figure 5-2a shows the nominal number and geometry of spacecraft, and the beam-
routing paths, for an example architecture. Each circle represents a spacecraft and is
labeled by a letter or number. The beam paths are color coded in order to keep track of
which beam comes from which spacecraft. The rows of the table that accompany these
diagrams, in this case Table 5-1, correspond to the particular spacecraft that is considered
failed. The rows are labeled in the same manner as the spacecraft in the diagrams. The
columns of the table correspond to the different designs examined. Each entry in the
table is the type of system that would remain if that particular spacecraft (row) failed in
that particular design (column). In the same manner that Figure 5-2a shows the nominal
spacecraft geometry and beam paths, the degraded state diagrams, in this case Figure
5-2b shows the spacecraft geometry and beam paths for each type of degraded system
found in the table (Table 5-1).
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Table 5-1: Degraded state table example
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It should be noted that the degraded state diagrams that are associated with each
of the architectures are examples of the different types of degraded state systems. If the
same type of system would remain if two different spacecraft were to fail, the system was
only drawn in diagram form for one of the two scenarios. An example of this can be seen
in Figure 5-2. In this example a Linear 2 system is shown as an example of a degraded
state. Table 5-1 corresponds to this example and shows that a Linear 2 system is left if
several different spacecraft fail for several different designs. The diagram corresponds to
the failure of spacecraft two. This is because all Linear 2 systems would be similar and
are therefore not drawn individually. If spacecraft three failed instead of spacecraft two
the diagram would be identical to that shown, except in mirror image and with spacecraft
three replaced by spacecraft two. Note also that spacecrafts two and three both have
output beams in the same geometry as spacecrafts one and four, respectively. Therefore,
if spacecraft one were to fail instead of spacecraft two, the same Linear 2 diagram would
be applicable but with spacecraft two replacing spacecraft one, and the same is true for
143
144 Case Study 1 - TPF-I Architectural Trade Study for Graceful Degradation
three and four. Since the geometry and beam-routing paths are identical in all four cases,
the Linear 2 system is only drawn once as an example.
The examples shown in Figure 5-2 and Table 5-1 are for a Linear Dual-chopped
Bracewell (DCB) system. This example will be discussed and explained further in the
following section, followed by the discussion, tables, and diagrams for each of the five
other architectures examined.
5.2.1 Linear DeB
The nominal Linear Dual-Chopped Bracewell (DCB) design is shown in Figure
5-3. This design requires four collecting spacecraft, labeled 1-4, and a separate
combining spacecraft, labeled C. The beams from the outer collectors are routed through
the inner collectors to the combiner. The beams from the inner collectors are routed
through the other inner collector to the combiner. The architecture is symmetrical, such
that spacecrafts one and two are mirror images of space crafts three and four, respectively.
Figure 5-3: Nominal configuration for the Dual-Chopped Bracewell architecture.
The first thing of note about the Linear DCB architecture is that if the combining
spacecraft were to fail the mission would be over. In this sense, the combiner is the
weakest link of this design. If spacecraft one were to fail the beams from spacecraft two,
three, and four could follow the same paths as in the nominal design and the path-lengths
would be equal. The same is true if spacecraft four failed. In the unmodified design,
without variable phases, only two of these collectors would be useful since that is the
only way to zero-out the phases, as discussed above. If phases are allowed to vary, the
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system could reach a three spacecraft linear system. If spacecraft two were to fail
however, then spacecraft three would have no method of equalizing its path length with
those from spacecraft one and four, and only a two-collector system would be possible.
If the angles in and out of the spacecraft were variable and a three-collector system was
possible, a triangular geometry could also be used. Finally, the major design change
examined for this architecture was making spacecrafts one and four identical to
spacecrafts two and three respectively. This removes the two-collector system restraint if
spacecraft two or three fails. The summary table of all possible degraded states for the
Linear DCB architecture is shown in Table 5-2 and the corresponding degraded state
diagrams are shown in Figure 5-4.
Table 5-2: Degraded states for the Linear DCB architecture.
._ - a) ._ -Q a)O _ 
00 .- .11 a)- en . _11 c D - C a
_Z CU C 0 = ' t) M )C a co II 4am II 
): _< V 6- > a < c ) E c) X < c) C4(C C:I:1 r 
Linear or Linear or
1 Linear 2 Linear 2 Linear 3 Linear 3 Linear 2 Linear 2 Triangular Triangular
3 3
Linear or
2 Linear 2 Linear 2 Linear 2 Linear 3 Linear 2 Linear 2 Linear 2 Triangular
3
Linear or
3 Linear 2 Linear 2 Linear 2 Linear 3 Linear 2 Linear 2 Linear 2 Triangular
3
Linear or Linear or
4 Linear 2 Linear 2 Linear 3 Linear 3 Linear 2 Linear 2 Triangular Triangular
3 3
C X X X X X X X X
i i MI
145
146 Case Study 1 - TPF-I Architectural Trade Study for Graceful Degradation
a. Linear 2
x
c. Triangular 3
b. Linear 3
Figure 5-4 : Degraded states for the Linear DeB architecture.
5.2.2 X-array
The nominal X-array design is shown in Figure 5-5. This design requires four
collecting spacecraft, labeled 1-4, and a separate combining spacecraft, labeled C. The
four collecting spacecraft are identical. The advantage to this design is that the 3-to-l
aspect ratio of the rectangular geometry allows for a relatively long resolution baseline
while keeping a relatively short nulling baseline. The resolution baseline is the distance
between the spacecraft on the long side of the rectangle. A long resolution baseline leads
to increased capability to resolve the signals from multiple planets. The nulling baseline
is the distance between the spacecraft on the short side of the rectangle. A short nulling
baseline leads to increased capability to reject the light from the target star. While many
designs have a single baseline length, which needs to be set at a compromise value since
longer is better for resolution and shorter is better for nulling, the X-array design has
separate baselines which leads to more optimal lengths for each individual function
[Lawson & Dooley, 2005].
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Figure 5-5 : Nominal configuration for the X-array architecture.
The X-array design degrades very gracefully, with many options for degraded
states. As with the Linear DeB design, the combiner is the weak link in this design since
if it fails, the mission is lost. Also as with all other four-collector architectures, if a single
collector fails, but the unmodified design without variable phases is used, the system is
forced into a two-collector system due to the phases. If the phases are variable however,
several three-collector options are possible. Since all four collectors are identical the
system acts the same no matter which collecting spacecraft is assumed failed. If the
beam angles in and out of the spacecraft are not variable, the system degrades to a three-
collector system with three different baselines, called 3 Single. If the beam angles in and
out of the spacecraft are somewhat variable, the system can degrade to a 3-collector
system with two identical baselines and one unique baseline, called 2 Same. The major
design change examined for the X-array was to allow the angle of the beams into the
combiner to vary by as much as 70 degrees. In this case the system can degrade to a
three-collector system with three identical baselines, called 3 Same. The summary table
of all possible degraded states for the X-array architecture is shown in Table 5-3 and the
corresponding degraded state diagrams are shown in Figure 5-6. It should be noted that
there is no need for extra beam routing or other major changes with the X-array design.
This system degrades quite gracefully with relatively minor changes (variable phases and
variable angles into the combiner).
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Table 5-3 : Degraded states for the X-array architecture.
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Figure 5-6 : Degraded states for the X-array architecture.
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5.2.3 Triangle
The nominal Triangle architecture is shown in Figure 5-7. This architecture
consists of only three spacecraft. One of these spacecraft, in this case spacecraft number
three, functions as both a collecting spacecraft and a combining spacecraft.
Figure 5-7: Nominal configuration for the Triangle (TTN) architecture.
The Triangle architecture degrades very ungracefully since there is no redundancy
built into the system. With the unmodified design the mission would be over with a
single failure to any of the three spacecraft. This is true of the design with variable
phases or with variable beam angles into and out of the spacecraft. The only way to
produce a degraded state that is still functional is to add an extremely long delay line to
the combining spacecraft, equal to the distance between the spacecraft. This addition
would introduce a significant amount of extra complexity and weight and almost
certainly not be considered. The only way to ensure some functionality in the case of any
single failure for this system is to both add a very long delay line to the combining
spacecraft, and to make spacecraft two identical to spacecraft three. The summary table
and corresponding diagrams for the Triangle architecture can be seen in Table 5-4 and
Figure 5-8, respectively.
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Table 5-4: Degraded states for the Triangle architecture.
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Figure 5-8: Degraded state for the Triangle architecture.
5.2.4 Diamond DeB
The nominal configuration for the Diamond DCB architecture is shown in Figure
5-9. The Diamond DCB design has four collecting spacecraft and no separate combining
spacecraft. Instead, the combining is done on one of the existing collecting spacecraft:
spacecraft four.
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Figure 5-9 : Nominal configuration for the Diamond DCB architecture.
In the Diamond DeB design there is no added bonus to varying the angles into or
out of any of the spacecraft. Therefore, in addition to adding variable phases to the
design, two other major changes to the design were examined - adding extra beam
routing, and adding combining ability to spacecraft two. The extra beam routing paths
that would be required are shown in Figure 5-10 by the dashed arrows. Note that not all
of these extra beam paths would need to be implemented. If only a subset of these beam
paths were added, only a subset of the degraded states that result from these paths would
be available.
Figure 5-10: Extra beam routing path options for the Diamond DCB architecture. The dashed
arrows show the extra beam paths.
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As with the architectures with separate combiner spacecraft, in the Diamond DCB
design the combiner, in this case spacecraft number four, is the weak link since if it fails
the mission is lost. This effect is reversed however if spacecraft two is given combining
capability. Also, as with all other four-collector architectures, if a single collector fails in
the Diamond DCB design without variable phases, the system is forced into a two-
collector system. Due to phasing limitations, beams from spacecrafts two and three
cannot be combined together in a single Bracewell format. Therefore, if spacecraft one
fails and phases can not be varied, a different version of the single Bracewell is required.
With variable phases and extra beam routing added to the design, the system can degrade
to a three-collector, Triangle design. It is of interest to note that there is no advantage to
having variable phases with this architecture unless extra beam routing paths are also
added, since no beam routing path could achieve a three-collector system without adding
extra beam paths to the current design. The summary table of the degraded state
possibilities for the Diamond DCB architecture and the corresponding diagrams are
shown in Table 5-5 and Figure 5-11. Since the Triangle degraded states require different
elements of extra beam routing, all versions of this design are shown separately.
Table 5-5: Degraded states for the Diamond DCB architecture.
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a. Single Bracewell a
c. Triangle a
e. Triangle c
b. Single Bracewell b
d. Triangle b
f. Triangle d
Figure 5-11 : Degraded states for the Diamond DeB architecture.
5.2.5 Z-array
The nominal configuration for the Z-array architecture is shown in Figure 5-12.
The Z-array is very similar to the X-array architecture. The advantage of the 3-to-l
aspect ratio of the rectangular geometry, allowing for a relatively long resolution baseline
while keeping a relatively short nulling baseline, is true for both architectures. The
difference between the two architectures is that in the X-array there is a separate
spacecraft for combining the light, and in the Z-array the combining is done on one of the
collecting spacecraft. In this architecture all beams are combined and modulated in
154 Case Study 1 - TPF-I Architectural Trade Study for Graceful Degradation
spacecraft one. Note that the Z-array architecture is not symmetric. Spacecraft three is
the only spacecraft with a simple beam routing design, with only a single output beam.
Therefore, for this architecture, in addition to variable phases and variable beam angles,
the major design change considered was to make spacecraft three a mirror image of
spacecraft one. While this design change obviously makes spacecraft three more
complex, it should be noted that this design change does reduce the number of different
spacecraft designs required, which could save some money and effort. This modified
design can be seen in Figure 5-13.
x
Figure 5-12 : Nominal configuration for the Z-array architecture.
Figure 5-13 : Modified design for the Z-array architecture - spacecraft 3 is the mirror image of
spacecraft I.
With the Z-array architecture, all combining and modulating occurs in spacecraft
one. Therefore, in the unmodified design, without spacecraft three mirroring spacecraft
Case Study 1 - TPF-I Architectural Trade Study for Graceful Degradation
one, if spacecraft one fails the entire mission fails. Additionally, the unmodified design
for the Z-array architecture has the restriction that spacecraft three can only transfer its
beam to spacecraft two. This essentially leads to the equivalent of a failure in spacecraft
three if spacecraft two were to fail, since spacecraft three could no longer transfer its
beam to the rest of the system. Since no interferometry would be possible with only the
two spacecraft, if spacecraft two fails in the unmodified design, the entire mission fails.
If the angles into and out of the spacecraft are allowed to vary then the output from
spacecraft three could be varied to allow transfer of its beam to other spacecraft, taking
away this restriction. The simplicity of the design for spacecraft three, with only a single
output beam, also restricts the system to degrading to a two-collector system, even in the
case of variable phases and angles. As with all other four-collector systems, it is not
possible to degrade to a three-collector system without variable phases. The table of
degraded states and corresponding figures for the Z-array architecture can be seen in
Table 5-6 and Figure 5-14, respectively. While the fully modified design for the Z-array
architecture degrades very gracefully, it is important to note that in this case the graceful
degradation comes at the cost of a very complex nominal configuration, as shown in
Figure 5-13.
Table 5-6: Degraded states for the Z-array architecture.
IS ') = _' .1 -4- M
'i._ E c -aV)5cr Mi U a) Da E r an C X e a)
._ r 6 = t ;__ EI> E
= 5 = C IC C c'.,
Single Single
l X Bracewell X Triangle b X Bracewell X Triangle b
Single Single Single Single Single T
2 X Bracewell X Bracewell Bracewell Bracewell Bracewell r aa a a a E E ___ E
_- .- 11 Lr O .- -- -
Single Single Single Single Single Single Single Trianle a
4 Bracewell Bracewell Bracewell Bracewell Bracewell Bracewell Bracewell or b
a a a a a a a a
155
156 Case Study 1 - TPF-I Architectural Trade Study for Graceful Degradation
a. Single Bracewell a
c. Triangle a
x
b. Single Bracewell b
x
d. Triangle b
Figure 5-14 : Degraded states for the Z-array architecture.
5.2.6 Linear 3
The nominal configuration for the Linear 3 architecture is shown in Figure 5-15.
The Linear 3 architecture is identical to the Linear DCB architecture, except the Linear 3
architecture has only three collecting spacecraft in the nominal configuration. The Linear
3 architecture is actually one of the degraded state architectures for the Linear DCB.
Figure 5-15: Nominal configuration for the Linear 3 architecture.
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The Linear 3 architecture degrades very ungracefully, since there is no
redundancy built into the system, assuming three collecting spacecraft are required. The
unmodified design could degrade to a single Bracewell architecture if the single outer
spacecraft is lost. This same two-collector system could be achieved if either spacecraft
one or spacecraft two is lost, and spacecraft one is given the extra beam routing capability
of spacecraft two. Additionally, this two-collector system could be achieved with any
spacecraft failure, other than the combiner, if the angles out of the collectors are allowed
to vary. The two-collector system was assumed to have zero productivity, since
chopping was required. Therefore, under the current assumptions, the Linear 3
architecture degrades very ungracefully. If, however, future studies find chopping is not
required, this system could do very well in terms of graceful degradation. The summary
table and corresponding diagrams for the Linear 3 architecture can be seen in Table 5-7
and Figure 5-16, respectively.
Table 5-7: Degraded states for the Linear 3 architecture.
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a. Single Bracewell
Figure 5-16: Degraded state for the Linear 3 architecture.
5.3 Study Results
As discussed above, the architecture trade study completed by the TPF-I design
team compared the performance, cost, and risk of all the previously discussed
architecture options. While graceful degradation was considered an important parameter
to include in the trade study, it was by no means the only consideration. Each of the
architectures was judged in terms of a total of 27 different discriminators, including the
ability to degrade gracefully. A given discriminator was quantified by gIvmg a
numerical score to each of the architectures in terms of one or more parameters.
To capture the needs of the TPF-I design team, the graceful degradation category
was split into two separate parameters. The first parameter assumed a single spacecraft
failure prior to the beginning of operations. No other failures throughout the lifetime of
the mission were considered. This parameter was designed to reward an inherent
robustness to failures. Architectures are more desirable if it is possible to have some
productivity in the event of a major failure. The level of productivity will vary depending
on which spacecraft failed, but this was accounted for by determining the productivity of
the system with a failure of each individual spacecraft, and finding the average of all
scenanos.
The second parameter used to quantify the ability of the different architectures to
degrade gracefully was the total overall expected productivity. In this case, each
spacecraft was assumed to have a 5% probability of failure prior to operations, in
addition to a 5% probability of failure by the end of the mission lifetime. If a single
spacecraft both collects and combines light these probabilities of failure were doubled,
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since the spacecraft was assumed to be significantly more complicated than a spacecraft
performing only one of these functions. This parameter took into account not only the
productivity of the remaining system after a single spacecraft failed, but also the
probability and timing of these failures. For this parameter, the EPRA modeling
approach discussed in Chapter 3 was used to calculate the expected productivity.
For both parameters, expected productivity was measured by the total expected
star-count in the detection phase of the mission. The star-count in the detection phase,
without considering failures, was already taken into account in the architectural trade
study. Since those architectures with higher productivity in their nominal states should
not get double points for these higher nominal productivities, both of the graceful
degradation parameters were normalized by the nominal star count levels. Therefore, the
final parameters used to measure graceful degradation in the trade study were:
* The expected percentage of the nominal detection star-count assuming a
single spacecraft failure, and
* The total expected percentage of the nominal detection star-count given a
5% probability of failure, for both pre-operations failures and failures
throughout life, for each spacecraft with a single function.
In all cases the star-count model described in Chapter 4 was used to determine the
productivity of all nominal and degraded states.
As mentioned above, none of the architectures considered could lose a single
spacecraft and have any productivity in the remaining system, without adding variable
phases to the design. Adding variable phases to the design is a significantly easier design
change to make than adding variable beam angles in and out of the spacecraft.
Additionally, comparing the other major design changes that were unique to each of the
architectures was not appropriate in this trade study, since the complexity and difficulty
of adding these design changes varies from one design change to another. Therefore, for
the architectural trade study, all architectures were compared assuming original designs
with variable phases, and no other design changes were considered.
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The results of study are given below. Table 5-8 shows the expected percentage of
the nominal detection star-count, assuming a single spacecraft failure. The specific
degraded states that led to the productivity values given in Table 5-8 can be seen in the
tables and degraded state diagrams associated with each of the architectures in Section
5.2.
In terms of this discriminator, the X-array architecture performs the most
favorably, followed closely by the Linear DCB architecture. The main thing to note in
Table 5-8 however is not the architectures that perform well, but the architectures that do
not perform well. The Triangle, Diamond DCB, and Linear 3 architectures would have
zero productivity if any of the spacecraft in the architecture were to fail. This is a
significant negative aspect of all three of these architectures.
Figure 5-17 shows the expected percentage of the nominal star-count for each of
the architectures, assuming a 5% probability of failure, both by the beginning of
operations and the end of life, for each single-function spacecraft. The performance of all
architectures, in terms of this particular parameter, is relatively similar. This is due to the
trade-off between probability of failure and impact. Architectures that initially have four
spacecraft capable of collecting light can lose a single collecting spacecraft and still
function, making the impact of a failure significantly less than for those architectures that
nominally begin with only three collecting spacecraft. Since the probability of failure is
on a per-spacecraft basis however, the architectures that nominally have four collecting
spacecraft also have a higher probability of losing a spacecraft than those with only three
collecting spacecraft. These two effects nearly cancel each other out. This result does
not lessen the importance of the study. Prior to this work, many engineers on the design
team conveyed opinions that architectures with fewer spacecraft were less risky due to
the lower probability of failure. At the same time, other engineers viewed these same
architectures as more risky due to the increased impact of a failure. The result that the
productivity in degraded states for this case-study nearly balances out the additional
probability of failure incurred with extra spacecraft, is both interesting and not
necessarily intuitive. Without completing the study, and determining the productivity in
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the degraded states, there would not have been a way to know which of the architectures
performed better or worse in terms of this parameter.
When comparing the X-array to the Z-array or the Linear 3 to the Triangle
architecture, the architectures with a separate combining spacecraft (X-array and Linear
3) perform better in terms of overall expected productivity than those architectures with a
dual-functioning spacecraft. This is partially because, from a probabilistic stand-point,
having one extra spacecraft with a given failure rate is slightly better than having one less
spacecraft, but with one of the spacecraft having twice the failure rate. This can be seen
by comparing 0.952 or 0.9025, to 0.9. Note that the difference between these
architectures will be due not only to this probabilistic difference, but also to the
difference in productivity in degraded states, and the difference in productivity of the
nominal state.
While only by a relatively small margin, the X-array and the Linear-3
architectures do perform best in terms of the overall expected productivity. This makes
sense, since the Linear-3 architecture has the lowest probability of a failure occurring,
and the X-array architecture has the best productivity in degraded states. The Diamond
and Z-array architectures perform the worst in terms of this parameter. This is due to the
fact that both architectures have four spacecraft capable of collecting light, leading to a
higher probability of failure, but the Diamond architecture does not have a degraded state
that has any productivity if a single spacecraft is lost, and the Z-array architecture has
only a single productive degraded state.
Table 5-8: Normalized expected productivity results assuming a single spacecraft failure.
Linear Linear
DCB X-array Triangle Diamond Z-array 3
Col. 1 41% 28% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Col. 2 0% 28% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Col. 3 0% 28% 0% 0% 34% 0%
Col. 4 41% 28% N/A 0% 0% N/A
Comb. 0% 0% N/A N/A N/A 0%
Average 16% 22% 0% 0% 8% 0%
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Figure 5-17: Overall expected productivity results assuming a 5% probability of failure per
spacecraft both pre-operations and throughout life.
The results shown assume a 5% probability of failure, both before operations
begin and by the end of life, for each spacecraft with a single function. The probabilities
of failure for spacecraft that are required to both collect and combine light were doubled
to 10%. The 5% value was based purely on engineering judgment. Therefore, a
sensitivity study was carried out to examine how much the specific probability of failure
chosen impacts the study results. The results of the sensitivity study can be seen in
Figure 5-18, where the value on the x-axis corresponds to the probability of failure for a
single-function spacecraft. The same probability of failure was used in all cases for both
the pre-operations probability of failure and the probability of a failure occurring by the
end of life. An exponential failure rate was assumed for failures that could occur
throughout life. In all cases the failure rates were doubled for any spacecraft that is
required to both collect and combine light.
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Figure 5-18: Sensitivity study of overall expected productivity results.
Figure 5-18 shows that the results of this study are not particularly sensitive to the
value assigned to the probability of failure. In all cases the relative pattern between
architectures remains reasonably consistent. The Diamond and Z-array architectures
consistently perform worst, followed by the Triangle and Linear DeB architectures. The
X-array and Linear 3 architectures consistently perform better than the other four
architectures. While the range of performance does spread as the probabilities of failure
are increased, there is still not a truly significant difference between the results for all
architectures even when a 10% probability of failure is assumed. A probability of failure
of larger than 10% per spacecraft would almost certainly be too conservative of an
estimate. Therefore, the result that there is only a small difference in the performance of
the architectures, in terms of this parameter~ is shown to be insensitive to the uncertain
input of the probability of failure per spacecraft.
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5.3.1 Effect on Architecture Trade Study
The results shown above were incorporated into the TPF-I architecture down-
select trade study. For the architecture down-select, each architecture design was judged
based on 27 different discriminators. One of these discriminators was the ability to
degrade gracefully. Each discriminator was given a weighting by a group of experts,
with the sum of all weightings equal to 100 [Lay et al, 2005]. The average weighting per
discriminator was therefore 3.7. Graceful degradation was judged to have an above
average weighting of 4.3. The above average weighting shows the importance that was
placed on this characteristic. The performance of each of the architectures was quantified
using one or more parameters per discriminator, with the graceful degradation
discriminator using the two parameters discussed above. The 4.3 weighting given to the
graceful degradation discriminator was split equally between the two parameters.
Once weightings were set, the same group of experts judged each of the
architecture's performance, in terms of each parameter. First the architecture that
performed best was identified and assigned a score of 10. Next, the architecture that
performed worst was identified. The group of experts then voted on the score, from 1 to
10, that should be given to the worst performing architecture. The difference in the score
from the best to the worst performing architecture should reflect the difference in the
level of performance, and not the importance of that parameter. The importance of the
parameter was already accounted for in the previously agreed upon weighting scheme.
The score given to all other architectures was then decided by a group vote. Usually, the
scores for the architectures that were neither the best nor the worst performing were
based on a linear transformation between the two extreme scores. The weighting
multiplied by the score gave each of the architectures a particular number of points for
that parameter. The points were then totaled to give the total points for each of the
architectures. Since the weightings added up to 100, and each parameter was judged on a
score of 1 to 10, the total number of possible points was 1000 [Lay et al, 2005].
For the overall expected percent of the nominal star-count given a probability of
failure per spacecraft, the best architecture was the Linear 3 with a value of 82%. The
Linear 3 architecture was therefore given a score of 10 for this parameter. The worst
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architecture in terms of this parameter, with a value of 71%, was the Diamond DCB
architecture. The Diamond DCB architecture was given a score of 7.5. All other
architectures were scored based on a linear transformation between the two extremes for
this parameter.
For the expected percent of the nominal star-count given a failure in a single
spacecraft, the best architecture was the X-array with a value of 22%. The X-array
architecture was therefore given a score of 10 for this parameter. The worst architectures
in terms of this parameter were the Diamond DCB, the Triangle, and the Linear 3
architectures. These architectures all had zero star-counts assuming a failure in any one
of the spacecraft. Zero chance of any productivity given a major failure was considered a
very large negative for these architectures by the group of experts, and these architectures
were therefore given a score of zero for this parameter. Since the jump from no possible
productive states to any possible productive states was deemed a big difference, this
parameter was not scored using a linear transformation between the two extreme scores.
The Z-array architecture, with a value of 9%, would have scored a 4.1 using a linear
transformation, but was given a score of 5.0 by the group of experts. The Linear DCB
architecture, with a value of 16%, would have scored a 7.3 using a linear transformation,
but was given a score of 8.0 by the group of experts. See [Lay et al, 2005] for more
details about the architecture down-select and trade study process.
The difference in performance across architectures, in terms of the expected
percent of the nominal star-count given a failure of a single spacecraft, ranged in scores
from 0 to 10. Given a sub-weighting of 50% of the total weighting of 4.3, or 2.15, this
corresponds directly to a point difference as high as 21.5 points. This difference had a
significant impact on the outcome of the trade study and the down-select. As an
example, a 20 point difference between the Linear DCB architecture and the Z-array
architecture can be attributed exclusively to the graceful degradation discriminator (both
parameters). This difference is especially large when considering that the total point
difference, considering all discriminators, between the two architectures was 31 points.
This example shows that the graceful degradation discriminator was not only given a
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high importance weighting by the group of experts, but also made a significant difference
in the outcome of the architecture down-select and trade study.
5.3.2 Design Change Due to Study
In addition to affecting the outcome of the architecture down-select, the graceful
degradation study presented here also affected the design of the possible TPF-I mission
architectures. The Linear DCB and the X-array architectures have similar beam
combiner designs. The beam combiner is the part of the instrument that combines the
beams from the separate spacecraft and finds nulls. The design of the beam combiner is a
large part of the experimental and theoretical work that has been ongoing for TPF-I.
While there are initial sketches and theoretical designs for a beam combiner for each of
the architectures, most of the effort has focused on designing the beam combiner for the
Linear DCB and X-array architectures.
Prior to the work done in this study, the design under development for the beam
combiner did not easily support adding in the ability to vary the phases of the beams.
While the design team was developing a single design in detail, prior to choosing the
given design, a trade study was done and several designs for the beam combiner were
considered. The ability to vary the phases of the incoming beams was not considered as a
parameter when choosing a beam combiner design, since at the time there was no need to
vary the phases. However, one of the designs under consideration that was not initially
chosen to be developed in detail could easily support adding the ability to vary the
incoming beam phases. Therefore, after reviewing the results of the graceful degradation
study, and learning that being able to operate in a degraded state after the loss of a single
spacecraft both would be possible, and would be considered high priority among experts,
the lead engineer in charge of the beam-combiner design suggested switching the
baseline design, to consider in more detail the design that could accommodate varying
phases.
This suggested design change materialized because a study was carried out, very
early in the development cycle of the TPF-I mission, to examine what would be required
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to be able to operate in degraded states, and how productive those degraded states would
be. It was discovered that, with a design change to allow for variable phases, several of
the mission architectures could operate in a degraded state without a single spacecraft.
The productivity in these degraded states proved to be enough to merit the change in
design, as seen both in this study as well as in the TPF-I Risk Analysis study shown in
Chapter 6. While this design change is relatively small at this point in the development
cycle, it may have been impossible to make such a change later. If these same results had
not been shown until several years later in the design process it would have been
impossible to change the design of the beam combiner. The design that does not support
variable phases would have been worked out in detail, and switching to a new design
would have required a very large amount of effort and resources. A cost-benefit analysis
at that point in time would almost certainly show that it would not be worth switching
designs to achieve the extra risk mitigation and benefits accrued from having variable
phases. The cost of making this same design change at the current point in the
development cycle for the TPF-I mission is significantly smaller in terms of effort and
resources. Therefore, it is worth it from a cost-benefit stand-point to make this design
change while in this early phase of the mission. By conducting the degraded state study
early enough in the life-cycle of the design process, it is possible to affect the design from
the early stages, when design changes are not as costly. We are more likely to achieve a
design that is inherently robust and low risk if we allow risk to be a tradable parameter
throughout the design process, instead of simply a parameter that is calculated when the
design is completed.
5.4 Conclusions
This case-study showed the method behind, and results of, a study to determine
possible degraded states for various TPF-I architectures. Rules for determining the
productivity of a degraded state were determined. The productivity in these degraded
states was then quantified using two separate parameters, to bring risk and the concept of
graceful degradation directly into an ongoing architecture trade study and down-select for
a real NASA mission, TPF-I.
_ 
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This graceful degradation case-study showed the impact that a risk-based study
can have on the design of a mission if carried out early in the design life-cycle. The
design of the TPF-I mission was affected by the results of this case study in two separate
ways. First, the architecture selection was directly affected by the varying architectures
ability to degrade gracefully. Second, a major design change to the beam combiner was
recommended, to allow for risk mitigation and graceful degradation. These two impacts
directly show how incorporating risk into the design process at an early stage can, and
did, have an affect on the design of a flight mission.
Chapter 6
CASE-STUDY 2: RISK MODEL AND ANALYSIS
FOR TPF-I
6.1 Introduction and Motivation
At the end of the architecture down-select process discussed in Chapter 5, the
TPF-I design team chose the Linear DCB architecture as the baseline design. Once this
architectural design was chosen, more detailed design work could begin. A more
comprehensive risk model and analysis was among the studies that were completed.
While the degraded state analysis discussed in Chapter 5 used expected
productivity analysis to determine the risk of various TPF-I architecture designs, it was
not a detailed risk analysis. The purpose of the degraded state analysis was to determine
the relative risk of each of the possible architectures, in terms of major failures only. The
study was limited to the impact of failures of full spacecraft, and did not explore how or
why the spacecraft may fail. Once the baseline design for the mission was chosen, it was
possible to begin a much more in-depth risk analysis. In this case, the specific risks and
failure modes for the Linear DCB design were examined.
The risk analysis process for TPF-I consisted of three major steps:
1. Capture and define the major risks associated with TPF-I.
2. Create a model of the risks to determine the effect on the mission
productivity.
3. Analyze and compare the risks.
Each of these steps will be discussed in detail in the following sections.
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6.2 Capture and Define Risks
The first step in developing any risk model is to gather the information required
about the risks to the project. This has been accomplished for TPF-I by interviewing
several experts from the TPF-I design team. Examples of the type of questions asked
during the expert interviews include:
· Describe your subsystem. How does it work? What does it do? What are
the major attributes?
· What are the most probable failure modes for your subsystem? The most
catastrophic?
· What are approximate probabilities of occurrence for each of the failure
modes discussed? What are the impacts on the mission if each failure
were to occur?
· Does your subsystem depend on any other subsystem?
· Are there any technologies being developed that would help to mitigate
the risks discussed?
It should be noted that while these are examples of the types of questions asked, not
every question was asked to every expert. The interview questions guided conversation,
but were not strictly followed.
Eleven interviews in total were conducted, with experts from the attitude control
system (ACS) [Rahman, 2003], structures [Adams, 2003], the Autonomous Formation
Flight (AFF) sensor system [Tien, 2003], formation flight algorithms and control
[Ahmed, 2003], the instrument system [Martin, 2005], and six systems level experts
[Fisher & Miller, 2003] [Gunter, 2005] [Hamlin, 2005] [Henry, 2005] [Lay, 2005].
These interviews resulted in 101 risk items. A risk item is defined as either a failure
mode or a development risk. A failure mode is a failure that could occur once the system
is designed or built. An example of a failure mode is a deployment failure. A
development risk is a risk that a given aspect of the design will not be developed in such
a way as to meet requirements, even in a nominal state. An example of a development
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risk is the possibility that a material will not be found that is capable of remaining stable
enough to meet requirements at cryogenic temperatures.
After reviewing all risk items captured during the interview process, three major
categories of risks were identified. These categories were:
1. Risks that result in the failure of a single spacecraft
2. Risks that result in the failure of the entire system or constellation
3. Technology development risks
Additionally, the risks that result in failures of either the individual spacecraft or the
entire system could be broken down further. Failures of the individual spacecraft fell into
categories of bus failures, payload failures, or the Autonomous Formation Flight (AFF)
system failures. System level failures could be broken down into systematic bus failures,
systematic science or payload failures, formation failures, control system failures, or
failures that occurred prior to the beginning of operations, known as pre-operations
failures. All categories of risk items can be seen in Figure 6-1.
Mission Level Failure
I
1. Individual spacecraft
level failure
a. Bus failure
b. Payload failure
2. Systems failure 3. Technology development
failure
1 a. Systematic bus failure I
b. Science/payload failure I
c. Formation failure
-i d. Control failure
_ e. Pre-operations failure
Figure 6-1: Categories of risk items.
-.
c. AFF failure
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Each development risk or failure mode was placed into one of the categories
discussed above. Several of the risks or failure modes captured were clearly sub-sets of
other risks or failure modes. It is important to keep the level of the risk identifiable. In
other words, a failure of the entire spacecraft would not want to be placed on the same
level as a failure of a particular actuator. A tree structure was implemented to capture
this idea of risk levels. As an example, two ways that the payload could fail would be if
the optical delay line (ODL) failed or if the starlight camera failed. The ODL itself could
fail due to a failure in the ODL sensors, the ODL actuators, the ODL cryo-coolers, the
ODL interface hardware, or the ODL software. Therefore, an ODL sensor failure is a
level below the full ODL failure, and the full ODL failure is at the same level as a
starlight camera failure. This results in a risk list with a tree structure. A higher level
failure could occur from any one, or multiple, of the lower level failures.
It is important to note that the tree-structure and categories discussed above are
for organizational purposes only. They are used to help organize the list of risk items and
to clarify the risk list when showing design team members and managers. The categories
and tree-structure do not affect the results of the risk model, in terms of the expected
number of observations completed.
The full TPF-I risk list can be seen in Appendix A. The following sections
describe the risks to the TPF-I mission, organized into the categories discussed above,
and shown in Figure 6-1.
6.2.1 Individual Spacecraft Failures
6.2.1.1 Individual Spacecraft Bus Failures
Bus failures include all failures that result from non-payload related engineering
functions. These risks are not specifically related to the interferometer instrument. What
makes TPF-I unique in terms of these risks is the fact that the functions are required
across five different spacecraft.
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Deployments are one of the riskiest aspects of any space mission. This particular
mission has a very large number of deployments, many of which are single point failures.
In addition, deployments tend to be looked at as "something that's been done before".
Therefore, in a mission such as this one, with many aspects that haven't been done
before, there is concern that deployments may be overlooked.
There are a relatively large number of deployments per spacecraft - causing
significant risk to each individual spacecraft. The four main deployments on the buses
are the sunshades, the solar arrays, the high gain antenna, and the cryo-radiator
deployments. There are six cryo-radiators and four solar arrays per spacecraft that need
to deploy. The sunshades need to deploy on each spacecraft in order to achieve the
thermal environment required. While the exact deployment sequence for the sunshades
has not been developed yet, this sequence may include several stages, including folding
out or deploying booms, and deploying a spreader to provide the correct angular
separation between the layers of the sunshade. The high gain antenna, located only on
the combiner, will also need to be deployed.
A meteoroid or other debris strike is also of concern to all space missions. These
types of strikes are particularly concerning for TPF-I due both to the surface area, and the
sensitivity, of the spacecraft. With 4m diameter mirrors and 4 apertures, there is 50 m2 of
mirror surface alone that is in danger of strikes. The impact of a meteoroid or debris
strike can vary from no damage to catastrophic based on several variables, including the
size and location of the strike. If a meteoroid were to hit one of the apertures with
enough force to cause damage, the effect could range from impacting the optical surface
of the mirror to a catastrophic failure. If the strike were to leave a spot on the mirror, this
would in effect reduce the effective collecting area of the aperture, but would not cause
the aperture to no longer function. The question in this situation is whether or not the
interferometer can deal with apertures with different optical surfaces. A hole in an
aperture would be more of a catastrophic strike, as this would cause stray-light issues, in
addition to the same sensitivity issues (reduction in collecting area). For this study, it is
assumed that a meteoroid strike to any spacecraft would result in the complete failure of
that spacecraft.
-
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At the time of operations for TPF-I, there is the possibility that several other
missions, such as WMAP, SIRTF, and JWST will also be in orbit about L2. There is the
slight possibility that, due to a control error from either TPF-I or one of the other
missions, one of these other spacecraft could impact the TPF-I spacecraft. If this were to
occur the effect would almost certainly be catastrophic, however the probability of this
occurring is so low that it is still considered a very minor concern.
TPF-I will rely on computers and autonomy algorithms for operation. Computers
will be required to find and track any fringes. Therefore, a computer failure would be
catastrophic. However, computer designs meant to sustain the radiation environment at
L2 have been flown before, and will be flown many more times before launch, leading to
an extremely low probability of a computer failure.
The Attitude Control System (ACS) is responsible for maintaining the attitude of
the spacecraft. This subsystem ensures that the spacecraft remain correctly oriented with
regard to the star, and to the other spacecraft. The system will use star-trackers, gyros,
and sensors. All of these components have some possibility of failure.
The Direct-to-Earth (DTE) communications capability aboard the combiner
spacecraft could also fail. While all five spacecraft will contain some DTE
communications capability, the DTE capability aboard the collector spacecraft will be
significantly reduced compared to the combiner spacecraft. Therefore, if the DTE
capability aboard the combiner spacecraft is lost, the system would be in a degraded state.
6.2.1.2 Individual Spacecraft Payload Failures
The instrument system is in charge of designing and building the interferometer
instrument. This includes both the collecting and combining aspects of the system. The
majority of design work at this point has been conducted on the aspect of combining the
beams of light to find fringes.
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One of the biggest challenges for TPF-I, in terms of risk, is the very large number
of mechanisms on each spacecraft payload. There are four alignment mirrors inside the
combiner. Each collecting spacecraft has an actuated field of regard mirror, a mirror to
allow the metrology beam to align with the starlight beam, a transfer mirror, and a wave-
front sensor. Each inner collecting spacecraft also has an additional moving mirror with
sensors. The beam combiner also has an additional two alignment mirrors per starlight
beam for the metrology beam alignment. Finally, each collecting spacecraft has a single
alignment mirror to adjust for the secondary mirror deployment. This mirror will move
once and lock into place, so it should have only a single event failure mode.
One of the main components to the instrument system is the optical delay lines.
The delay lines have some redundancy built in. There are 4 sets of delay lines on the
combiner, and only 3 are theoretically required for interferometry - one delay line for
each pair of beams (2 total) plus one for combining the pairs. All beam paths are
identical, so a failure in any single delay line should result in a functioning system, with a
layer of redundancy removed. There are 5 total stages of actuation in each delay line -
one course stage, two voice coils, and two piezo stages. In addition to the actuation
stages, the delay lines also contain sensors, interface hardware, cryo-coolers, and
software.
There are several simple sensors throughout the system that should be reasonably
robust. However, there are additional more complex sensors that may have a higher
probability of failure. These include the science and fringe tracking cameras. There are
two fringe tracking cameras and a single nulling, or science camera. These cameras are
not redundant, such that all three are required for a functioning system. There is no room
to put a redundant camera system of either kind. In addition to a complete failure, any of
these detectors may also be less sensitive than was expected prior to launch. One
possible source for decreased sensitivity in the detectors would be radiation damage.
Decreased sensitivity of a detector is a degraded state since, assuming it can be calibrated
for, it is possible to adjust for the decreased sensitivity. This degraded state would have
increased calibration and observation time over the nominal state.
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The metrology system consists of 13 fast steering mirrors spread out over 5
spacecraft. Additionally, 9 intensity gradient detectors (IGDs) are required to control the
fast steering mirrors, which essentially control the starlight angle. These sensors have no
moving parts and are assumed to either work or not work, but will not fail throughout the
lifetime of the mission. Metrology alignment mirrors are needed to control the path-
length from internal variations. Finally, two metrology lasers are required for the system
to work. All elements are single point failures, and there is no clear method to put
redundancy into the system.
Every mechanism in the optical train is a single point failure. Stationary optical
elements could get damaged, such as a misalignment at launch, and cause a single point
of failure. The bigger concern, however, is with moving parts of the optical path, such as
fast steering mirrors, actuators, and delay lines. If any of the mechanisms allowing
motion in these components fails, the whole system fails. In general, moving parts are a
cause for concern for spacecraft designers, but in this case there is even more concern due
to the number of critical moving parts that need to not only function, but also function
accurately and smoothly. Note also that these moving components may fail due either to
not surviving launch or to wear and tear. Many of these components will be moving at
100 to 1000 Hz, which may cause additional stress.
As with the buses, the individual spacecraft payloads also require deployments.
These fault modes consist of a failure during the deployment of the stray-light baffles or
the secondary mirror. There are a total of ten stray-light baffles across all spacecraft that
need to be deployed. The secondary mirror is the most critical, and therefore the most
dangerous, of the deployments. The secondary mirror needs to be deployed precisely and
then held stable at cryogenic temperatures. The deployment is an especially difficult
deployment since the positioning needs to be extremely precise. A lock-out deployment
will probably need to be used to ensure this precision. A failure on deployment of the
secondary mirror would lead to a complete failure of that particular telescope. If the
system could operate without that telescope, this particular failure may not be a complete
system failure however. Finally, it is possible that a mechanism that locks down the
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optical components for launch may not release, or deploy, and would cause a failure of
that spacecraft.
The mechanism to include variable phases, which allows for degraded states with
one fewer spacecraft, could fail. Two mechanisms are considered: the first uses wedges
sliding across one another with a motor, and the second uses rotating plates also driven
by a motor. There is some possibility that the mechanism could get stuck in one end
point or another, but the design is well understood, and the probability of a failure is very
low. It may also be possible to add redundancy to this mechanism to additionally reduce
the probability of failure.
The high-low resolution switch could also fail. This would result in the system
being stuck in either the high or low resolution mode. It is also possible for this switch to
fail such that neither position could be reached, leading to complete system failure.
While ground testing can lead to a reduction in several risks, it can also lead to
additional risks. Modifications will need to be made to the flight system for ground
testing, to account for differences in the environment and test set-up. While many of
these modifications will be accomplished through software, one hardware modification is
required. To test the internal beam path for the combining spacecraft, mirrors will be
placed over the input channels. A test beam will then be sent from a source in the middle
of the combining bench through the internal beam path, reflect off the mirrors, and return
through the beam path to the detectors. If these test mirrors are not removed, or if the
mechanism to move these mirrors fails in the down position, there would be no input
capability to the combiner.
The cryo-cooler is used to bring the optics down to the required temperature. A
failure in the cryo-cooler would result in a significant increase in the temperature of the
optics. An increase in the temperature of the optics of more than a few degrees translates
directly into a critical increase in the noise level. Therefore, it is assumed that a failure of
the cryo-cooler would result in a failure of the mission.
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To achieve the correct signal to noise ratio and light-collecting capability, there
are requirements placed on the quality of both the primary and secondary mirrors for all
collecting spacecraft. If any of the mirrors do not meet these requirements, collection
ability of that particular spacecraft would be lost. Note that this failure mode affects a
spacecraft's ability to collect light, but not the ability to transfer beams.
The final two risks regarding the payloads on the individual spacecraft both
involve control. There is a risk of loosing control of the secondary mirror. This would
result in a lack of the ability of that particular spacecraft to do wave-front control, and
therefore a lack of the ability to collect starlight. There is also a possibility of
contamination of either the primary or secondary mirrors due to a control system error.
In this failure mode one spacecraft would be erroneously sent a command to fire thrusters
toward another spacecraft. This risk does not cover the failure mode that nominal
operations, with all spacecraft in the proper orientation, causes contamination. Nominal
operations contamination would be systematic, and is therefore covered in the systems-
level science section.
6.2.1.3 Individual Spacecraft AFF Failures
The Autonomous Formation Flight (AFF) system is the course knowledge sensor
for formation control. For TPF-I to be able to hold a formation, requirements are placed
on both knowledge and control. The AFF system is in charge of the knowledge portion
of these requirements. The system includes 47c steradian coverage and close range radar
capability for collision avoidance.
The AFF system hardware includes 4 transmitting antennas, 12 receiving
antennas, 4 transmitter modules, 12 receiving modules, 1 baseband processor, 1
frequency subsystem, and 1 power subsystem. While they aren't a part of the AFF sensor
system, actuators use the knowledge provided by this system to move the spacecraft and
hold the formation. The actuators are therefore also placed in this category. There are
also software components to the system which are used to control the sensors. The
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software component risks are common across all buses, and are therefore discussed with
the systematic bus failures.
There are multiple catastrophic AFF system failures. There is only one each of
the reference signal and baseband processor. These items are single string and the course
sensing system would be lost if either of them failed.
There are several additional degraded state failures for the AFF system. If up to
two antennas or transmitters fail, it may be possible to still get some coverage. Some
parts of coverage are more critical than others. This could lead to different levels of
degrading failures. A partial failure of the AFF system would cause the probability of
collision between spacecraft, and of formation evaporation, to increase.
6.2.2 Systems Failures
Systematic failures are failures that affect the entire system. If any of these
failures or risk items occur the entire system, including all five spacecraft, would be
affected at the same time.
6.2.2.1 Systematic Bus Failures
The ACS subsystem was discussed above in the individual spacecraft bus section.
While the different hardware components for the ACS subsystem are on each spacecraft,
and could therefore fail individually on each spacecraft, the software, or estimation
function, for the ACS subsystem is identical for all spacecraft. Therefore, a software
error would be a systematic error, and would most likely cause a failure of all five
spacecraft.
The thermal subsystem is also a concern. There is a possibility of leaks from the
warm side to the cold side of the spacecraft. Given the uncertain nature of the thermal
system, it is possible that these leaks may be missed prior to launch due to a lack of the
ability to completely model, or measure, the thermal characteristics of the system.
A. 179
180 Case Study 2 - Risk Model and Analysis for TPF-I
Sources for thermal leaks include a lack of appropriate thermal shielding, power or
electrical lines, or simply excess sources of heat on the cold-side of the spacecraft,
possibly due to the placement of other sub-systems. An increase in the temperature of the
optics would result in an increase in noise for the observations. It has been approximated
that an increase of only a few degrees on the optics will result in approximately twice the
noise factor for observing. Therefore, it is assumed that with only a single source of
thermal leaks the system could still function, but in a degraded state. It is assumed that if
multiple thermal leaks were to occur, no observing would be possible.
If the thrusters used on all spacecraft are not modeled or tested properly prior to
flight, the out-gassing rate may be higher than expected. While this could be accounted
for through adjustments made during operations, it would result in a higher rate of fuel
consumption than planned. This would lead to a shorter lifetime than in the nominal case
due to a lack of consumables.
In addition to the hardware errors discussed above, operator errors are also a
concern. An example of an operator error would be sending a command to the wrong
spacecraft. Operator errors are considered a system level concern, since the operator is in
charge of the entire system of multiple spacecraft, such that an error in any single
command would most likely affect the entire constellation.
6.2.2.2 Systems Science or Payload Failures
The possibility of receiving bad data from the instrument is a concern. It is
unclear how TPF-I protects against bad data. In other words, how does one verify what
the observatory is seeing? With no method of verification this is a very risky area for
TPF-I. Possible sources of bad data include an exo-zodi with lumps, contamination of
the spectra from hidden planets, or a failure of the planetary signal extraction algorithms.
Even without the consideration of bad data, there are still risks involved in the
observing scenario for TPF-I. If the formation control is not as accurate as desired, or if
the formation can not be stabilized to the desired level, it will be difficult to achieve
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sufficient observing time between movements. The number of calibrations required may
also lead to a lack of stable observation time.
In addition to the risk of contamination from a control system error discussed in
Section 6.2.1.2, there is also a risk of contamination from thrusters during nominal
operations. If testing and modeling are incorrect or inconclusive, it is possible that the
mirrors of the collecting spacecraft could be contaminated either by their own, or
neighboring, thruster plumes. Since this situation would occur due to a systematic design
flaw, this risk affects all the collecting spacecraft in the system.
As discussed previously, the optical path for this system requires very high levels
of precision and accuracy. Any misalignment of the optical path elements could result in
mission failure. One possible source of optical misalignments is from thermal variations.
While these thermal induced optical misalignments would be small enough that they
could be calibrated for in most circumstances, they would result in extra calibration time,
which can be modeled as a decrease in the lifetime of the observatory. There would also
be situations in which enough control authority would no longer exist in the delay lines to
remove certain disturbances. This situation can be modeled with decreased observational
efficiency, since the extra disturbances will result in more overhead time.
Stray-light is a major concern for the TPF-I design team. Modeling is used to
determine the causes and effects of stray-light on the observatory system. This modeling
results in recommendations of how to mitigate stray-light. Examples of stray-light
mitigations include using stray-light baffles at all beam input and output locations on the
spacecraft, and restricting the spacecraft to flying within a maximum distance apart to
reduce beam spread. The results of these stray-light models set the size of the stray-light
baffles and the maximum distance apart the spacecraft are allowed to fly. If the models
have either missed or underestimated any sources of stray-light, these mitigation
techniques may not solve the problem. Depending on the severity of the stray-light issue,
this could result in either decreased observational efficiency, or in mission failure.
The metrology system is used to measure the path-lengths of the science beams.
If the metrology beam has a slight misalignment from the science beam, and this
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alignment is not sensed by the metrology system, a path-length error will occur. This
situation is called beam-walk, and results in complete system failure.
6.2.2.3 Systems Formation Failures
The formation flight system is responsible for the knowledge and control of the
inertial attitude of each spacecraft, the relative range and bearing of all pairs of
spacecraft, the formation pointing capability, and the corresponding rates to all of these.
The goal for knowledge of the relative range is at the single centimeter level, while the
goal for relative bearing is at the single arc-minute level. The goal for control is 5-10
centimeters, and 5-10 arc-minutes, respectively. While these goals may be able to be met
currently with state of the art technology in the laboratory for individual spacecraft,
formation control and knowledge are much more difficult for constellations of spacecraft.
There are two types of failures of the formation flight system - failures which
affect only the local, individual spacecraft, and failures which affect how the spacecraft
will react in the formation. Failures to individual spacecraft are covered in Section
6.2.1.3. Two of the most likely failures modes of the formation from a system level
include the collision of two or more spacecraft and evaporation. Evaporation occurs
when the spacecraft loose formation by drifting more than 10km apart from one another.
Either of these failure modes would be catastrophic.
The most difficult and challenging part of the formation flight system is the new
software design that is required, including signal structure, processing algorithms, and
frequency subsystem design. This is due to the requirements placed on the system from
the simultaneous operation of multiple spacecraft. One of the major error sources for the
system comes from multi-path. Multi-path occurs when a signal bounces off another
spacecraft instead of coming directly from the originating spacecraft. A failure of the
AFF software structure would be catastrophic.
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The handoff between the course to medium sensors, and medium to fine sensors,
could be a concern. There is no real way to test this handoff accurately, and the analysis
and modeling is not at the level it needs to be at as yet.
The formation flight algorithms rely on very fast inter-spacecraft communication.
If there is a failure of the inter-spacecraft communication system, the individual
spacecraft would not be able to determine where each of the other spacecraft is, resulting
in a formation failure. In addition, if there is too much latency in the communications
system, the formation control would be very difficult.
The process of acquiring the formation for the first time is also risky. After
deployment from the cruise stage, the individual spacecraft need to turn on the AFF
system, acquire signal from each of the other spacecraft, and maneuver into an initial
formation. All of these steps need to be completed before the spacecraft either collide, or
drift apart beyond the sensor range. While the end result of this failure would be
collision or evaporation, it is a separate risk item since the cause of the failure is unique.
6.2.2.4 Control Failures
One of the main sources for concern regarding the control algorithms for TPF-I is
the possibility of vibrations on the spacecraft due to self-induced disturbances. There are
five primary excitation sources on the TPF-I spacecraft - the cryo-pump, the reaction
wheels, the thrusters, moving optics, and thermal snap. Thermal snap occurs since the
spacecraft needs to rotate to observe, and is therefore in a continuously varying cone
angle from the sun. While thrusters will certainly cause vibration issues, it is hoped that
the thrusters will only be used when absolutely necessary, such as to de-saturate the
reaction wheels, but will not be used during observations. Moving optics, such as delay
lines, will need to move throughout the observing process, however. The final source of
self-induced vibrations is a disturbance from the placement of other subsystems. Solving
the vibration problem is difficult since you need some control in order to correct for any
vibrations that do occur, but the more powerful a control system you have, the more
vibrations you are likely to excite with it. Whether or not science could be collected in
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the presence of vibrations given an excitation failure would depend on the level of
vibrations. Science return would definitely be reduced however.
Another possible failure mode is sensor noise coupled into the control loop. The
possible noise sources for TPF-I have not been characterized to the level needed to
integrate into the design process. Characterizing these noise sources is a work in
progress.
The control system relies on the propulsion system to provide all 6 degrees of
freedom whenever needed. There is a concern that the control loop will need to thrust in
a given direction, and won't be able to because of plume impingement risks, or hardware
in the way. This would result in thrust directions being limited, causing control
difficulties.
A degraded state is also possible from plant dynamics changing, due to fuel slosh
or fuel usage. This would cause the control to be more difficult, and would affect the
observational efficiency.
The final control system risk item is the risk of an un-sensed mode. This is the
risk that there is collector vibration, in the direction of the star, at a frequency higher than
the fringe tracker can measure, or approximately 1 Hz. Since this mode would be un-
sensed, it would also be impossible to track, leading to a failure to track the fringe.
6.2.2.5 Pre-operations Failures
Launch failures are something that all spacecraft need to worry about. However,
nothing is unique about this particular launch that makes it more risky than other
launches. The current design is slated to use a Delta IV heavy rocket. It is unclear how
many of these rockets will have launched previous to TPF-I. A failure during launch
would almost certainly be a complete failure.
Additional launch failures consist of scenarios such as a piece of the spacecraft
breaking, or experiencing permanent deformation, due to launch loads. To protect
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against this type of failure the design is analyzed to ensure it is strong enough, stiff
enough, and has enough damping to survive the known launch environment. The
acceleration loads placed on the system at launch could also cause failures or
misalignments.
This mission consists of a more complex system of systems than the engineers
and designers are used. Additionally, it is impossible to test the full observatory system
during ground testing. The complexity of the system, coupled with the lack of the ability
to fully test the system on the ground, increases the number of unknown unknowns. The
high level of complexity also leads to an additional risk of design error, or incorrect
requirements.
While it will not be possible to test the full observatory system on the ground, as
much ground testing as possible will be carried out prior to launch. Mishandling during
ground testing can also be a concern. Lack of testing can lead to certain risks, but
increased testing can also lead to risks of failures occurring during testing.
Missing the L2 injection has a low probability, since this problem has been done
before, and will be done several more times before TPF-I flies. The James Webb Space
Telescope will be a good risk retirement vehicle for this particular risk.
A failure during cruise stage would be mission catastrophic. However, this phase
of the mission is essentially the "easiest" phase of the mission - with nothing new being
done for the first time. In addition to having heritage to previous designs, there will also
be fault protection built into the cruise stage that should remove the majority of the risks
involved in this stage, such as a propellant failure during a mission critical maneuver.
The deployment of the constellation from the cruise stage is also a concern. The
exact deployment sequence is not known at this time, but more than one deployment may
be required. Tip-off during spacecraft deployment could be a relatively major issue.
This would occur if there is contact with the cruise stage during the deployment of any of
the spacecraft, due to unbalanced spring forces.
-
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6.2.3 Technology Development Failures
Developing the instrument control technology such that it can meet the
requirements is an area of concern. The requirements on TPF-I are much tighter than
those that were placed on a previous NASA formation flown interferometer mission,
Starlight, which were already challenging to meet. The current requirements for TPF-I
are to cover 10 arcminutes over a 10 milliarcsecond resolution. This leads to a dynamic
range of 60,000. While this requirement would be exceptionally difficult to meet, it is
still very preliminary. If the resolution or range could be relaxed, the requirement would
be much easier to meet. An estimate of a dynamic range that could be realistically met
would be approximately 6,000.
Keeping the spacecraft structure stable, with very little vibration, is especially
difficult at cryogenic temperatures, since the characteristics of materials are somewhat
unknown in this temperature range. In addition, in most common materials as the
temperature decreases, the amount of natural damping in the material also decreases.
Therefore, it has been theorized that these materials will ring for a very long time when
placed in a cryogenic environment. While the exact problem is not well understood,
since cryogenic structures are not well understood on a large scale, it is theorized that this
is a problem which is orders of magnitude worse than the same excitations would create
in a room temperature environment.
A testing program to examine the characteristics of cryogenic structures would
greatly help with the stability failure mode. This testing could be done on ground or with
the shuttle, with more accurate testing available from the similar environment of the
shuttle. Ground testing may be possible but will be difficult. Testing would definitely
help to understand the problem better, which would in turn help with understanding the
solution. Sophisticated modeling efforts could also help the stabilization issue. These
models should simulate the environment and the spacecraft. Finally, tasks are underway
to develop new materials that have more natural damping in cryogenic temperatures.
One material that is looking promising is a version of a glass. There appears to be more
possibility of finding better materials for the mirrors of the telescope than for the
structure, although the search is still on.
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For the formation system, the technology to develop the AFF sensors to produce
4n steradian coverage without requiring any maneuvering is at TRL 3-4. The technology
to develop smart algorithms to avoid collision is at TRL 5-6. Finally, the technology to
develop on-board autonomy for formations is at TRL 3. In all cases the ideas for how to
accomplish the tasks are there, and just the resources and time to develop them are
required.
There are two main technology developments for the instrument system. Single
mode spatial filtering uses optical fibers to filter the wave-fronts. Wave-fronts from the
different apertures are distorted in different ways. The single mode filter is blind to the
details of the distortion and simply takes the average. This technology leads to the ability
to match wavelengths and relaxes the requirements on optical alignment. The other main
technology development is adaptive nulling. While this technology development is
proceeding well, it should be noted that it is a key, required technology.
There is a concern of trying to control a formation of spacecraft in the unstable
environment of L2. Some technology will need to be developed to both model this
unstable environment to the level needed, and to develop the control algorithms required
for this environment.
Finally, as discussed previously, it is important for the formation flight control
that the inter-spacecraft communications meet given latency requirements. While the
basics for the inter-spacecraft communications system exist, this latency requirement will
require new technology development.
6.3 Risk Model
Once the risks were identified through expert interviews, the process of
developing a risk model began. Each risk item required two main components to be
modeled - probability of occurrence, and impact in the event of occurrence. All impact
and probability information was based on a combination of engineering judgment and
expert opinion. An effort was made to ensure consistency across the model when dealing
with varying experts opinions.
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6.3.1 Impacts
There are two main categories of impacts for risk items - those leading to
complete failure, and those leading to a degraded state. Risk items that lead to degraded
states can lead to any of the following states:
- Loss of a spacecraft
- Loss of a spacecraft payload
- Reduced observational efficiency
- Increased failure rate of a different failure mode
- Reduced lifetime
- Increased integration time
- Increased minimum baseline length
- Decreased maximum baseline length
- Stuck in the high or low resolution mode
- Stuck in the three-collector or four-collector mode
- Combination of above
If the risk items that lead to the loss of a spacecraft occur on one of the outer
collecting spacecraft, the system is still able to function using the remaining spacecraft.
If these risk items occur on one of the inner collecting spacecraft, or on the combining
spacecraft, the system would not be able to function, since there would be no way to get
three star-light beams with equal path-lengths to the combining spacecraft. An example
of a risk item that leads to the loss of a spacecraft is a failure of a component in the
specific optical path of each spacecraft.
Loss of a spacecraft payload is defined as the loss of the collecting ability of one
of the collecting spacecraft. A loss of an outer collector spacecraft payload results in the
same degraded state as a loss of the entire outer collector spacecraft. A loss of an inner
collector spacecraft payload results in a degraded state in which the inner spacecraft can
not collect light, but can still transfer star-light beams from a different collector to the
combiner. Therefore, a loss of an inner collector spacecraft payload can still lead to a
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degraded state with three collecting spacecraft, as long as all other spacecraft and
payloads are still functional. A secondary mirror deployment failure is one of the failures
that would lead to the loss of a spacecraft payload.
Reduced observational efficiency is one of the most common impacts of risk
items. Observational efficiency is defined as the ratio of time spent observing to total
time. The total time is the observing time plus the time required for overhead, including
all engineering and house-keeping functions. The observational efficiency is usually
decreased due to an increase in the required overhead time per unit of time spent
observing. This can occur if more engineering functions are required, or if these
functions would take longer, given a particular failure. One example of a risk item that
leads to reduced observational efficiency is if plume impingement concerns restrict the
possible thruster firing directions for the control algorithms.
Another very common impact for risk items is the increased probability of a
different failure mode. One of the more common failure modes impacted by other
failures is a collision of spacecraft. The loss of a single sensor in the AFF system will not
result in system failure, but will result in an increased probability of a future collision.
Other common failure modes that are impacted by other failures are evaporation, and not
having enough time between disturbances to settle the spacecraft to the required level.
Reduced lifetime can occur if more time is required for calibrations, or if
consumables are used at a rate higher than expected. An example is if the thruster out-
gassing rate is higher than expected. This leads to a shorter lifetime because of the
limited amount of fuel available.
The integration time per star is a function of the signal-to-noise ratio of the
instrument system. Therefore, an increase in noise levels will lead to an increase in
integration time per star. As an example, a single thermal leak to the cold-side of the
spacecraft would result in an increase of a few degrees of the temperature of the optics.
This increase in temperature would correspond directly with an increase in noise, which
corresponds directly to an increase in integration time.
------
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The distance between the individual spacecraft in the formation sets the baseline
distance for that formation. The baseline determines the resolution of the instrument. In
some cases a longer baseline is required, while in other cases a shorter baseline is
required. See Chapter 4 for a review of how the baseline affects the observational ability
of the instrument. The minimum distance between any two spacecraft in the formation is
set for safety reasons, to avoid collisions between spacecraft. Failures of the AFF system
to perform as required could lead the design team to decide to increase the minimum
allowable separation distance between spacecraft. The maximum separation distance is
set by stray-light concerns, and is only applicable to spacecraft between which a beam is
being transferred. If a single stray-light baffle were to not deploy, the system could still
function, but the maximum allowable distance between spacecraft would be decreased.
Note that in some cases, depending on which spacecraft the failure occurred on, it may be
preferable to use only three spacecraft, but use the nominal maximum allowable distance.
This is accounted for in the model.
The final two possible impacts are specific to given risk items. If the switch that
determines if the system is in high-resolution or low-resolution mode is stuck, the system
will clearly be stuck in one of the two modes. Similarly, if the mechanism to allow for
variable phases becomes stuck, the system could be stuck in either a three or four
collector mode.
6.3.2 Probability of Occurrence
It is very difficult to determine the probability of each of the risk items occurring.
An initial attempt was made to determine the probability of occurrence from the expert
interviews that provided the risk items. It became clear however, that not only was each
expert uncertain in his or her response, but responses between experts were not
correlated. The optimistic versus pessimistic stance of the individual expert led to a very
wide range in the value of probabilities. Therefore, it was decided to set the probabilities
using bins of values. Five probability bins were used - very high, high, medium, low,
and very low. Determining which category, or bin, a given risk item fell into was much
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more intuitive to the experts interviewed. Each probability bin was then given a specific
probability value. Probability values of 10%, 5%, 1%, 0.5%, and 0.1% were used for the
very high, high, medium, low, and very low bins respectively. If a failure mode or risk
item could occur at any point throughout the lifetime of a mission, such as the failure of a
moving component or part, this probability value was used as the probability of the
failure occurring by the end of life. An exponential failure rate was then calculated using
this probability.
In order to normalize the probabilities between experts even more, a set of group
definitions was determined to assign a probability bin to each risk item. These groups
were based on the reasoning that the experts gave as to why certain risk items fell into a
particular bin. As an example, it was determined, through expert interview, that a
deployment failure of the secondary mirror is more probable than any other deployment
failure, since a very high precision deployment is required. Therefore, separate groups
were defined for general deployments and for precision deployments. The description of
each group, along with the probability bin and value assigned to that group, is shown in
Table 6-1.
In a few cases a known, unique probability value was given to a risk item. This
occurred in three cases. The probability of being hit by a micro- meteoroid while in orbit
about L2 was based on research done for the James Webb Space Telescope in 1998 by
Lindsey [Lindsey, 1998]. The value used was the sum of the flux per square meter of
meteoroids between 0.5 cm and 7 cm in diameter, times 5 years of operation. This value
was then multiplied by the exposed surface area of TPF-I, including apertures and
sunshades. The same value was used to determine the probability of hitting another
mission in L2. The probability of a launch failure was calculated using the average
failure rate of all Delta launch vehicles, or 6.5% (174 successes out of 186 attempts).
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Table 6-1: Probability group definitions
1 1Probability Probability
Description ID Category Value
Individual component/moving part, with heritage 1 Very Low 0.1%
Individual component/moving part, no heritage 2 Low 0.5%
Deployment - normal 3 Very Low 0.1%
Deployment- precision required 4 Low 0.5%
Scenario is completely understood and heritage systems 5 Very Low
or scenarios exist 0.1%
Scenario is not completely understood, similar but not 6 Low
exact heritage systems or scenarios exist 0.5%
Scenario is not completely understood, no heritage 7 Medium
systems or scenarios exist 1.0%
Scenario is not completely understood, similar but not
exact heritage systems or scenarios exist, lack of 8 Medium
solution or exact heritage causes concern for design
team members 1.0%
Technology/subsystem development, requirements are 9 High
very strict and there exist heritage systems 5.0%
Technology/subsystem development, requirements are 10 Medium
strict and there exist heritage systems 1.0%
Technology/subsystem development, requirements are 11 Very High
very strict and heritage systems do not exist 10.0%
Technology/subsystem development, requirements are 12 High
strict and heritage systems do not exist 5.0%
6.3.3 Risk Model Summary
The full TPF-I risk list and model for the Linear DCB architecture can be seen in
Appendix A. The model consists of 101 individual failure modes or risk items. Of these,
35 result in a complete failure, 26 result in a degraded state, and 40 result in either a
complete failure or a degraded state, depending on the severity or location of the failure.
Almost one-third of the risk items (62) occur from a single event at a given point in time,
as opposed to occurring at any point throughout the lifetime of the mission (39). A
summary of the risk model can be seen in Table 6-2.
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Table 6-2: Risk model summary
Total Number of Risk Items 101
Complete vs. Degraded State Failure
Complete failures 35
Degraded state failures 27
Either complete or degraded state failures 39
Single Event vs. Throughout Life Timing
Single event 62
Throughout life 39
Probability Categories
Very high probability 1
High probability 5
Medium probability 22
Low probability 16
Very low probability 54
Unique probability 3
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6.4 Results and Analysis
6.4.1 Risk Model Results
The failure modes and risk items discussed above were modeled using Matlab and
the EPRA modeling approach. The star-count model discussed in Chapter 4 was used to
calculate the number of stars the system could observe in both the nominal state, and all
degraded states. Note that only the detection phase of the mission was modeled. Due to
the use of only the detection phase, a 24 month life was assumed. A Linear DCB
architecture was used. The minimum and maximum allowable baseline was set to 60m
and 240m respectively. Finally, a single launch was assumed, resulting in 3.8m diameter
apertures.
The results of the risk model are shown in Table 6-3. Given the above described
architecture, TPF-I can expect to observe 116 star systems in the detection phase of the
mission. Without any failures, this same architecture could observe 224 star systems.
This implies that there is a 48.2% loss in observations from the risk items modeled. The
current TPF-I requirement is to observe 150 star systems in the detection phase. While
this number could easily change, the probability of meeting the current requirement is
46.3%.
Table 6-3: Results of TPF-I risk model
Expected Number of Observations 116.1 observations
Standard Deviation 78.4 observations
Number of Observations Without Failures 224 observations
Probability of Completing Greater than 150 Observations 46.3%
Reliability Answer 41.6%
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The final value shown in Table 6-3 is the reliability answer for this architecture.
If the same risk items were used to determine the reliability of the system, instead of the
expected productivity, the answer would be that the system is only 41.6% reliable. This
is the probability that the system is in any functioning or partially functioning state by the
end of the lifetime of the mission. Providing a manager or decision maker with the
option of calculating risk as expected productivity allows for the option of viewing risky
missions in a more favorable light. TPF-I will be perceived as a much less risky mission
if it is reported that, even accounting very conservatively for over 100 possible risk items,
the mission is expected to observe over 100 stars in the detection phase. This is
compared to reporting that the mission is only 41.6% reliable.
It should be noted that a pure reliability analysis can not be used to short-cut the
use of a system model. The current model shows that at the end of life the TPF-I
architecture is 41.6% reliable, and that without any failures the instrument could observe
224 star systems. Using only these two values, the expected number of observations
would be approximated as 93.3 observations. This is a difference of 22.8 observations, or
24%, from the calculated value of 116.1 observations. This difference, shown in
Equation 6-1, is due to the fact that many of the failures could occur throughout the
lifetime of the mission, and that a failure at the end of life would result in a much more
productive mission than a failure in the beginning of life. This example shows that a true
expected productivity model, including both the probabilistic and system model aspects,
is required to accurately estimate the expected productivity of a complex system.
E[observations]Es,,,,a,, - Observations NoFai,,rs x Reliability + 0 x (1 - Reliability)
E[observations]Estima,ed 224 x 0.416 = 93.3 (6-1)
E[observationsbct¢,a,ed - E[observations]E,a,ed = 116.1- 93.3 = 22.8
Figure 6-2 shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for the number of
observations TPF-I will complete in the detection phase of the mission. The values on
the x-axis are the number of observations, and the values on the y-axis are the
probabilities of producing greater than each number of observations. This figure can give
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the design team and science team a feel for how the probability of meeting a given
requirement changes as the requirement changes. This figure also easily provides the
probability of receiving no data (-21%).
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Figure 6-2: CDF of observations for TPF-I
There are two main points of interest in the shape of the CDF, as shown in Figure
6-3. There are drop-offs at approximately 100 observations and 180 observations. The
drop-off in the probability of achieving greater than 180 observations is a remnant of the
approximations used in the modeling process, and is not a true drop-off. As discussed in
Chapter 3, the R vector is adjusted to account for situations when the system never
leaves the first state. This adjustment is step 5.2 in the summary of the EPRA modeling
approach (Figure 3-15) shown in Chapter 3. For the case where the system never leaves
the first state, it is possible to calculate the exact time needed to observe each star system.
The only cases where it is clear that the system never left the first state are cases where
the last observation, or last n observations, could only be completed in the first state. In
these cases either the system completed the observations still in the first state, or it did
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not complete the observations at all. The probability of completing each of the
observations that must be completed in the first state will therefore be lower than the
probability of completing other observations. Following the expected path through the
system for TPF-I, assuming both nominal and degraded states, leads to the completion of
approximately 180 observations. If the system is in the first state throughout the lifetime
of the mission however, it would be possible to complete 197 observations. To complete
anywhere between 180 and 197 observations, this modeling approach assumes that the
system would need to be in the first state throughout the lifetime of the mission, resulting
in the lower probability values shown in the CDF. If all paths through the system could
be mapped, this sudden drop-off would not occur, and the CDF would have a constant
steep slope between the values at 180 observations and 197 observations, as shown by the
dashed line in Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3. Note that the value of 197 observations does
not match the reported 224 observations with no failures. This is due to the fact that
many single event failures that occur prior to operations are used to calculate the
expected value of system parameters, such as observational efficiency. The difference
between the expected value and the nominal value of these parameters leads to the
difference between completing 224 observations with no failures, and 197 observations
given the probability of these single event failures occurring, but assuming that the
system did not leave the original state after operations began.
While the drop-off at 180 observations in the CDF is a remnant of the
approximations used in the model, the drop-off at approximately 100 observations is real.
For the TPF-I case, if the system is in a degraded three-collector state for the entire
lifetime of the mission, it can only complete 102 observations. The drop-off in the CDF
at this value corresponds to the adjustment in the probability matrix that changes the
probabilities from the probability of being in that degraded state at that time, to the
probability of being in that degraded state at that time assuming that the operations did
not begin in that state. This adjustment is step 4.2.1 in the summary of the EPRA
modeling approach (Figure 3-15) shown in Chapter 3. Many of the failures that could
result in a three-collector system occur prior to the beginning of operations. Therefore,
the fact that a three-collector system can complete only 102 observations in the given
lifetime has a large impact on the CDF. If the variable phases mechanism that allows the
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system to transform to a three-collector system were not included in the design, the
portion of the CDF before 102 observations would essentially shift down the y-axis and
meet up with the portion of the curve past 102 observations. This drop-off in the CDF is
not a factor of approximations, but is a true factor of the productivity of the system, and
is therefore of particular interest to engineers and designers working on TPF-I. The
above explanation of the shape of the CDF curve is summarized in Figure 6-3.
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Figure 6-3: Explanation of drop-offs and shape of the CDF curve.
It is of interest to note that the drop-off that occurs at approximately 100
observations is not a sharp drop. This phenomenon is explained by the step in the
analysis process where the R vector is sorted in decreasing order. This is step 5.3 in the
summary of the EPRA modeling approach (Figure 3-15) shown in Chapter 3. This
adjustment is done to ensure that the R vector contains the probability of completing any
n observations, and not the probability of completing the first n observations in the initial
star-list. In this case there are several star systems which TPF-I can complete in the first
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state but not in degraded states, but which are early in the initial star-list when sorted by
the time to complete the observation in the first state. When the probability of
completing each observation is sorted to account for this situation, a few observations fall
within the change in probabilities that occurs at the 102 observation mark, smoothing out
this drop-off. This can be seen in Figure 6-4.
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Figure 6-4: Details of the drop-ofT at 102 observations
6.4.1.1 Extended Lifetime Results
The results shown above assume a 24 month lifetime for the TPF-I mission, for
the detection phase only. This is based on the baseline mission scenario of a 5 year life,
with 2 years spent in the detection phase and 3 years spent in the spectroscopy phase.
While this is the current lifetime listed in the science requirements and documents, the
TPF -I design team has been instructed to carry enough consumables for an extended
mission of an additional 5 years. Therefore, the same risk list was modeled using this
extended life scenario, with a total lifetime of 48 months. While the total allowable time
to complete observations was set at 48 months, the failure rates of failures that could
occur throughout the lifetime of the mission were still based on a 24 month lifetime. This
was done in order to capture the concept of designing to a 24 month lifetime, but carrying
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enough consumables for a 48 month lifetime. The results of this model run are shown in
Table 6-4 and Figure 6-5.
With the extra 24 month extended mission, making a total mission lifetime of 48
months, TPF-I could expect to complete 132.7 observations. This is 16.6, or 14.3%,
more observations than with the lifetime set at 24 months. This increase is not as large as
what may be initially expected. This is due to two factors. First, the observations are
completed in order from shortest to longest completion time in the first state. Most of the
star-systems for which the observations could be competed in a reasonable amount of
time are already completed by the end of the 24 month lifetime. Therefore, in the extra
24 months of extended lifetime, only star-systems for which an observation would take
on the order of several months are left. The second factor leading to the relatively small
increase is the fact that failure rates are still determined using a 24 month lifetime.
Therefore, the probability of any of these failures occurring is relatively high by the end
of the 48 month lifetime, resulting in a lower expected productivity during the extended
mission.
One important result of the risk model using the extended lifetime is shown in
Figure 6-5. The drop-off corresponding to the number of observations that can be
completed using a three-collector system moved from 102 observations to 136
observations. The extra 34 observations that can be completed if the system is in a
degraded three-collector state for the entire lifetime is a very large improvement. This
puts the number of observations that can be completed in one of the most severe
degraded states near the required number of observations for the mission. This difference
between results for the 24 and 48 month lifetimes is more significant than the difference
in the overall expected number of observations of 16.
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Table 6-4: Risk model resultsusing extended lifetimeof 48 months
Expected Number of Observations 132.7 observations
Standard Deviation 97.2 observations
Number of observations over Expected Observations usmg 24 16.6 observationsMonth Lifetime
Percent Number of observations over Expected Observations using 14.3%24 Month Lifetime
1 . Probability Distribution
0.8
0.7
'"c.2e;;
~ 0.6
'"~o
)(
A 0.5
C>c
'<;
::>e 0.4
c.
'0
>-a 0.3.~
1Il~e
Q. 0.2
0.1 o 50 100 150 200
Number of Observations
250 300
Figure 6-5: CDF of number of obsen'ations using extended lifetimeof 48 months
6.4.1.2 No Technology Development Failures
As discussed previously, the risk model consists of three main categories of risks
- failures of individual spacecraft, system level failures,and technology development
failures. While failuresof the individual spacecraft or the system as a whole are very
common to include in a technical risk list,technology development failures are not as
common. This is due at leastpartiallyto the fact that these failureswould occur several
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years before any of the other failures on the risk list would occur. Technology
development is one of the first activities for a mission of this nature. If a technology
development program were to fail, the results of this failure would be known for several
years before the launch of the mission. This implies that the mission would either be
cancelled, or designed around the particular technology development failure. Technology
development failures are very important, and indeed if one design requires more
technology development than another design, then the design with more technology
development will be considered more risky. However, while they are important, this type
of risk is usually captured separately from the technical risks of a mission. Therefore, the
risk model was run again, this time without the technology development risks, for both
the 24 month design lifetime and the 48 month extended lifetime. The results are shown
in Table 6-5.
Table 6-5: Risk model results using no technology development risks
Expected Number of
Lifetime Standard Deviation
Observations
Design lifetime (24 months) 126.0 84.6
Extended lifetime (48 months) 144.8 105.6
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Figure 6-6: CDF for risk model using no technology development risks and extended lifetime
Without technology development risks, the TPF-I mission can expect to complete
126 observations. This is 9.9, or 8.5%, more observations than with the technology
development risks included. Without technology development risks and with a 48 month
lifetime, the TPF-I mission can expect to complete 144.8 observations. This is 12.1, or
9%, more observations than the 48 month case with technology development risks
included. In addition, this is 28.7, or almost 25%, more observations than the case with
technology development risks included, and with only a 24 month lifetime. Additionally,
without technology development risks and with a 48 month lifetime, the number of
observations that can be completed with a degraded three-collector system is 146. This is
very near the mission requirement of 150 observations, and can be seen in the CDF
shown in Figure 6-6. A comparison of all the cases discussed above is shown in Table
6-6.
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Table 6-6: Summary and comparison of risk model cases
Expected Number of
Case Definition
Observations
24 month lifetime, all risk items 116.1
24 month lifetime, no technology development risks 126.0
48 month lifetime, all risk items 132.7
48 month lifetime, no technology development risks 144.8
24 month lifetime, no failures or risk items 224.0
6.4.2 Mitigation and Design Change Studies
While the results discussed above are certainly informative and interesting, the
absolute value of the expected number of observations for any case should be used
carefully. This mistrust of numerical output, as opposed to the relative value, should be
true for all risk models and analysis, since by definition the model and its inputs are
uncertain. In addition, the model is only capturing the risks that have been determined by
the design team. It is the relative difference between cases that is more interesting and
informative. Even if the model does not capture all risks, relative values of varying case
runs can determine the relative impact, and therefore importance, of those risks that are
captured.
To determine the relative importance of different risk items, mitigation and design
change studies were completed. These studies were carried out in a manner similar to
studies to determine the Birnbaum or Fussell-Vesely importance measures, as discussed
in Section 2.2. For each mitigation study, different groups of risk items were assumed to
be completely mitigated, and the impact on the overall expected productivity was
determined. To model a risk item being completely mitigated, the probability of
Case Study 2 - Risk Model and Analysis for TPF-I 205
occurrence was set to zero. When the risk model was run with the probability of
occurrence of a given group of risk items set to zero, the expected number of
observations increased with respect to the case where no risk items were mitigated. The
amount of this increase indicates the level of importance of that particular group of risk
items. The same concept was used in design change studies. Instead of mitigating a
group of risk items, one particular aspect of the design was changed. An example of a
design change would be to remove a level of redundancy. In this case, the number of
expected observations decreased from the expected number of observations for the case
without the design change. In the same manner as the mitigation studies, the difference
between the expected productivity, with and without the design change, indicates the
level of importance, in terms of risk, of that aspect of the design.
6.4.2.1 Probability Category Mitigation Study
The first mitigation study that was completed was a study comparing the
importance of all the risk items in each of the five probability categories. The results of
this study can be seen in Figure 6-7.
Medium and very low probability risk items have the highest impact on the total
expected productivity of this system. This is not unexpected. The majority of risk items
(54 out of 101) are very low probability. The second largest number of any one
probability category is medium probability risks (22 out of 101). While there is more
than double the number of very low probability risks than there are medium probability
risks, the medium probability risk items still have the highest impact on the overall
system expected productivity. This is because while there are a very large number of
very low probability risk items, each individual item has by definition a very low
probability of occurrence. The higher probability of occurrence for the medium
probability risk items leads to a larger impact when mitigated. While the very low
probability risk items have only a small impact individually, there are enough of these
risk items that mitigating all of them still has a very large impact on the overall system
productivity. Note that even though by definition they have the highest probability of
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occurrence, the small number of high (5 out of 101) and very high (1 out of 101)
probability risk items leads to a very small impact on the expected productivity of the
system if they are mitigated. In addition to the small number of risk items that fall into
these categories, those risk items that have high or very high probabilities of occurrence
are also all technology development risks. All technology development risks are
degraded state risks, and therefore have smaller impacts than the risks that lead to
complete failure.
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6.4.2.2 Risk List Category Mitigation Study
The second mitigation study compared the importance of the risk items in each of
the various risk list categories. The results from this study can be seen in Figure 6-8.
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Figure 6-8: Results of the risk list category mitigation study
The difference in the importance level of the three main risk list categories is
quite dramatic. Of the 101 risk items modeled, 50 are spacecraft level risks, 41 are
system level risks, and 10 are technology development risks.
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development failures have the lowest impact on the overall expected productivity of the
system by a large margin. This is not unexpected since there are many fewer risk items
that fall into this category compared to the other categories. In addition, all technology
development risks are degraded state risks, making the impact of this category less than
the impact of either category that contain complete failure risks.
Spacecraft level risks impact the overall expected performance of the TPF-I
mission much more than system level risks. In fact, removing the spacecraft level risks
from the system would increase the expected productivity by almost twice as much as
removing the system level risks. This is due in small part to the fact that there are more
spacecraft level risks modeled than there are system level risks. The difference in the
number of each type of risk item is relatively small however, at only 9 additional risk
items in the spacecraft category. The main difference between these two categories is
that most risks in the spacecraft level category are repeated on 5 different spacecraft. As
an example, any aerospace mission will require an ACS subsystem. TPF-I, however,
requires 5 separate ACS subsystems. A failure in any one of these subsystems affects the
mission productivity, and a single failure in any one of three of the ACS subsystems
would result in complete mission failure. This system of systems nature of the TPF-I
mission means that any relatively minor and normal risk that other aerospace systems
might face is multiplied in importance for this mission.
An additional mitigation study was carried out to determine the importance of
each of the subdivided risk list categories. The results are shown in Figure 6-9, where it
is seen that the individual spacecraft payload failures have the largest impact on overall
expected productivity. Each payload, on each spacecraft, requires a very large number of
precision moving parts. The failure of a single actuator on a single fast-steering mirror
could lead to mission failure. For these components there is no method of adding
redundancy, without adding an entirely redundant optical path. Reducing the number of
single point failures on each individual spacecraft payload would make a very large
difference in the expected productivity of the mission.
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Figure 6-9: Results of the detailed risk list category mitigation study
The individual spacecraft bus failures also have a relatively large impact on the
expected productivity for TPF-I. This result is more unexpected than the result of
payload failures having a large impact. Two of the major perceived risks for the TPF-I
mission are the number of single point failure moving optical elements, and the formation
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flight system. The results of the model show that the "every-day" engineering functions
are nearly as important, in terms of risk, as the optical elements, and are significantly
more important than the formation flight system. This is an especially important result
with the realization that the risk list was put together with a focus on unique failure
modes, mostly dealing with the instrument and formation flight system. This implies that
the importance of the bus failures, or engineering functions, may be even larger than
shown in Figure 6-9. The result that, in terms of risk, these engineering functions are
very important to TPF-I, is both a major and unexpected result.
Of system level failures, the only category that has a significant impact on the
overall expected productivity of the system is the pre-operational failures. Pre-
operational failures have a larger impact on expected productivity than failures that occur
throughout life, because if a pre-operational failure occurs the mission will produce zero
return. In contrast, a failure that can occur throughout life has a possibility of occurring
at the end of life, resulting in a relatively productive mission.
6.4.2.3 Design Change Study
A design change study was carried out to determine the effect of three different
design changes on the expected productivity of the mission. The current design includes
some redundancy for both the optical delay lines and the AFF antennas and transmitters.
Both of these layers of redundancy were removed to examine the impact. The current
design also calls for a mechanism to allow for variable phases in the beam combiner.
This mechanism allows for the possibility of having degraded three-collector systems, but
also introduces the risk of the mechanism failing in the degraded state mode. This
mechanism was also removed from the design to examine the impact on the overall
expected productivity. The results of this study are shown in Figure 6-10.
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Figure 6-10: Results of the design change study
Redundancy, both in the optical delay lines and the AFF system, does not lead to
a significant increase in the expected productivity of the overall system. It should be
noted that the AFF antennas and transmitters may have a more complicated redundancy
scheme than is modeled, leading to a larger impact on the expected productivity. The
variable phases mechanism does have a significant impact on the expected productivity
of the TPF-I mission. Including the ability to vary the phases of the beams leads to 10.2
more expected observations than if this ability were not included.
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6.4.2.4 Major Perceived Risk Areas
In addition to the individual studies discussed above, the importance of all areas
of the TPF-I design that are often perceived to be risky were compared, in terms of
expected productivity. The results of this study can be seen in Figure 6-11.
.2- I.-~ 1~50.2-00
: eno oO. 
0n 
= to
x
'-''- 2F . ..
,, o co *
Mitigated Category
50.0
40.0
30.0
21.2
20.0- 12.5
10.0
0.0 3 1.
0.0
a. Expected Number of Additional Observations
b. Expected Percentage of Additional Observations
Figure 6-11: Results of the major perceived risk items mitigation study
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Spacecraft level failures have the largest impact on the expected productivity. As
discussed above, this is due to the fact that many of these risks are multiplied by five
spacecraft. Comparatively, system level failures have almost half the impact of these
spacecraft level failures. A separate study, to examine in depth the most efficient way of
improving the reliability of each of the individual spacecraft, could lead to a very large
positive impact on the expected productivity of the TPF-I mission.
One of the concerns that is mentioned most often when discussing the risks
associated with TPF-I is all the small things that are required to work for the system to
work. This concern is modeled by mitigating all very low probability failures. As
mentioned above, there are many single point failures in this mission, including many
moving optical elements. While each of the failures in this category has a very low
probability of occurrence, the number of failures increases the impact on the system as a
whole.
Collision and evaporation are viewed by many managers as two of the most major
risks for TPF-I. In the current model, collision and evaporation are both medium
probability, complete failure risk items. In addition, many other failure modes lead to an
increase in the probability of collision and evaporation. Completely mitigating these two
failure modes still leads to an expected increase of only 1.3 observations, or 1.2%. While
these risk items are perceived by many to be some of the most major risks TPF-I faces, in
reality they have relatively little impact on the expected productivity of the mission.
TPF-I has an especially large number of deployments. Each of the five spacecraft
needs to deploy the sunshades, stray-light baffles, cryo-radiators, and solar arrays.
Additionally, the combining spacecraft needs to deploy the high-gain antenna, and each
collecting spacecraft needs to do a precision deployment of the secondary mirror. Most
of these deployments are also complete failure risks, and all occur prior to the beginning
of operations. Therefore, it is not surprising that the deployments for TPF-I have a
significant impact on the expected productivity.
The final thing to note about Figure 6-11 is the relative impact between the
engineering, science, and formation functions. The science functions have the largest
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impact. This is not surprising due to the complexity of the interferometer functions. The
engineering functions also have a relatively large impact on the expected productivity. In
fact, the engineering functions have more than half the impact of the science functions,
and are significantly more important than the formation functions. As discussed
previously, the result that, in terms of risk, these engineering functions are very important
to TPF-I, is both a major and unexpected result.
6.4.3 Sensitivity Studies
As discussed above, the output of any risk model will by definition be uncertain.
Probability values are based on engineering judgment alone and can very rarely be
verified. While the impact of some failures can be modeled with significant certainty,
such as the productivity of a system with one fewer spacecraft, the impact of other
degraded state failures is very uncertain. This is especially true if the impact of the
failure results in the change of a system level parameter, such as observational efficiency
or the failure rate of a different failure mode. Therefore, sensitivity studies were carried
out to determine the sensitivity of the expected productivity modeling results presented
above to the specific probability values assigned to each probability bin, as well as to the
level of impact of failures on system parameters.
The first sensitivity study was conducted to determine the sensitivity of the
expected number of observations to the specific values assigned to each probability
category. Each probability value was adjusted by 10% individually. Additionally, all
probability values at once were adjusted by +-10%. The results are shown in Figure 6-12.
Case Study 2 - Risk Model and Analysis for TPF-I 215
Sensitivity to Probability Values
.s -
G) 0
m:i)cn
c .c c
Cll E 0
-=::J;:l
OZCll
~"C ~
ss3:c u .0
G) G) 0~ e-
~W
10.0%
8.0% -
6.0%
4.0%
2.0% -
0.0%
-2.0%
-4.0%
-6.0%
-8.0%
-10.0%
-+-AII
-Very High
-High
-Medium
-Low
-Very Low
-10% 0%
Change in Probability Value
a. All results
+10%
3.0%
Sensitivity to Probability Values
.s -G) 0
Cl:i)cn
c .0 C
~ E.2
o::J-
G) Z ~
Cl "C G)
SScncu.o
G)G)Ou Q,~ ><lw
2.0%
1.0%
0.0% -
-1.0% -~- --~-
-2.0%
-3.0%
-Very High
-High
-Medium
-Low
-Very Low
-10% 0%
Change in Probability Value
+10%
b. Results of individual probability bins only
Figure 6-12: Results of probability value sensitivity study
Even in the most extreme case, when all probability values were adjusted by
:l:10% at the same time, the resulting expected number of observations still varied by less
than 6%. If a single probability value is incorrect, the effect was even more minimal.
The expected productivity results were most sensitive to the probability value assigned to
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the medium probability risk items. Even in this most sensitive case however, the change
in the expected observations, for a 10% change in the probability value, was only
approximately 2%.
The second sensitivity study examined the sensitivity of the expected productivity
results to the uncertain degraded state productivities. In several cases a degraded state
productivity was calculated by adjusting one or more system parameters. These system
parameters included observational efficiency, probability of collision and evaporation,
lifetime, integration time, minimum baseline length, and maximum baseline length. The
most common parameters affected by other failure modes were observational efficiency
and the probability of collision and evaporation. The factor by which each parameter is
impacted varies from failure mode to failure mode. The most common impact of failures
is to alter system parameters by a factor of either two or five. Therefore, this study
examined the sensitivity of the expected productivity results when all factors affecting the
probability of collision and evaporation were set to five, when all factors affecting the
observational efficiency were set to two, and when all factors affecting any of the system
parameters were set to two. The results are shown in Table 6-7.
Table 6-7: Results of impact sensitivity study
Expected Number of % Difference from
Observations Baseline Case
All impacts affecting
Collision and Evaporation 116.1 -0.02%
changed to x5
All impacts affecting
Observational Efficiency 116.5 0.34%
changed to /2
All impacts changed to x2 117.0 0.76%
or /2
Alterations to the factors applied to system parameters used to adjust the
productivity in degraded states made very little difference on the total expected
productivity. Changes to the factors affecting a single system parameter affected the
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results of the risk model by less than 0.5%. Even when the factors affecting all system
parameters were adjusted, the result still varied from the baseline case by less than 1%.
This insensitivity to the specific factors applied to system parameters to adjust the
productivity of degraded states removes a large amount of uncertainty in the results of the
TPF-I risk model.
6.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
The main conclusion to the TPF-I risk model and analysis is that the TPF-I
mission is not as risky as originally perceived. In all cases examined, over 100
observations can be expected to be completed. In addition, when using the slightly less
conservative, although still realistic inputs of an extended 48 month mission lifetime and
no technology development failures, the expected number of observations is 144.8. This
is very close to meeting the mission requirement of 150 observations, which is set
without any consideration of risk or failures. It has also been shown that while these
numbers should still be used carefully in an absolute sense, the outputs of the model are
not sensitive to the two most uncertain inputs - the probability values used and the
unknown productivity of certain degraded states.
The mitigation and design change study results led to several recommendations of
future directions for the TPF-I mission. First, a detailed study should be conducted to
determine the best way to improve the reliability of the individual spacecraft. This study
should examine the best places to add redundancy, or to increase testing, to ensure a
lower probability of failure of the individual spacecraft. It is very important to keep in
mind that any study of this nature should not ignore the "every-day" engineering
functions of the spacecraft, as these may have a very large impact on the overall expected
productivity of the TPF-I system as a whole. The best course of action for TPF-I as a
project may be to improve the reliability of components and functions that are not unique
to TPF-I, but are used on many aerospace missions.
Design improvements that would have a large impact on the expected
productivity of the TPF-I system include decreasing the number of required deployments,
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and ensuring that the ability to include variable phases remains in the design. Each of
these design improvements would result in a direct increase of over 10 expected
observations.
Finally, all risk items categorized as medium probability should be examined in
detail. These risk items should be examined to ensure that they truly are medium
probability, and to determine if there is anything that can be done to reduce this
probability. Not only do these risks have a large impact on the overall expected
productivity of the system, but they will also be easier to improve, in terms of probability
of occurrence, than a risk item that currently has a low or very low probability.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Thesis Summary
Risk is clearly viewed as an important design parameter throughout the aerospace
industry. However, risk is not used to the extent it could be when making design
decisions. This is especially true for design decisions made in the early conceptual
design phases.
The risk analysis and modeling approaches that are currently used in the
aerospace industry date back to their heritage with human spaceflight and the nuclear
industry. This heritage has led to all aerospace systems being treated as safety-critical
systems from a risk perspective. If a system is safety-critical, then any critical failure has
the same consequence - loss of human life. This consequence is so large that the
consequence of any non-critical failure can be considered negligible. In non-safety
critical systems however, the consequence of failures may vary drastically. This is due
both to the consideration of non-critical failures, such as degraded state failures, and to
the factor of when a critical failure occurs. If a critical failure occurs early in the lifetime
of a mission, the impact on the scientific return of the mission will be much greater than
if the same failure had occurred towards the end of the lifetime of the mission. This
difference between the impacts of failures depending on when the failure occurs is
ignored using current aerospace industry risk assessment techniques.
The definition of risk is the combination of the probability of a negative event
occurring and the impact of that event. Therefore, the current risk assessment techniques
used in the aerospace industry are actually reliability analyses, and not risk analyses,
since the previously discussed varying impacts are not considered for non-safety critical
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systems. To complete an accurate risk assessment, it is important to bring together the
fields of system performance and reliability, to accurately model the expected value of
the total system productivity, accounting for the possibility of failures throughout time.
This type of analysis is called expected productivity analysis.
Examples of the productivity metric of missions include the number of star
systems observed, the number of rocks sampled, or the distance traversed. While the
metric will vary between missions, it will always represent the return, or productivity, of
the mission. Therefore, the expected value of the productivity metric will always be a
parameter that is well understood by the designers and engineers on a team. Expected
productivity analysis is a good risk assessment technique because it is quantitative, and
calculated at the same maturity level as productivity modeling. When expressed
quantitatively, risk can be incorporated as a factor in design decisions and trade space
analyses. Additionally, since expected productivity can be calculated at any fidelity level
that the mission productivity model is calculated at, it can be used at any point in the
design life-cycle. Expected productivity analysis also has the capability to model and
take into account the productivity of potentially important degraded states. Most
importantly, expected productivity analysis captures the varying impacts associated with
when a failure occurs.
An example was given in Chapter 2 to illustrate the importance of the varying
impact of failures based on timing. In this example a very simple system was analyzed
using two risk analysis techniques - one that uses probability of failure as the risk metric,
and the other that uses expected productivity as the risk metric. Two failure modes were
modeled. The first failure mode involved a deployment failure, which would occur at a
single point in time prior to operations. The second failure mode involved the failure of a
moving component, and it was assumed that this failure could occur at any point
throughout the lifetime of the mission. The two analysis approaches were used to
determine the more important risk, between the deployment failure and the failure of the
moving component. It was shown that the two approaches often provided opposite
answers. This example showed that risk analysis techniques that use the probability of
failure by the end of the mission lifetime as the risk metric may not correctly identify the
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most important risk items, in terms of both probability and impact, and could therefore
lead to improper risk mitigation investment decisions.
While an expected productivity analysis is relatively simple to complete if the
productivity of the system depends only on the functional state of the system, the
required calculations become much more complex if the productivity of the system is
path-dependant. An example of a system with a path-dependant productivity function is
an observatory. The time required to observe a given star system may depend not only
on the functional state of the observatory, but also on the stellar characteristics, such as
luminosity and distance. The same path-dependant productivity situation is true for
nearly all space missions. The time required for a rover to traverse a given distance will
depend on the characteristics of the terrain, and the time required to send a transmission
will depend on the size and complexity of the data. For systems with path-dependant
productivity functions, the productivity in each state depends on which action in a list of
actions the system is executing at that time, which, in turn, depends on the amount of
time the previous actions took, and therefore depends on the previous states of the
system. The system itself is still a Markov system, since the current state of the system
depends only on the previous state. The productivity however, is now time and path-
dependent, making the calculation of the expected productivity much more complicated.
While Monte Carlo simulations can capture this effect, these simulations take a long time
to run and are very inefficient, especially when utilizing complicated performance
functions. This inefficiency is particularly harmful when broad architecture trade-spaces
are being explored, and the number of systems to be analyzed is very large. A more time
and effort saving approach to modeling the overall expected productivity of systems with
path-dependent productivities could improve both the accuracy and efficiency of these
modeling efforts.
An approach has been developed to model the expected productivity of systems
with path-dependant productivities in a more efficient and effort saving manner than a
Monte Carlo simulation. The approach is called Expected Productivity Risk Analysis
(EPRA). The basic principle behind the EPRA approach is to find the expected path, and
then find the expected productivity given the expected path. Initial conditions are set by
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failure modes that occur prior to the beginning of operations. The probability of being in
each state throughout time is then found using Markov modeling, and the number of time
steps required to complete each object is determined using a productivity model. An
object is defined as a single unit of the performance metric, such as an image or a
measurement. Next, the expected number of time steps to complete each object is found.
Based on these expected times to complete each object, the probability of being in any
functioning state at the end of each number of objects is calculated. Finally, the
probability of completing exactly each number of objects, and therefore the expected
number of objects completed, the standard deviation, and the Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) are calculated.
The EPRA approach has been tested against a Monte Carlo simulation with
excellent results in terms of both accuracy and speed. When tested using 35 various
scenarios, the EPRA approach produced results that varied from the Monte Carlo results
by an average of less than a quarter of one percent, while completing the calculations up
to almost 275 times faster. In addition to matching in terms of the overall expected
productivity results, the EPRA approach results also matched the Monte Carlo results in
terms of the CDF for the productivity, as shown in Figure 7-1.
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Figure 7-1: CDFs for two different tested scenarios. The solid green lines show the new EPRA path-
dependant simulation results while the red lines show the Monte Carlo results (dashed lines
represent the 95% confidence interval)
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Examples presented in this thesis have shown expected productivity both can, and
has impacted a design, through two case studies using a real mission, Terrestrial Planet
Finder Interferometer (TPF-I). TPF-I is an interferometer mission, consisting of multiple
individual spacecraft flown in formation. The first case study discussed in this thesis
identified and analyzed the major degraded states for various TPF-I architectures. For
this study, spacecraft level failures only were considered. The various candidate
architectures for TPF-I were compared in terms of the performance of the remaining
system, given a failure of an individual spacecraft. The ability to perform in the event of
a major failure is known as graceful degradation. This study examined both the ability of
each of the architectures to degrade gracefully, as well as possible design changes to
achieve more graceful degradation.
The graceful degradation case-study had two major results. First, a design
decision to switch the type of beam combiner instrument used on TPF-I was
recommended based on the results of this study. The study showed that, without the
ability to vary the phases of the beams from the collectors, no architectures could support
any interferometric capabilities after the loss of a single spacecraft,. With the ability to
vary beam phases however, multiple architectures, including the front-running X-array
and Linear DCB, could have productive degraded states without certain spacecraft in the
array. While the beam combiner design that was being pursued does not support variable
phases, a previously considered beam combiner design could support this capability.
Therefore, a recommendation was made by the instrument design team lead to switch the
design of the beam combiner instrument, to include this ability to vary the phases of the
incoming beams and allow for graceful degradation. Because this study was completed
at such an early point in the design process this decision to switch designs, to a design
that is inherently more robust to failures, was possible.
The second major result from the graceful degradation case-study was an input to,
and effect on, the architecture trade study and down-select for TPF-I. The various
candidate architectures for TPF-I were judged based on 27 different parameters,
including the ability to degrade gracefully. Each parameter was given an importance
weighting, with the sum of all weightings equaling 100. This led to a average weight of
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3.7 per parameter. Graceful degradation was given an above average weighting of 4.3.
This led to the graceful degradation parameter having a significant impact on the
outcome of the architecture trade-study. As an example, the point difference between the
Linear DCB and the Diamond architectures was 20 points, while the total point difference
between these two architectures was only 31 points. By introducing risk analysis at an
early phase in the design, through expected productivity, it was possible to make risk a
direct factor in a major architecture decision.
The other major case-study discussed in this thesis identified and analyzed the
major risks to the front-running TPF-I architecture, the Linear DCB architecture. Design
team members and experts were interviewed to identify the risks associated with the
mission. This led to a risk list with 101 risk items. These risk items were then modeled,
using the new EPRA approach. The TPF-I star-count model, that was developed by the
TPF-I team for performance trades, was used as the productivity model. The results of
this modeling effort showed that TPF-I can expect to complete 116 observations in the
detection phase of the mission. In addition to the expected number of observations, a
CDF was produced to show engineers and designers the probability of completing greater
than any given number of observations. The CDF for the nominal TPF-I design is shown
in Figure 7-2.
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Figure 7-2: CDF results ofTPF-I risk model
To determine which risk items have the largest impact on the overall system risk,
mitigation and design change studies were completed. In these studies, the risk model
was run with categories of risk items mitigated, modeled by setting the probability of
occurrence to zero. The effect of the risk items was then determined by comparing the
expected number of observations with and without the mitigations. An example of the
results of these mitigation studies is shown in Figure 7-3. Results of the mitigation and
design change studies led to several recommendations for future work regarding risk
mitigation for TPF-1. These included a detailed study to examine how best to improve
the reliability of the individual spacecraft in the array, reducing the number of
deployments required, and examining in detail mitigation options for all of the risk items
categorized as medium probability.
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Figure 7-3: Example of mitigation study results for TPF-I risk model
The work presented in this thesis has suggested that the expected value of the
performance metric of the system, defined as the expected productivity, is a very valuable
metric to represent the technical risk level of a mission. It has been shown that using the
probability of failure by the end of lifetime as a risk metric does not appropriately capture
both aspects of risk for non-safety critical systems, since the varying impacts of failures
at different points in time throughout the mission is not accounted for. The work
presented in this thesis has presented expected productivity analysis as a new risk
analysis technique. This technique has been implemented on a JPL pre-formulation flight
mission, TPF-I, and has had an impact on design and architecture decisions. By using
this new technique for risk analysis, that can be implemented in the pre-formulation
phases of a mission and can truly capture all aspects of risk, it will be possible to use risk
analysis results to impact design decisions at an early phase of the design process. This
will reduce the cost of risk-mitigating decisions, and will make future missions both
lower risk and less expensive.
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7.2 Contributions
This thesis has developed a new approach for risk analysis using expected
productivity. A new modeling approach for determining the expected productivity of
systems with path-dependant productivities was developed and tested. Finally, the
approach of using expected productivity as a risk analysis methodology was
demonstrated using two case-studies from a JPL mission, TPF-I. The specific
contributions of this research are as follows:
1. Introduced the concept of using expected productivity as a complete risk
analysis technique for non safety-critical systems. Expected productivity
analysis models all components of the risks to a mission, including both the
likelihood and impact, in a quantitative way that can be applied at any stage in
the design process.
1.1. Developed the rationale for why to use expected productivity as a
risk metric. This rationale was developed by first showing why
current, probability of failure based, techniques do not capture risk in
an appropriate way for non-safety critical missions. The rationale
for why expected productivity covers the holes of probability of
failure based techniques, and therefore makes a more appropriate
risk metric for non-safety critical systems, was then developed.
1.2. Developed a new importance measure for use with expected
productivity analysis. This new importance measure was then
compared to existing risk importance measures, using a simplified
example.
2. Developed a new modeling approach, EPRA, which estimates the expected
productivity of systems with path-dependant productivities. The EPRA
approach can be applied to a large number of aerospace systems that have
path-dependant productivities, including but not limited to, observatories or
rovers.
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2.1. Documented the mathematical approach in a step-by-step manner.
This should allow for simpler implementation on new missions or
projects.
2.2. Tested the new EPRA approach against the only existing approach,
Monte Carlo simulations. The EPRA approach results had very
good accuracy, with much shorter calculation times, when compared
to the Monte Carlo simulations.
3. Provided examples of how risk analysis in conceptual design can be used to
affect design decisions early in the design process, using a JPL pre-
formulation phase flight mission, TPF-I.
3.1. Initiated a suggested design change to the TPF-I mission. The work
presented in this thesis led the instrument design team lead for the
TPF-I mission to suggest a design change. This design change will
significantly reduce the risk to the TPF-I mission, while not
significantly increasing the cost of the mission, since the change will
be made at such an early point in the design cycle.
3.2. Completed the TPF-I graceful degradation case-study. Rules for
operating in a degraded state were developed, and used to determine
the productivity in degraded states for all candidate architectures.
Design changes that would improve the graceful degradation
capabilities of each of the architectures were also identified. Finally,
input was provided to the architecture down-select and trade study,
on the level of graceful degradation of each of the candidate
architectures, in terms of both productivity in the degraded states and
likelihood of reaching a degraded state. This led to risk being used
as a direct factor in a major architecture decision for TPF-I.
3.3. Completed a risk list, model, and analysis for the TPF-I design team.
Gathered a list of major risks to the TPF-I mission through expert
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interviews. Modeled the risk items using the EPRA modeling
approach. Provided analysis results, including nominal results,
mitigation study results, and design change study results, to the TPF-
I design team. Made several recommendations for risk mitigation to
the team, based on the study results. Specific recommendations
include completing a follow-on study to examine how best to
improve the reliability of individual spacecraft, and examining in
depth all risk items labeled with a medium probability of occurrence.
7.3 Recommendations for Future Work
While the work presented in this thesis takes a large stride towards improving risk
analysis techniques for use with missions in the early design phases, there are certainly
many related areas of exploration that should be studied in the future. Specific areas
recommended for future study include:
Develop a more efficient software tool to implement the EPRA approach.
o The current implementation of the EPRA approach can take
anywhere from several minutes to several hours to complete a
single analysis, depending on the complexity of the productivity
model used. While this is certainly much more efficient than
running a Monte Carlo simulation, it can still be hampering to run
for very large trade space analyses. Therefore, developing a
software tool that can implement the mathematical approach
presented in this thesis in a more efficient manner would be very
useful.
o Determine a more appropriate software environment, and
implement the EPRA approach in that environment. The work
presented in this thesis was implemented using Matlab. While this
software environment worked for the case-studies presented in this
230 Conclusions
thesis, it is limited in its memory availability, and can
accommodate limited sizes of matrices. Determining a software
environment that could accommodate the memory and matrix sizes
required to complete studies larger than those presented in this
thesis, and implementing EPRA in that environment, could be very
useful in the future.
Additional case studies to show how expected productivity can be used as
a risk analysis tool.
o In order to be proven as a risk analysis methodology that will work
on all classes of missions, expected productivity analysis needs to
be implemented on case-studies that do not involve observatory
missions. Examples include completing an expected productivity
analysis of a Mars rover or orbiter, or a Lunar rover or orbiter.
o One of the main recommendations resulting from the risk analysis
for TPF-I is to complete an additional risk analysis study on the
individual spacecraft in the TPF-I array. This study should include
all science and engineering functions on the individual spacecraft.
o There are many areas where redundancy could be built into the
TPF-I design. These include redundant components, such as
sensors, a fully redundant optical train, or a fully redundant
spacecraft. A study to determine where the best areas to add
redundancy to the TPF-I system, in terms of expected productivity,
could be very useful.
o One of the main considerations for risk mitigation for the TPF-I
mission is to fly a spare spacecraft. However, all of the
architectures under consideration have multiple types of spacecraft
in the array. A study to determine which type of spacecraft has the
largest impact if flown as a spare, in addition to whether or not it is
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worth designing a spare spacecraft that could work as a spare for
multiple types of spacecraft, could be very helpful to the TPF-I
mission.
* Determine the most appropriate way to integrate existing reliability-based
tools into the expected productivity analysis methodology. Reliability-
based tools and methodologies have sophisticated capabilities to identify
risks, as well as to calculate probabilities of occurrence throughout the
lifetime of the mission. Examples include quantitative fault tree and
phased mission system analysis tools. Combining one or more of these
reliability-based tools with the expected productivity analysis
methodology presented in this thesis could lead to a very powerful risk
assessment tool suite.
* Apply various probability distributions to the EPRA approach. The work
presented in this thesis assumed an exponential failure rate for all failures
that could occur throughout the lifetime of the mission. It would be
interesting to study the effect of other failure rate distributions, including
Bathtub curves and Weibull distributions, on expected productivity
analysis results.
* Develop a methodology for analytically calculating the uncertainty bands
on EPRA results, to determine confidence intervals and sensitivity
analyses. This would require a new methodology for analytically
propagating uncertainty through very complex and large models.
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Appendix A
Full TPF-I Risk List
The process of identifying risk items for the TPF-I mission was discussed in
Chapter 6. As mentioned in Chapter 6, once completed, the risk list was organized in to a
tree-like structure. It is important to note that the tree-structure and categories are for
organizational purposes only. They are used to help organize the list of risk items and to
clarify the risk list when showing design team members and managers. The categories
and tree-structure do not affect the results of the risk model, in terms of the expected
number of observations completed.
The full TPF-I risk is shown in Table A-1. Note that in Table A-1, Oe is the
observational efficiency, Pcoll is the probability of collision, Pevap is the probability of
evaporation, MaxBase and MinBase are the maximum and minimum baseline lengths
allowed respectively, IntTime is the integration time, Pthlk_es is the probability of a
thermal leak due to excess sources on the cold side, Life is the lifetime of the mission,
Pnotime is the probability of not having enough time between disturbances to complete
an observation, Pvibe is the probability of vibrations due to self-induced disturbances, spc
stands for spacecraft, comb stands for combiner, and coll stands for collector.
The tree-structure organization for the risk list is shown in Figures A-i through
A-14. In Figures A-i through A-14, the boxes are color-coded according to probability.
Additionally, a solid border means the failure mode is critical, no border means a
degraded state failure mode, and a dashed border implies the failure mode could be either
degraded state or critical. A detailed discussion of the individual risks to the TPF-I
mission, organized into the categories shown in Figures A-i through A-14, is given in
Chapter 6.
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